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POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT

GEORGE BLUMENTHAL FOUNDATION

1907

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LECTURES

POLITICAL PROBLEMS
OF
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT

BY

ALBERT SHAW, LL.D.



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PREFACE

THE present volume is made up of a series of lectures delivered as the opening course upon the new Blumenthal Foundation in Columbia University. The lectures are printed as they were delivered, with no material changes. It would seem desirable to say in this prefatory note that, quite regardless of the titles assigned to the separate lectures (which here appear as chapters), the work is to be taken as a single essay or dissertation. We are only at the beginning of the history of a great blended family of white men of European stock who have made their homes in what was so recently the wilderness of North America, and who are working out for themselves a life of varied human relationships in their effort toward the realization of certain ideals and standards.

Thus far the history that they have made has been that of an initial period of development, and of adaptation to the conditions presented by a new country. This volume deals with the political phases of that initial period of development. It attempts to give some analysis of the nature of politics in American life, and of the problems of a larger sort which have presented themselves for solution through political means. The theme of the book is the struggle of the American people to realize national unity upon the basis of a homogeneous and well-conditioned democracy.

Although the several chapters discuss different phases or problems of American political life, the attempt has

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been not to present particular problems in a technical or unrelated fashion, but rather to refer the problem in every case to its origin in the struggle for the achievement of a great nationality, and to show how the problem relates itself to the continuous evolution of our free, democratic society. It is in this spirit that the reader will find some discussion of the passing problems of sectionalism and unity; of immigration, race, and citizenship; of domain and the public guardianship of natural resources; of parties and participation in the business of government; of economic policies such as those relating to railroads, money, and the tariff; and, finally, the questions that have arisen in the nation's dealing with other governments and peoples.

Some readers may find in the book a measure of hopeful confidence in the character and the future of American democracy that current facts might seem to them not to warrant. It remains, therefore, only to be said that the views expressed are mature and deliberate, whether dealing with race problems, with economic conditions, or with the principles and methods of our practical democratic life.

ALBERT SHAW.

New York, 1907.

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POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT

I

THE NATURE AND MEANING OF POLITICS IN AMERICAN LIFE; —NATIONAL UNITY AS THE TRANSCENDENT PROBLEM

It is obvious that there are two standpoints from which to make a survey of the political life and problems of a nation. The first is that afforded by the formal structure and organization of government. It brings into focus the official methods through which the political interests of the people find expression. This mode of approach may be said in a general way to seek answers to the question, How we are governed; or, more precisely, the question, How we order those phases of our associated life which in the broad sense of the word we term political.

The other standpoint is a very different one, although it affords an examination of many of the same facts and conditions. This second attitude is that of practical politics in its scope, its motives, its more definite objects, and its relationships to various social and economic groups, and to human activities in general. If the one method deals primarily with the legal and constitutional aspects of governmental or political life, the other method deals by

preference with the functions of government, with the content of the political life, with the interests and activities which constitute our political society.

Doubtless it is in keeping with the more usual order of presentation to begin with the legal structure and mechanism of government, and to proceed afterward to a discussion of the functions and business, the work and conditions, of the political life. But I am to deal with the concrete problems that confront us in our associated life as members of the body politic, rather than with government in the forms through which it exercises its power.

Some of these questions lie at the root of the differences that give a certain permanence to the dividing lines between great parties. There are other questions, belonging just as truly and importantly to the political life, that do not of necessity present themselves in such a way as to coincide with the lines of party cleavage. I shall, indeed, bring forward a number of topics and questions of current politics. But it will be in accordance with my purpose to treat of them as illustrating the character and course of our political life and progress in general, rather than to present them as detached questions for detailed and unrelated treatment. Thus if I speak in subsequent pages of the tariff or the currency, the race problem or the public control of railroads, I shall deal with those matters in their broader phases as relating to the political development of the people of the United States.

So vast, indeed, are the considerations which react upon the political life in our times, that unless one chooses for his theme some specialized topic, he might almost feel himself launched upon a shoreless sea of more or less controverted ideas, without chart or compass. Let me say then

at the outset that it is directly across this vast and somewhat turbulent sea that I propose to sail, and I hope it may be possible to keep a fairly consistent course.

It is not only stimulating, but, I think, highly valuable, for the student and the man or woman of reflective mind to read now and then some great book dealing with the theory or the history and policy of states. Aristotle and Plato will not, indeed, tell us how to proceed in precise practical situations, but we should doubtless go forward more wisely with our practical solutions of current problems if our politicians and our journalists would but give themselves that broadening of mind which the philosophical study of politics would help to bring about. It is really necessary to drink, sometimes, at the old fountains. What the state means, or what it is for, is by no means a settled question. It always recurs. In some sense it may be said to constitute at once the deepest and the most practical of all our current political questions. I shall not venture far into the metaphysics of the state. Yet, in order to proceed with firmness and conviction to the treatment of the concrete questions of the day, it is almost indispensable to have given some thought — each intelligent citizen for himself — to the question what the state, the government, the political life, really mean and stand for in our accepted scheme of modern civilization.

Some thinkers and students, from the very nature and constitution of their minds, are impelled to find their answer to these questions by the use of abstract thinking, by philosophy and by logic. Other students and thinkers advance by preference upon historical lines. They study the political history and development of mankind at large, and of racial or geographical divisions considered separately.

However one proceeds, and whatever theoretical convictions he may derive from his intellectual processes, he arrives at the established fact that he must deal for better or for worse with a controlling organization of human society known as the state.

If it suit the quality of his mind to think in generalities, as Rousseau and his French contemporaries thought, or as our own great doctrinaire Jefferson found it natural to think (in such terms and phrases as one finds in the Declaration of Independence), I can see no serious objection. It is quite permissible to arrive by that sort of mental process at one's general conception of the meaning and place of the state, or of political government, in relation to society.

Or, if one choose to follow the evolutionary thinking of a Bagehot, as expressed in his book called "Physics and Politics," or to adopt the historico-political notions of writers like Sir Henry Maine or Edward A. Freeman, these surely are salutary processes. However accurate such writers may be in their finding in the modern state an aggregation (and an evolution of the continuous life) of ancient village communities, — their mode of study stimulates the imagination. They help the student to arrive at his own mature conception of the modern state and its sovereignty, especially in its relation to its federated parts and to its subdivisions, down to the primary local units.

A somewhat different mode of general approach is to be found in the classifications of the sociologist, who studies mankind in all stages of development and forms of relationship, and defines the position and the meaning of political life in the complex organic structure of society. It is to be remembered, further, that most of our abstract ideas

and the greater part of our body of accepted conviction have come to us down the highway of Christian theology. That deep sense of personal right and personal responsibility that forms the practical side of the abstract doctrine of individualism has grown up through religious association and tradition. Thus it is quite possible to argue that the elements of modern political society might better be understood from a study of the history of theology and of the church than from a study of the history of Aryan villages and Saxon townships.

Whatever lines of thinking and of inquiry we may follow, however, we arrive in this early part of the twentieth century at a point where we find, as a central edifice, a complicated human structure that we call political. And we find a great mass of ideas, convictions, prejudices, interests, and forces actively at work in this political edifice, with the more or less conscious and definite purpose of obtaining results that will make human life happier and better. In political philosophy, the accepted doctrines that dominate all things are those, first, of individual liberty, and, second, of equality of rights and opportunities. Under these doctrines as applied in political life and action, the practical question always is, How to secure for the greatest number of people the greatest amount of freedom, in ways that do not violate the prevailing ideals.

By every mode of approach, whether philosophical, theological, or historical, one arrives at the notions of political power and energy. It does not matter for our purposes whence this power is derived. Call it, if you will, a surrender by the individual of a part of his theoretical liberty, for the sake of a compensating sort of benefit he may derive from the negative and positive work of organized society.

Or consider, if it seem a better theory, that political power begins with an original status of absolutism, from which individual freedom is derived by reluctant grants and gradual extensions. All the conflicting doctrines have their phase of truth. And this may be asserted as regards the practical political life, quite as truly as in respect of the theoretical approach to political doctrine.

For we are made aware, in a hundred ways, of the absolutism of the political power that is now over us. Yet we are equally conscious of an exercise of individual freedom, by virtue of which we voluntarily submit to new exercises of political authority in restraint of our actions. And again, we impose our free will, so as to cause the state to lift its restraining hand and give us back a former liberty to move in other directions. The fact is that we find the state a great "going concern." It rests upon innumerable compromises, ever in process of readjustment. We shape it in so far as we can to an exercise of power in accordance with our opinions and supposed interests. On the other hand, its great balance wheels revolve with such momentum and with such dynamic energy behind them as to equalize the minor factors of disturbance. It is thus that the state adds the valuable elements of time, method, and steadiness to the inevitable process of change.

In the present-day political structure the foremost fact is the state, as represented by the central, or national, government. In the political life, as distinguished from the structure, on the other hand, the foremost fact is the citizen himself. The state is occupied with the great questions and policies that concern its external affairs; that is to say, its relationship with other states. It is further concerned with the ways and means of its own mainte-

nance, and with the problems and policies imposed upon it by the conditions of the country over which its sovereignty extends. There are great problems that relate to the condition and progress of the population as such. There are others which have to do with the conserving and development of the existing national domain or with the extension of the country's territory. There are questions having to do with the intensifying of the functions and activities of the state by reason of the growth of population, the shifting of population groups and centers, the growth of commerce and communication, and the general progress in arts of civilized life.

It is the accepted axiom that the government must be conducted in accordance with principles of justice. And changing social conditions require almost constant changes in the policy and method of government, in order that justice may in reality prevail among men in those matters where the authority of government must intervene. Again, as human society grows more complex, the instrumentalities of government must become more specialized and precise; so that modern government is concerned with the perfecting of its own working machinery, as one of its greatest tasks.

Furthermore, government has always to concern itself with the delegation or distribution of governing power. Modern statecraft has found everywhere that the effectiveness of political life requires either a system of federated subdivisions like our states, or else a series of departments or provinces like those of continental Europe; while for purposes still more local in their political and administrative character there must be further subdivisions, corresponding to counties, to townships or communes or parishes,

and finally to municipal and village organizations for the regulation of the affairs of those living close together in organic communities. The adjustments of power and the distribution of administrative work throughout these territorial and political subdivisions require constant attention, and involve frequent change through the creation of new conditions or else through mistaken experiments.

The work of the state in relation to the non-political groupings or activities of its citizens must vary from time to time in accordance with the changing importance or intensity of such activities. In one country or in one period, the state may seem to occupy itself above all things with a question like the relationship of the political society to the freedom or the forms of religious worship; or to the conflicting claims of state and church as regards the control of elementary education. Such questions we find just now deeply occupying the political life and thought of England, France, Italy, Spain, and other countries. Other states find themselves perplexed with problems growing out of a lack of tribal or racial unity throughout their domains; and their very existence is staked upon the success of a public policy and a statesmanship intended to modify the clashings of diverse population elements.

Differences of language or of religion or of historic background are accountable for many of those frictions that play so large a part in the higher politics of modern states. Illustrations will readily occur of themselves. Thus the question of the government of Ireland has been among the first, if not the very first, of those that have perplexed British statesmen for many generations. The bond of language is one that unites bodies of people in such firm groupings that it is obviously advantageous when such bodies, of

kindred blood and common tongue, coincide with the higher political organization and domain. Where the state includes several or many elements, of diverse languages and dissimilar ethnic traits, the work of the higher government becomes very difficult, and those innumerable concessions and compromises that belong to the state as a "going concern" are in constant process of disturbance, discussion, and readjustment. The dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary furnishes a perpetual example of difficulties of this sort, where the present task of statesmanship is to hold the discordant parts together by the maintenance of unity in a few things at the expense of a harmful diversity in many other things.

Still other states — most of the older ones, in fact — have to concern themselves with those changes of political and social structure that are demanded in order to give outward expression to the modern democratic ideals. This, practically, is what politics has meant in several countries for a century or more. In England, as throughout Europe at large, it has for a long time been one of the principal tasks forced upon government to broaden the political fabric at its base. The new diffusion of education and the gradual breaking down of social caste and economic serfdom have made it necessary to admit more and more people to full political franchise. In Russia the process is at some such stage now as it had reached in the days of King John in England, while in England itself the process must go on until the hereditary House of Lords disappears from the constitutional organization, and the church and land systems are reformed to meet democratic standards.

In some countries, the business of the higher statesman-

ship is in our times concerned above all else with the regulation and promotion of the activities of the citizens in their economic relationships. Even where the struggle for full democratic expression, or for the complete sweeping away of surviving feudal privileges, is an ever present and dominant fact in the political life, — as in Germany, for example, — the state may be found alert and modern in its recognition of the progress of the economic life of the people, and may attach the utmost seriousness to the functions of economic oversight and promotion. There are some countries where the democratic ideals have been so fully realized, in the development of an equally advantaged citizenship, that government not only seems to exist chiefly for the furthering of the economic interests and well-being of the people, but shows a tendency to absorb certain business functions, and to move in the direction of so-called socialistic undertakings.

Examples of such a tendency are afforded by Switzerland, New Zealand, and Australia. Experience shows that the seeming existence of a tendency of this sort does not necessarily signify the approach of far-reaching or essential changes in the business of government. Conservatism is always at hand to apply the brake when radicalism moves too fast. I think it well to linger for a moment or two upon this reflection, since — in the course of the chapters that are to follow — I shall of necessity make allusion to a great many different topics of concrete political activity. I would, then, suggest that we should be very slow to arrive at the conclusion that a multiplication of the specialized and detailed activities of government indicates a profound change in the nature or relative significance of the state.

The old balance between the power of the state and the

free range of individual action is not shifting in any very perceptible manner. There is the constant "give and take," as experience points the way. In the stricter regulation of the national highways of commerce, for example, the state adds with one hand far more to individual initiative and freedom in economic life, than it takes away with the other hand. In removing children from factories and sending them to school, the state does not necessarily exhibit a tendency toward socialistic exercise of power. Rather it shows in effect its determination to build up a democracy capable of maintaining economic freedom and personal initiative. When governmental authority extends quarantines, regulates and controls the water supply under the test of the bacteriologist, or asserts its power in many other new directions, it does not follow that the domain of individual freedom is narrowed. On the contrary, individual liberties are enhanced when the family is protected against infectious disease, or unwholesome milk, or adulterated food, just as truly as is the individual freedom enhanced through protection against invading armies, against mobs and riots, against burglars and highwaymen, or against any other sort of danger to life, freedom of movement, and the pursuit of one's reasonable ends in life. It is simply that old principles require new applications as the conditions of life alter in every direction. The practical compromises between social authority and private liberty are changing in details, rather than in essential bearings.

Nor would it seem to be true that there is any radical change coming about in the partitioning of lawmaking and administrative authority between the higher sovereignty and the lesser jurisdictions. The greater intensity of associated life in all its forms is accompanied by a wider

range of political activities. In the very nature of the case, what we may call the federative balance will adjust itself according to convenience and experience, between the central government and the state or local authorities. Those matters of large and general interest which can best be dealt with by the authority that has widespread jurisdiction will appropriately devolve upon the central government, while the states and municipalities will hold for themselves — or draw to themselves — whatever authority they need for the political tasks that they can best perform.

It is natural that some men should be conservative by instinct and suspicious of change. It is always to be expected that many will cling to the mere machinery of government and the established forms of political life, as if these were ends in themselves and things sacred like the Ark of the Covenant. It is not less natural that there should always be others so clear in their perception of social aims to be realized through political action, that government seems a mere means of getting things done. To such minds the established political forms are vexatious obstacles to progress whenever they are found standing in the way of quick achievement. Such reformers have scant respect for the slow processes, and would change the machinery every year. But here again one finds the balance shifting very little as between the forces of conservatism and those of radicalism. By common agreement there must be method and order in public action. And thus the radical ground of to-day is where the conservatives will surely pitch their tents to-morrow; and the desired reform is accomplished without strain or danger.

Meanwhile, then, the state is not changing its essential

character, though it is always extending or modifying the range of its activities. There are certain great principles or tendencies, like the law of gravitation in the material universe, or the law of supply and demand in the economic world, that are not losing their validity. The state is not likely, under any tendency now perceptible, to absorb the nation's capital through confiscatory schemes of taxation. Nor does it bid fair to become the universal landlord, nor yet the universal employer. On the other hand, I do not find any reasonable forecast, based upon existing tendencies, that would indicate a virtual breaking down of the supremacy of the state. It will assert itself against the undue aggrandizement and power of productive capital in the form of corporations and monopolies. In view of attacks from the opposite direction, moreover, I can see no prospect of the weakening of the authority of the state through the spread of the destructive doctrines of the anarchists. The state will continue to dominate, supervise, regulate, and modify, for the sake of maintaining a reasonable freedom of development in the economic life, as in the other associated forms of human activity.

The state, then, is our highest form of corporate life. It authorizes and regulates other forms of association, and is, in short, the corporation of corporations, — the clearing-house of all normal forms of activity. It sanctions and regulates the most important forms of private relationship, namely, those of the family. It defines and protects personal liberty in its various forms. It supports the institution of private property, limiting it according to the demands of the social welfare. It makes rules under which it administers justice. It provides for its own perpetuation through the training of the young, the encouragement

of agriculture and industry, the establishment of wholesome conditions, whether physical or moral. It takes care that there shall continue to be high standards of national life and character. It ministers directly to the advancement of science and art, and it fosters the exercise of public spirit, philanthropy, private thrift and industry, and those virtues without the existence of which society decays and the state itself must disintegrate.

The state is therefore much more than a mere association of the individuals who make up its citizenship, for coöperative objects and common ends. Other corporate associations are voluntary, and the individual may enter them or withdraw from them. He may renounce his church; he may leave his employment; he may break away from the parental authority which under ancient forms held him in patriarchal subjection; he may sacrifice his property. But he cannot escape from his subjection to the authority and power of the state. Except for those rare cases where the individual becomes an outlaw and flees to the ever diminishing areas in which conditions of wilderness and savagery prevail, he is always under the jurisdiction of some government that will hold him amenable to its rules for the ordering of life and conduct.

Evidently it is desirable that the state should have stability and that its organs should suit the community over which it has jurisdiction. Otherwise the play of political forces will be violent; and although the state, under one form or another, will exist and will assert its supremacy, its functions will be disarranged, and all the non-political forms of social activity will suffer, because the political machinery is doing its work badly. It is an aim of statesmanship to maintain good external relations so as to secure international

justice and harmony, without incurring the risks of an unsuccessful resort to war. It is equally its aim so to guide the inner life of the nation as to avoid revolutions and extreme political agitations.

In the healthy political life of a nation there will come times of very general agreement, when opposition to the prevailing order of things is mild rather than intense, and when the organs of the state seem, upon the whole, to be working admirably. There will be other times when differences of opinion regarding policies and problems are very sharp, when parties become almost warlike in their angry attitude toward each other, and when political agitation seems to have superseded all other forms of expression and activity. But with an intelligent citizenship, well trained in the honest use of the machinery provided for the ascertainment of the public will, and accustomed to the acceptance of the rule of the majority, no harm comes to the state or to the community from these periods of political campaigning. They simply form a part of that necessary struggle and discipline through which human society is moving, along the path of its destiny, toward a future which in our optimistic philosophy we believe will somehow be better than the present or the past for society and for its individual units.

I am merely endeavoring to show that it is one of the rewards of the well-ordered modern state that its machinery of government tends to work with an increasing smoothness and strength. The strain of political agitation is better endured from time to time. For the citizen, from his standpoint, has been making the state a better thing in its practical working; while the state, on its part, has been building up a better-trained and a more efficient and trust-

worthy citizenship. A great part of the political life consists in this action and reaction between the citizen and the state. It justifies politics as a great national game. The citizen must forever be trying to improve the character and methods of his government. He must criticize and investigate and compare. He must strive, without cessation of effort. The state, on the other hand, as a condition of its favorable existence, must forever be trying to protect and improve the quality of its citizenship.

Thus the state must face an endless series of questions and problems, one after another, that concern the abiding welfare of the people. For it is the people in their relations to one another, — their relations to the domain they occupy, to their families, to their neighbors, to their handicrafts or professions, to their social habits, to their intellectual convictions, and to their views of conduct, — that make up the state in its constituent elements. This may sound rather vague or metaphysical, but it is true, and that in a most practical way. For the state is not made up of the people alone, nor yet of the people plus the domain, but rather of the people living in their accustomed relations to one another, pursuing their callings, tilling the soil, delving in the mine, running the railroad, attending the school, debating the problems of life whether from the pulpit, or at the lunch hour in the factory, or at the corner saloon in the evening.

Thus the practical problems of politics and of the state relate not to the people alone, but to the people in association with their homes, their families, their callings, their mountains, their rivers, their railroads, their cities, their habits of living, their ways of thinking, — all their manifold interests.

Every state, considered in its character as such a composite entity as I have described, has become what it is largely by virtue of its particular history. That is why the more thorough students of political development attach so much weight to ethnic considerations, and treat physical geography with so much respect. The American political problems that we have to consider could be understood very little if we gave no attention to the racial origins of our people, or to the physical and climatic character of the great continental domain over which our government exercises authority.

Other nations, as those of Europe,—in that complex relationship of the people to their domain, their soils, their hills, their cities, their pursuits, their habits, their racial traditions,—are very much older than our own nation. Their national life has deeper root in the things of the past; and we would be very foolish to criticize them contemptuously because of certain survivals of custom and institution that are on their face condemned by the logic of present-day democratic politics. If in practice we find church and state a difficult thing to manage in the case of Utah, and if we find the reform of representation an almost impossible thing to manage in Rhode Island, we must not be surprised at the difficulties encountered by European states in the modernizing of relationships which have been part of the web and woof of life for many centuries.

In a general way we Americans may be said to have begun our national life with almost entire exemption from a set of political problems that continues to disturb the nations of Europe. I refer to those problems of transition and readjustment that have followed upon the breaking up of feudal life and medieval conditions. European

political structure is full of anomalies. Democracy grows into actual power, while retaining monarchy for a visible emblem of the state's dignity and authority, as well as of its unending continuity.

However fast or slow the modern political movement might have progressed in the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation, there could be no question about its swift pace when the modern industrial movement set in, with the application of steam power to industry and transportation. The factory system created all our modern cities, with the aid of the railroads and the steamships. The industrial nations began to develop productive capital, the efficiency of labor was multiplied, populations doubled and quadrupled. All the forms of new political activity, whether in the broadening of the political base and a change of the structure of government, or the new direction of government activities, followed inevitably in the wake of the new economic life based upon that modern combination that we call capital and labor.

The logic of the new economic system meant simply the increase of labor efficiency, the abundance and distribution of commodities that had once been scarce, the steady increase in the average standard of living, the shortening of the needful hours of labor, and the gradual bringing about of a condition where poverty — which had previously been universal, except for the favored few — was becoming exceptional, save for the survival of a degenerate element in the slums of a few cities. This new industrial society was sure to bring about a new political order of things. But we in America have not had to undo an old order, while entering upon a new one.

The long unceasing fight for manhood suffrage and general

equality of citizenship that is still going on in European countries has not vexed us here, because such minor limitations as existed in our earlier period were not difficult to remove and did not seriously impair the prevailing rule of an equal democracy. Our colonies had a common language, and with many diversities of minor organization, they had a fairly homogeneous citizenship. They were imbued with similar fundamental notions about the rights and duties of the individual, the nature of the democratic government, — including parliamentary or representative institutions, — and the separation of lawmaking, executive, and judiciary functions.

In the theory of international law and in the practice of diplomacy, the planet upon which we live is geographically partitioned among a series of equal, sovereign, independent states. For purposes of intercourse between nations, this is a useful working theory, although it corresponds to the real facts only in a limited and superficial way. Small states hold their position in the series of sovereignties by virtue of the protection of some large state, or through the guarantee of a group of states. Other sovereignties, which are complete for domestic purposes, are in greater or less degree subject in the international sense to the overlordship of some greater imperial sovereignty.

Thus the current theory of a series of equal and independent states, which has served a useful purpose for a long time past, is one that had its well-known historical beginnings in the rise of modern European nations after the break-up of medieval imperialism; and it is a theory that may gradually disappear as world relationships take on new forms. This observation is quite germane to my general theme, because several of our most practical and

most controverted problems in current American politics are, in point of fact, related to this possibly altered theory of sovereignty from the international standpoint. Our relations to Cuba, to San Domingo, to Panama, to the Philippines, and our attitude toward a variety of questions and topics, are affected by changing tendencies in world politics and international relations.

How rapidly, it may be asked, are we moving toward a new period of world harmony through the gradually strengthening bonds of commercial treaties, postal unions, periodic conferences like the one lately held at Rio, special conferences like that held at Algeciras, lawgiving assemblages, like the first Hague Congress, and courts for the adjustment of differences, like the permanent Hague Tribunal? In abstract theory, the citizen yields some of his freedom to the community for the sake of the greater practical freedom that comes to him from its protection and its positive services. In some analogous way, the minor sovereignty of state, or province, or dukedom, or principality may be regarded as parting with something of its independence and authority, when it enters the larger state under which it obtains security and prosperity for its non-political interests. Is it not further possible that the great states of the present order, — each trailing behind it a family of minor states or of colonies and dependencies, — may agree to yield up a portion of their theoretical sovereignty and absolutism to a higher international jurisdiction, for the sake of peace and harmony, and for the safeguarding of those non-political interests of commerce and of human brotherhood that hate the risks of war, and that find something rather arbitrary and narrow in the present conception and practice of nationalism?

However that may be, the process is not to be hurried. Limited federation rather than sweeping assimilation is the principle that our more recent experience would tend to establish. As I have said, we began in our American republic without kings, without great landed aristocracies, without powerful ecclesiastical establishments, without intrenched privilege in any form. These are the matters that have given other lands a century or two centuries of political problems, of logical division between liberalism and conservatism, and of struggles to realize equality of citizenship and an even distribution of right and power throughout the body politic.

Our early settlers had been made up largely from those advance forces of reform in church and state — chiefly in England, but also in other European countries — the outworking of whose ideas has largely determined the subsequent course of political controversy and development in their original home countries for the past three centuries. Even if adherents of the old order had in the main made up the early American colonial groups, the conditions of life in the new country would perforce have modernized their views and made democrats of them. But since the American settlers were for the most part already in revolt against the old order, with convictions so strong that they were willing to sacrifice almost everything for freedom of thought and action, it was the more certain that when the new communities they were creating in the wilderness had come together, — and had finally swung out into their orbit as a complete and independent state in the international sense, — the democratic and republican basis of that state should have been secure and unquestioned.

Thus, to repeat, most of the things which have divided parties and been the subject-matter of political life and action in modern European countries were matters of unanimous agreement with us from the very outset. Our larger political life has not, therefore, been so logical or consistent in its course and progress. The stranger who would study our constitutional and political history would not find it following the analogies afforded by the history of England or of other European countries.

Our geographical separation from Europe has from the beginning strengthened us in our international position. Our flag has always floated everywhere as the emblem of an unquestioned political entity and sovereignty. And our internal contentions and struggles have been far less dangerous to our stability than they would have been had we lived in contiguity to other powerful states. It so happened that the distance of the other great members of our world system of sovereignties lessened relatively the centrifugal forces. Our isolation contributed to the conditions which in spite of ourselves have kept us from flying to pieces.

The elements that make up a state, as I have said, do not consist alone in its people, in its territory, nor in its legal instruments and forms. They are to be found in the blending of all its interests, material or otherwise. The Declaration of Independence, the Revolutionary War, the experience of the colonies under the Articles of Confederation, and, in due course, the adoption of the present Constitution of 1787, all played their indispensable part in the founding of a great sovereignty.

But the internal character of our sovereign state, and its permanence in the world of states, had yet to be worked

out. This became the central problem of our political life until some forty years ago. And while that central problem seems now to have been settled for a good while to come, many echoes are still heard from the noise and clash of the old-time controversy. Thus a number of our discussions of current politics can only be understood in the light of the great dispute that had to be settled by force upon the field of battle. The unity and strength of states require such a blending of interests that the considerations which hold their parts together are much stronger than the considerations which would pull them apart. It is neither useful nor scientific, therefore, in the study of deep-lying political controversies, like our own long contest, to attach too great importance to the question which side was right and which side was wrong. Statesmanship is a matter of compromise and expediency. The difference between right and wrong in public policies is not so much a matter of abstract ethics as it is a matter of the Gregorian calendar. It is not so much *what* should be done in politics as *how* to do it, and, above all, *when* to do it.

Nearly all the differences between conservative groups and liberal groups can be referred to that simple question of dates. Russia shall have constitutional liberties and parliamentary institutions: certainly, every one agrees to that. But the disputed question is, when and by what process and after what course of preliminaries. Are separation and revolution justifiable in given cases, and how shall they be avoided? We were facing those questions in our practical political life for more than seventy years. Now, such questions as separation and revolution do not enter into the serious stages of political controversy without deep-lying causes. There is usually a strong argu-

ment on both sides. There may be lacking a citizenship fit for responsible and regulated political life. There may be a governmental machinery so ill devised that it is not responsive to the needs of the body politic, or elastic in its bearing upon the different conditions of the several constituent parts of the state. Or deep discord may inhere in differences of non-political social structure and in the ends and aims of organized life. A tariff system might seem beneficial to one section and ruinous to another. In a well-ordered state the normal play of political life at such a period would bring about a change of tariff policy, and a gradual equalizing of economic conditions, for the sake of the larger interests involved in the maintenance of unity.

The continuance of our federal union was for more than two generations an object of concern so profound that all our important domestic and foreign policies had to be tested by the question whether the play of party difference and controversy would fall within the normal lines of ordinary political strife, or whether it would go deeper and threaten disruption. New England, through its devotion to commercial and seafaring pursuits, protected the slave trade in the early day, and plotted secession when the second war with England was preceded by embargoes on shipping. The presence of so distinct a race as the negroes and the existence of so archaic an institution as slavery provided us from the very outset with elements of the most serious political controversy. The rapid development of the slave system in one half of the country, while it was excluded from the other half, made a condition fraught with ever increasing danger to unity. This difficulty was accentuated by the rapid growth in the northern half of the country of the modern industrial system, followed by

the creation of manufacturing cities, the building of railroads, and the transformation of agricultural into manufacturing states. The early Southern statesmen had hoped for a retreat from the slavery system before its numerical and economic factors made it unmanageable. The Northern statesmen had tolerated the continuance of the slave trade through the pressure of private commercial interests, and with little thought of the day of reckoning.

The invention of the cotton gin gave the agricultural South a new and stupendous source of wealth and power, strengthened the slave system tenfold, and crystallized the Southern attitude against protective tariffs at the very moment when Northern economic tendencies made for protective duties. National statesmen like Webster and Clay saw the importance of time as an element in political controversy, and sought compromises which would postpone projects of division in order that there might grow up those varied and ever blending interests that hold nations together in spite of their differences. And this was a rational and legitimate course of action. Many a statesman in many a country has gone so far as to seek external disputes and to risk international war, for the sake of arousing patriotism at home and tiding over a threatened period of civil strife or territorial division.

The hair-splitting of the lawyers played its part and had its influence upon the national state of mind, so that it may be said to have entered really into the controversy. But the deeper questions at issue were not those of the dialecticians or the constitutional lawyers. The arguments for and against the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were excellent on both sides, and in later years the logic of Calhoun was as flawless as the logic of Webster.

The deep forces of our political life were working toward their own conclusions, while the lawyers were debating the nature of the federal compact. There had been thirteen original colonies laying claim to the possession of national sovereignty; and these thirteen had delegated certain powers, by virtue of which they had created a fourteenth entity, which alone represented them in external relations, and which alone was recognized by the rest of the world as having the attributes of sovereignty. As a matter of fact, apart from theory, not one of the thirteen had ever really stood out in possession of statehood in the higher sense, or exercised sovereignty in the presence of the world. They were in a condition of evolving nationality, with no outside status except their collective one, and with a very imperfect adjustment of their internal structure.

In the Napoleonic epoch and later on, European sovereignties were frequently lost to sight and then appeared again. Germanic confederations and empires have been recrystallized in various forms of inner and outer sovereignty. It is not in the least strange or discreditable, therefore, that these straggling minor sovereignties of ours, extending all the way from the St. Lawrence River to the Gulf of Mexico, should also have been deeply agitated over the possibilities of dissolution and regrouping. It could not have been otherwise under the circumstances.

The arguments on both sides were entirely legitimate. It belonged to the nationalist or federalist to hold things together until the complex blend of advantages in union should clearly outweigh the considerations that lay behind the motives of separation. There lies no compelling obligation in paper compacts. Written constitutions of federal character have final value only as they are sustained by the

realities that hold the several states or sections together, regardless of recent or ancestral documents.

In our case, then, what was the really determining factor that settled not only the questions of argument, but also decided in advance the issues of a needless and ill-fated war? The answer is a plain one, and it goes to the heart of all our political life. The unity of the nation was not evolved out of the arguments or wishes or even the war struggles of the thirteen original so-called sovereignties that had formed the compact. For a new makeweight, altogether, had appeared, in the growth of the nation beyond the Alleghanies. The chief steps toward union — following the events that led up to the constitutional arrangement of 1787 — had been, first, the cession of the northwestern lands by Virginia and the other colonies to the Union as a whole, and, second, the great Louisiana Purchase accomplished a little later by Mr. Jefferson.

These vast domains were unquestionably national, whatever might have been the status of the thirteen colonies. And as the new states one by one came into the Union, the federal compact became a mere legal theory, — a piece of fiction comparable with that in accordance with which the king of England is still the source of all authority and power. For whatever may be true of the original thirteen, it is not true of any of the other states, excepting Texas alone, that it was ever sovereign in any sense of the word, plenary or limited. These states are territorial divisions of a great inseparable national domain, peopled, not by Ohioans, or Kentuckians, or Nebraskans, or Californians, but by Americans, owing full and undivided allegiance to the government of the nation.

During that very period when the constitutional lawyers

were debating the nature of the federal compact, we were creating a nation that belonged to itself, that owed nothing to preëxisting local commonwealths, and that found no sufficient reason to attach more importance to legal fictions than to plain historical truth and to the normal forces of political life. If divergence of interests between North and South, or between East and West, should in some future time become so great that the benefits of national union were in the minds of most men outweighed by the disadvantages, cleavage might follow and separate sovereignties might emerge. But the reasons for such division would no longer be referred back to the legal nature of the federal compact.

Our system as now established does not contemplate the withdrawal of a state or a group of states by orderly process. The Constitution provides a way for the admission of new states, but no way for the expulsion or withdrawal of a state once admitted. Thus in our newer series of political questions — dealing in some of their phases with the relations between the state and the nation — the old fine-spun arguments about states' rights and national sovereignty survive as historical curiosities. The national Constitution is subject to amendment as are those of the states. The distribution of functions is to be worked out from time to time for purposes of convenience in the light of experience. With this practical freedom to adjust and to change, nobody is in danger of oppression or harm through the aggrandizement of the central government. Nor, conversely, is any one in danger from the undue assertion of state supremacy.

Political sentiment and political education make for the broad and continental view, rather than for the narrow

and parochial view. In matters of wide concern, where the federal government has not acquired or exercised authority, there is a tendency toward voluntary unformity in the laws and customs of the several states. The civil and penal codes of New York have, with more or less change, been transferred to the statute books of many another state. Each state is a laboratory of political experimentation, and its successful undertakings are widely imitated in other states. Thus we find a field for constant discussion and safe controversy, touching the relative functions of state and national government. On the other hand, the progressive work of one state will set an example that leads to wholesome political controversy within the real though limited field of state politics, in the commonwealths that are less advanced at certain points, as for example in matters of education or taxation or penology, or in methods for the protection of the public welfare against the undue pressure of private interests.

II

CONSTRUCTIVE PROBLEMS OF POPULATION AND CITIZENSHIP, WITH QUESTIONS OF RACE, LANGUAGE, AND STATUS

THERE is a sense in which the molding of an effective citizenship, imbued with a sense of public as distinguished from private well-being, and capable from time to time of fairly harmonious action, is at once the principal task and the highest reward of government. There is another sense in which the shaping of an efficient mechanism of government is the chief concern of a well-ordered citizenship. In practice the processes are not very distinct from each other, although to some extent they are separable for purposes of discussion. Both processes give rise to groups or successions of political problems.

The visitor from another country finds here a great English-speaking population of composite European descent. Its legal and social structure, its literature, its moral and religious ideas, like its prevailing language, are of English origin. Modifications have been great in number and deep in influence, but the manifest advantages of a common language have been great enough thus far to prevail over all obstacles; and language itself has a wonderful power to preserve laws, forms, customs, and ideals.

In our formative period, the nations that were reaching out with the instinct for colonization in new countries were principally the English, French, Spanish, and Dutch.

They were maritime and commercial nations, and they became great naval powers in the course of their commercial and colonial rivalries. The ultimate character of North America as respects race and language could not have been predicted until after the middle of the eighteenth century. Few people realize how much depends upon the acquisition of technical sovereignty over unoccupied territories.

There are men now living who knew in their childhood grandfathers or old neighbors who had survived from the period of the French and Indian War, when the entire English foothold on this continent lay east of the Appalachian Mountains, nowhere reaching so far north or west as the St. Lawrence River, and extending southward only to about the middle of what is now Georgia. It was a coastwise fringe about a hundred miles deep. Florida, the Gulf of Mexico, Texas, California, and the great West belonged to Spain. To France belonged not only the territories contiguous to the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes, but the entire country drained by the Mississippi River and its tributaries from western Pennsylvania to the Rocky Mountains.

Conditions which had led to American colonization had brought to the English settlements a class of people better fitted for agricultural and industrial pioneering and the making of modern communities than had gone from Spain or France to the territories over which they had assumed jurisdiction. The Spaniards had in Mexico and farther south found a comparatively large Indian population, with cities and towns, agricultural development, and wealth in gold and silver. From the economic standpoint the Spaniards were conquerors and despoilers, while from the religious standpoint they were missionaries and church

builders. They imposed the Spanish language and church, and many Spanish customs, upon the native population. But conditions made it difficult to create in Mexico, or elsewhere in North America, a Spanish-speaking population of European stock and character.

The French in the province of Quebec showed capacity to take root in new soil and to develop communities and institutions; and they had begun to show a like capacity in their settlements on the extreme lower Mississippi. But for the rest of their great domain they were too much scattered. As explorers, missionaries to the northern Indians, fur traders and trappers along the vast network of interior waterways, they were a superb race of pioneers; but their settlements were remote, and their pursuits were too precarious for the rapid development of a people. Nevertheless, if the war between England and France had ended differently, and if the French rather than the English had won in the decisive battle of Quebec, we should probably have had to deal in North America with a very different set of political problems.

The war that ended in 1763 had carried English jurisdiction to the Mississippi, and our own war that ended twenty years later had substituted the American for the English flag. If the earlier war had not been fought, or if it had ended differently, it is not probable that the colonies would have sought their independence. The French power would have increased steadily, as would also the French population west of the Alleghanies. New Orleans, St. Louis, Detroit, Pittsburg, and various other communities would have taken on a permanently French character like Montreal or Quebec. For our English-speaking people must not think that the French could not have developed a great

nation in North America if they had but retained sovereignty over their unoccupied territory for another century.

It was a series of larger historical events, having their chief causes in the rivalries and struggles of Europe, that preëmpted a great domain for the English-speaking colonies of the Atlantic seaboard and gave them an opportunity to create a powerful and homogeneous nation in the process of subduing a wilderness. We acquired our territory westward to the Mississippi before the French trading posts on the rivers and lakes had become important enough to give any permanent character to the development of the country. In like manner, some twenty years after the close of the Revolutionary War, we acquired, through the so-called Louisiana Purchase, the great remaining territory of France stretching from the Mississippi to the Rocky Mountains, and containing few permanent communities except in what is now Louisiana proper. Mexico retained Texas and the California country for a generation longer, but developed it too slowly to give it a permanent Spanish impress; and it fell into our hands while it was still for the most part an unpeopled and wilderness region.

If a nation possesses a certain degree of pioneering and colonizing energy, its natural instinct is for the acquisition of contiguous unoccupied territory. Growth of numbers, wealth, and power is an instinctive demand that belongs to the sense of nationality, and is bound up with the spirit of patriotism. An extension of domain where circumstances permit is one of the most obvious elements of such national growth. The acquisition of adjacent undeveloped territory by an agricultural nation whose people have the pioneering impulse and a natural hunger for land ownership is a wholly different thing from the extension of

sovereignty over established communities. Thus our earlier extensions of sovereignty, for the sake of our normal westward development, involved a set of political problems wholly unlike those that would attend our acquisition of Cuba, or that would arise in case of a proposal to annex the older parts of Canada on the north or the Republic of Mexico on the south.

No state of modern times has had such an opportunity for the development of a homogeneous citizenship of high character and capacity as fell to the lot of the United States. An early perception of this fact became very general, and although its expression was often boastful and exaggerated, it was of itself an important element in the growth of the nation. Never was there a nation so convinced of its own high destiny, so sure of the peculiar favor of Providence, or so sincerely sorry for the inferior lot of people born in other lands and living under other jurisdictions. This superb confidence had much to do with differentiating the American people from other peoples. It helped them to surmount the difficulties that lay in the way of their progress, and it gave them power to assimilate new ingredients of population.

It would be a mistake to regard their favorable opinion of their own political and social advantages as a seriously erroneous one. The American communities in our Revolutionary period were the most advanced in average condition of any in the world. There was a higher diffusion of intelligence and a more even distribution of property than in any of the European countries. Here was to be witnessed the one great democratic experiment of the modern world. And the chief solicitude of American government and statesmanship was for the preservation of those

conditions and ideals, which were so distinctive that they gave our people a certain consciousness of high example and the sense of a mission to inspire liberal and democratic tendencies in European countries against effete institutions.

So real and so powerful were these sentiments in our early period, and with such good reason when viewed in the light of historical facts and contrasts, that it is by no means strange that they should have done constant service in our own political controversies. Practical democracy became doctrinaire and exacting. It was suspicious of any sort of restriction or limitation. It preferred a somewhat riotous individual freedom to a restraint that might savor too much of centralized authority and power.

In New England the town meeting and the small democracy of the self-governing neighborhood had created a remarkably efficient and well-trained citizenship. The Southern county system had not developed the private citizen so highly, but it had produced in every county a very considerable number of men capable of leadership and of administrative work. After the Revolution the westward movement advanced with great energy and rapidity. The new lands were subdivided and sold with conscious reference to their settlement and ownership by small farmers, — not for acquisition and retention in the form of large estates. The land system intentionally facilitated the subsequent formation of local governments in townships and counties, of convenient size and general regularity. The support of schools was provided for by the designation for school purposes of certain lands in each new township.

As the process of settlement went on, Territorial

governments were established, through which all the rudiments of local political life were planted and nurtured under national authority and oversight. Thus when the new communities had attained sufficient growth and stability to be admitted as states in the Union, they were already in possession of the same laws and customs and local institutions of self-government as had grown up in the older states from which they had migrated, but reduced to a more regular and typical form. In the local institutions of the newer states there had been worked out certain types that blended and combined the somewhat varying systems of the original seaboard colonies. In the structure and government of the Western townships and counties there was a combination of the characteristics of the New England towns and the Virginia counties.

And while there was a certain tendency to migrate westward on parallel lines, each of the newer states received population accessions from a number of the older ones, with the result that the westward movement added constantly to the solidarity of the people, and intensified whatever was distinctive in their traits as Americans and whatever was typical in their institutions. It is always to be borne in mind that this process of growth and development across the continent was not by methods that were random or accidental, — or even natural, in the sense of being unrestrained. It was, upon the whole, a process of an ordered sort, guided by a national policy that was concerning itself as regards the permanent character of American citizenship. The thing aimed at was fitness to maintain through future generations the democratic political life of the country whether local or national.

This process of creating a continental people, demo-

cratic in spirit and republican in political forms, has been one of the great positive aims of government in the United States, and many practical questions and problems have from time to time arisen in association with it. Economic and social conditions in the early period of the country were favorable to large families, and the westward movement was strong and irresistible. Since the church, the school, and the local organization of government were promptly established as each new county or township of the public domain was surveyed and opened to settlement, the freedom and private initiative of frontier life were tempered by the presence of familiar institutions.

The process was so rapid that the country had been settled from one ocean to the other long before the pioneers had lost the immediate sense of kindred with those who had remained in the older states. Nothing like this, so far as we know, has ever happened in the history of any other land. Not only is it to be said in a general way that the early stock of New England or Pennsylvania, of Virginia or North Carolina, spread westward, forming new communities across a continent, but the movement is to be illustrated in a much more striking way by the migration and spread of particular families. Elsewhere and in other times family clans and patriarchal groups have held together within limited areas. But in this country, as many a genealogical compilation will show, the families have spread straight across the country, increasing and multiplying under favorable conditions afforded by new soils and ample room, until a great nation has been formed within three or four generations, essentially based upon this spread of interrelated families.

Although, as I have said, this movement to new lands was

mainly upon east and west lines, there was in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois a blending of the settlers from New England, the Middle States, Virginia, and the Carolinas. But with the growth of slavery and its new economic importance, the fear and danger of disunion led to various political compromises, among which was the understanding that some of the new states should be slave territory and others should be free. Missouri had been admitted in 1821 as a slave state. By all natural conditions of soil and climate and tendency of population, it should have been a free state like Illinois. Texas came into the Union in 1845 by a different method, with slavery already existing as a domestic institution.

In the states north of the Ohio River, formed from the lands ceded by the northern and middle colonies and Virginia, the Ordinance of 1787 declared that slavery should never exist. It provided for the equal division of estates among children in the descent of property, with a view to the building up of democratic communities, based upon landownership. One of the chief purposes of the Ordinance was declared to be the "extending of the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty, which form the basis whereon these republics, their laws and constitutions, are erected; to fix and establish those principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions, and governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in the said territory."

Elsewhere in the Ordinance it is declared, "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." According to the terms of the Ordinance, the territory was later divided into the five states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and

Wisconsin. It established principles both positive and negative which were intended to build up states upon the ideals of equality, freedom, private property, and democratic government. Some especial considerations were extended to the existing French communities, but these were small, and it was perfectly understood that the new states would become the home of English-speaking Americans, who would generalize, so to speak, the peculiarities of the Eastern colonies and produce the national type.

Such statesmanlike forethought was amply rewarded. For the settlement of those states of the old Northwest Territory under the conditions prescribed was of incomparable importance in the creation of that body of citizenship which has rendered the nation one and indivisible, as a matter of underlying fact, regardless of legal theories.

Three years later, the principles of the Ordinance of 1787 were applied to the territory south of the Ohio River, Virginia having ceded to the Union what is now Kentucky, and North Carolina having made a similar grant of what is now Tennessee. In 1798 there was organized under act of Congress what was called the Mississippi Territory, Georgia having ceded to the United States its rights and claims over the lands which now comprise the states of Mississippi and Alabama. With the sole exception of the clause forever prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude, the Ordinance of 1787, providing for the government of the Ohio country, was extended to the Mississippi Territory as it had been to Kentucky and Tennessee. This Ordinance had declared among other things that "the said territory and the states which may be formed therein shall forever remain a part of this confederacy of the United States of America."

One of the striking declarations of that great Ordinance reads as follows: —

"The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands and properties shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights, and liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made for preventing wrongs being done to them and for preserving peace and friendship with them."

Thus the things chiefly characteristic of the institutions and people of the great series of states west of the Appalachian Mountains and east of the Mississippi River were described in the Ordinance of 1787. These states were to belong forever to an American nationality that was to rest upon high principles of character and intelligence. What I wish to emphasize is the fact that the essentials of their political structure and social life were carefully provided in advance and laid down for them through the collective wisdom and the best judgment and experience of the United States. It was the intention of Congress to create a homogeneous citizenship, with a similarity of local and general institutions, in all the states to be formed out of the national domain. Citizenship was conceived of as belonging to a like-conditioned body of free white men.

It was clearly perceived that great and serious practical difficulties were to be encountered through the existence of two alien races — Indians and Negroes — which could not be absorbed or assimilated. North of the Ohio it was feasible to exclude slavery. South of the Ohio such exclusion could not be agreed upon, and it was left for the states in the future to deal with it as a domestic problem.

It was generally expected at that time that the new states south of the Ohio would be built up by farmers cultivating their own lands, and the subsequent importance of the slavery question from the economic and from the political standpoints was foreseen only dimly if at all.

The Indian question, on the other hand, was everywhere, west of the Appalachians, a serious and difficult one. However great at times may have been the practical injustice of our treatment of particular Indian tribes, it is to be remembered that it has been the intention of the government and of the people as a whole to act fairly toward the natives of the country. The tribes with which we had to deal were without agriculture except of the most limited sort, were nomadic in their habits, and held their lands only in the sense of having a prescriptive right to roam over them in their pursuit of wild animals. These Indians were few in numbers, and as our forefathers needed lands for orderly settlement, it was necessary for the general government to extinguish the Indian title by some form of agreement with tribal chieftains, based on the analogy of international treaties.

The process has been a long and continuing one, and it would be both interesting and instructive to trace the effect of our contacts and relationships with the Indian as affecting the development of what is most distinctive in American citizenship and character. Certain Indian traits and qualities — those of physical courage and endurance, of silence and stoicism under conditions of danger and difficulty, of a certain unassailable personal dignity — have for a hundred years unquestionably so affected the American mind as to have entered very deeply into the quality of what we may call American personality. If all our

pioneers were not at some time engaged in Indian fighting, they were all schooled in the need of being prepared for it. Outside of our Eastern cities, every American boy until within a very recent period has been trained in the use of arms, has had some knowledge of wild animals and woodcraft, and has imbibed something of that personal initiative, resourcefulness, and capacity for self-directed action that could not have come alone from our early provisions for democratic equality and universal education. It came in large part from the experience of subduing a great continent and from the actual or traditional dealings of our people with so remarkable a man as the American Indian.

The obtaining of Indian lands, the carrying on of Indian wars, the relocating of Indians on substituted lands farther west, the dealing with them on reservations, the attempts to educate them and to fit them for modern economic life, and the constant efforts of philanthropists and idealists to give practical effect to our national pledges of justice toward the Indians, have provided us with a series of problems of government and administration from which we have never at any time been wholly free.

In Mexico the Indians were never supplanted, but entered into the body of citizenship. The result must be a slow and uncertain experiment in the creation of a new nationality of mixed racial origin, with the Spanish language as one of its chief uniting bonds. One-fifth of the Mexican population is white, with some small infusion of Indian blood. Two-fifths is of thoroughly mixed racial character, and about two-fifths almost purely Indian. The Indian racial type is evidently destined to prevail in Mexico, and the process of race amalgamation will go steadily forward. It will be a slow and difficult task, but

not an impossible one, to bring this Mexican population up to a much higher average standard of intelligence and efficiency than now prevails.

Our methods of agricultural settlement and advance almost wholly precluded intermarriage. Our conditions were incomparably more favorable than those of the Spaniards in Mexico. We were dealing with a small number of Indians, relatively speaking, and these were of nomadic and savage character, in contrast with the fixed nature of the Indian population of Mexico. The French, on the contrary, as hunters and trappers among the Canadian Indians of the Northwest, took Indian wives, with the result that there arose a considerable population of French-Indian half-breeds. Here again the number of Indians is small when compared with the rapid development of the white race, and Canada's Indian problem will be solved by the complete absorption of the Indian population into the composite European stock that is building up the Western Canadian provinces.

By original agreement in accepting the cession of the Mississippi Territory from Georgia, the United States government had promised to extinguish the Indian land titles and make other provision for the Southern red tribes. Out of such agreements there resulted the subsequent creation of the so-called "Indian Territory," whither, from time to time, were removed the Choctaws, Creeks, Seminoles, and many other entire or fractional tribes. These Indians have been fortunately situated and well protected in their rights, and they have adopted so many white men into their tribal organizations that the full-blooded Indians are now in a small minority. A gradual opening up of these Indian lands to white settlement resulted some years ago

in the setting apart of the temporary territory of Oklahoma. We have just now witnessed the reunion of Oklahoma and what was left of the old Indian Territory, and the admission of the whole under the name of Oklahoma as a state in the Union.

The process has been marked by great care, in the distribution of lands in severalty to Indian families and individuals, and by various provisions to protect the Indians in all their rights of person and property during a future transitional period. All these red men of the Indian Territory will enter into full American citizenship, and the process of absorption into the white race will go on through intermarriage without further hindrance or difficulty.

Gradually through long experience we are learning how to deal more intelligently with the Indians now segregated in Western reservations. The government's policy of providing schools for the Indian children is constantly growing wiser in its practical methods, and although the aboriginal instincts are stubborn and hard to overcome, the inexorable pressure of our white population will either absorb the red man or cause his numbers to dwindle toward the point of extinction. As a subject requiring great care and intelligence in administration, the Indian question will remain with us for a long time. But as a question affecting population and citizenship, it has now practically disappeared. We shall always owe some traits and qualities of national character to our contact with the North American Indians, but we shall assimilate them as a race with results scarcely perceptible.

And when we set this fact in contrast with the actual racial conditions under which the Republic of Mexico is struggling, we shall better be able to see how tremendous

an element in the development of a new country, from the standpoint of its social and political problems, is that of a general unity of race and stock founded upon a high average of intelligence and character and of capacity for citizenship. Thus, although it was no part of the original American theory or forecast that the Indians should come into our citizenship, the process of race absorption is disposing of them, or will ultimately so dispose of them, as an alien factor giving rise to political difficulties.

The other original race problem, that of the Negroes in the United States, has pursued a very different course and remains with us to-day as in many aspects the most difficult matter with which we have now and in the future to deal. In the Northern as well as in the Southern colonies there existed a more or less distinct social aristocracy founded upon ancestral superiority in England, or else upon large holdings of land, or finally, upon educational or professional or political preferment. Such distinctions were not sharply drawn, and they were supported by no special privileges or advantages after our American political system had become fairly developed. American fundamental policy was indeed a leveling policy, but it sought to establish a very high level. It did not presuppose uniformity of results when it established, so far as laws and institutions went, equality of opportunity.

What it did, however, presuppose was a very high degree of social mobility. It meant that the landless man should easily become a landholder by the simple process of joining the pioneers and moving westward. It meant that the apprentice in any trade could easily become a journeyman, and that the journeyman should readily become an employer. It meant that the aspiring boy, however humble

his parentage, should have such an educational start that he might easily work his way into the learned professions. It meant that the private citizen should in his own local community have such frequent occasion to take part in public affairs that he might readily advance in accordance with his aptitudes and character to the higher places in state and national public life.

One of the chief concerns of the American state, in the large sense of that word, has been to preserve this social and political mobility and to prevent the crystallizing of our population into castes or classes by any process whatsoever. The public schools, which have, upon the whole, been our most uniform and vital institution, in this process of creating and maintaining a high level of citizenship as well as a social and industrial mobility, have always very properly been a matter of deep public concern. And it is important to note that at the present time, with the problems of citizenship presenting themselves in new phases, the public schools are recognized as more than ever the crucibles in which elements of discord are to be blended and fused, and a harmonious citizenship on the high levels of democratic efficiency well maintained.

But of this work of the public schools in our political life, I shall have occasion to speak further. I was about to remark that, although Virginia and the Southern colonies had from the first been less democratic in their population than the Northern colonies, they were by no means committed to an aristocratic system. It happened that a good many Virginia landowners had come with the traditions of the country squires of England, and that a large number of laborers had come over indentured, from the ignorant and unprivileged working-classes. Yet these inequalities

would have adjusted themselves in due time if it had not been for the gradual development of negro slavery. Land was abundant and easily acquired, the poorer classes were rapidly catching the independent spirit of the westward pioneer movement, and the statesmen who framed the northwestern ordinance for Ohio, and who applied its provisions three years later to Kentucky and Tennessee, and eight years later to the territory that soon afterward became Mississippi and Alabama, had no thought of the development of different agricultural, economic, or social systems north and south of the Ohio River.

When the new states were admitted to the Union, South as well as North, all the unoccupied lands belonged absolutely in fee simple to the national government by express acknowledgment of the states themselves. These lands were to be sold under uniform laws and conditions, and everybody expected to see the same kind of American agricultural commonwealths in the South as in the North. Slavery was looked upon as a thing to be tolerated for the present, but as a thing exceptional, undesirable, not compatible with conditions of American life, and therefore temporary.

There was nothing in the nature of the climate, nothing in the soil, nothing in the people, to make Kentucky or Tennessee, or even the highland parts of Alabama or Mississippi, in any way essentially different from Ohio, Indiana, or Illinois. We simply drifted, without a dream of the dire consequences, into an immense expansion of the slavery system through a series of circumstances and historical causes. For one thing, we were near the West Indies, where the lack of white labor and the profits from sugar, tobacco, and other products, brought about a large

and rapid development of the negro slave system, and afforded enormously profitable trade in slaves on the one hand, and in sugar, rum, and various commodities on the other hand, for the hardy seafaring men of the New England coast.

The warmer, alluvial parts of our South adopted the plantation methods of the West Indies, and in the lack of white labor began to acquire increasing numbers of negroes. In extending the provisions of the Ordinance of 1787 to the new Southern territories, while not prohibiting the institution of slavery, we had expressly prohibited the importation of slaves from outside the country. Subsequently, in 1808, we had abolished the foreign slave-trade altogether. From that time forth the demands of the lower South for negro labor had to be supplied from the more northerly states, and the domestic slave-trade became a profitable form of migration.

After a time it became apparent that negro slavery was very much interfering with the right kind of social democratic progress among the Southern white people. It was accentuating an aristocratic class of land-owning, slave-owning people, and it was putting obstacles in the way of the prosperity of the white majority who would otherwise have been owning and cultivating rich farms, as in the states north of the Ohio River. The drift of these poorer whites was to the hills and mountains of western Virginia, eastern Kentucky, western North Carolina, eastern Tennessee, northern and western Georgia, and northern Alabama. Into these regions of forest upland the slavery system did not penetrate, but the soil was too poor for successful agriculture, the people lost touch with the outside world, and declined, rather than gained, in culture

and civilization. Thus the South was greatly hampered in the development of a social democracy on a high level of intelligence and political capacity.

But the far more serious difficulty that men began to foresee lay in the numerical growth of a great body of African laborers, domiciled in an extending group of our states, and forming an element which could never be absorbed in that great social and political brotherhood which was the ideal of American citizenship and which originally looked upon our nation as one great family, like the Jewish commonwealth of old. Then began the efforts of the American Colonization Society, whose underlying motives were not chiefly those of the abolitionist, but those of far-seeing men who could discern nothing but danger and difficulty in the future presence here of great bodies of negroes, whether slave or free.

Their movement came too late, however, to be of any practical effect. It was helpless, like a floating plank, against the strong economic tide that was moving in the opposite direction.

We should have grown cotton even more successfully, maintained a homogeneous citizenship, and avoided a majority of our most dangerous and exasperating political problems, if we had never introduced African slavery at all. But the movement of history grows out of causes too complex to be perfectly regulated at a given moment by the collective intelligence or virtue of any community. Consequences are not discernible from the beginning, and nations have to learn by experience.

At least it may be said that the experience of one evil may show how to avert another. For one thing, our experience with slavery has shown us in the larger problems

of our political life that we must so apply statesmanship as to prevent those social or sectional divergences which might go too far for reconciliation, and lead to disunion or civil war. The existence of slavery as a developing economic system created differences of growing intensity which would otherwise have had no reason to exist. Extreme theories of states' rights have in logic no natural abiding place in this country, unless in the smaller of the original colonies, like Rhode Island and Delaware. Otherwise those doctrines are merely shifting symptoms appearing now here, now there, at the moment when some state or locality is conscious of a separate interest, or rankles with some sense of injustice.

But as the South grew into a prosperity based upon the slave system, it began to seek justification. It set up the new theory that the Southern people were essentially unlike the Northern in origin and characteristics, that their country was radically different in climate and soil, that its economic institutions must be permanently different, and that accordingly its domestic and foreign policies should also have a permanently different character.

Unity of sentiment and of ideals is what, more than anything else, binds a people together. This dwelling upon imaginary differences rapidly produced real differences. That is to say, there arose a divergence of sentiment and a wall of prejudice between North and South that made the normal working of political life practically impossible.

All this was intensified by the form in which anti-slavery sentiment began to assert itself in the North. Slavery had grown in this country as an institution in such a way that it was neither sensible nor just to attribute blame in any quarter. Mr. Lincoln approached the question with a per-

fectly normal mind. He saw that the country could not go on successfully if the spread of slavery were not restricted by its exclusion from the territories. Kansas had been kept free by the superior numbers and energy of the anti-slavery Northern and Western people as colonizers. Men like Mr. Lincoln would have calmed the excited apprehension of the South, and would meanwhile have built up the great West with such a development of free American citizens, recruited by millions of sturdy emigrants from European countries, as to have given the united forces of our modern social democracy an unquestioned advantage. The growth of railroads and the advance of modern industry would in due time have invaded the slave states in such a way as to prove that the economic advantages of slavery were only temporary in their character. Then would have come about some just and statesmanlike scheme for emancipation.

But the New England conscience, — which had played so valuable a part in the making of American ideals, and which had done so much to evolve that sense of public spirit and social justice, apart from personal or private advantage, which has molded the citizenship of the country, and shaped its practical political issues, — had come to look at the slavery question primarily from the standpoint of abstract human rights. It would be as useless to quarrel with this phase of American idealism as to try to argue down the east wind. The passion against slavery, as in violation of the fundamental principle of human liberty, grew to such a point that the unity of the country was menaced quite as much by the impatience and bitterness of the Northern abolitionists as by the crystallizing of doctrine and sentiment in the South.

This passion for human freedom and for the immediate translation into terms of practical American political life of the abstract theories of the rights of man, was in total disregard of the normal processes of historical and political evolution. But it is a plain fact of ordinary observation that history is not content to move by orderly process. An intense sentiment, like that which existed in the South, or a great passion for abstract right and justice, like that which was growing in the North, is quite as likely as anything else to create political issues and problems. These feelings proceed to make or mar the page of history, without regard to the warnings of the discerning and the dispassionate. In other words, that very capacity for social and political idealism, and for devotion to abstract conceptions of right and justice, which had done so much to give the American people its solidarity and its elevation, was the factor that most endangered its continuance, when diverging tendencies had on both sides led to conflict for the sake of high principle.

I dwell upon this because it is with us an ever recurring tendency. The chief danger in several of our moments or periods of political crisis has arisen from the fact that both sides have conceived of their respective positions as theoretically and ideally just. Thus, each side, so far at least as the rank and file were concerned, came to feel that it was contending unselfishly for high principles and a true cause.

Ever since the conclusion of the Civil War, the Southern negro question has in countless ways played a vital part in our larger political life as well as in the local political life of the South itself. And very much of the strain and difficulty attending the injection of this question into the national

life has been due to the intensity of theoretical views and convictions. I shall have occasion to recur to the negro question in several of its political phases, but meanwhile let us turn to some other questions relating to our population and citizenship, and having a bearing upon the problems of our political life.

Soon after the Revolutionary War, our adventurous young Americans were flocking westward, taking up lands under military grants to Revolutionary soldiers, and founding communities as far west as the Mississippi River. I need not pause here to speak of negotiations for the acquisition of the Florida country or for the free navigation of the mouths of the Mississippi. It became our good fortune, through the exigency of high politics, due to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic struggle, to acquire the great Louisiana country. Our experience in creating the newer sovereignties east of the Mississippi was promptly applied to the situations farther west. We were preparing what were soon to be unequaled opportunities for fifty millions or a hundred millions of people. These facts were not to be turned into immediate realities, but success was assured with reasonable effort.

As I have already said, the people in our original colonies were more well-to-do in their average lot, even in the period before the Revolution, than any like number of people in the countries from which they had come. In the period following the Revolution, in spite of the episode of our second war with England, our economic and social conditions were vastly more agreeable than those of European lands. If, therefore, the opportunities afforded by the growth of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and the other northwestern states, were sufficient to tempt hundreds of thousands of the younger

generation to leave the old homesteads of New England, New York, and Pennsylvania, while the sons of Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia were flocking across the mountains to Tennessee, Alabama, Missouri, and Arkansas, it is not strange that conditions thus inviting should have appealed to many people living under less favored circumstances in the European countries.

Men migrate for a great variety of reasons. It had taken strong motives and high resolution to create our original settlements in the early part of the seventeenth century. Whether they were seeking opportunities to exercise principles of civil and religious liberty, or hoped to profit by finding precious metals or by trade with the Indians, they were a picked and hardy lot of men and women; and in the struggle to give permanence to their settlements, they created unsurpassed opportunities for their own posterity as well as for millions of later comers.

An immense variety of circumstances has coöperated to bring about such a movement of alien population to our shores as history does not parallel. Early migrations had brought a considerable German population to this country, and it had located chiefly in Pennsylvania. But most of our population had been derived from the British Islands. The Scotch-Irish had become very numerous in the Middle States and had followed the valleys of the Appalachian system southward, and their families have increased and multiplied as one of the most important factors of the essential American stock. With the firm establishment of the American republic, British and German immigrants came steadily enough to have added important new elements to our population previous to 1845. But the movement on a very large scale began at about that time.

The great Irish famine, due to successive failures of the potato crop, was at its worst in 1846, and the migration of Irish people to the United States, which had averaged about thirty thousand a year, at once increased to more than one hundred thousand. In the decade from 1845 to 1855 more than a million and a half of Irish people came to this country. In that same period there was a similar increase in the movement of Germans, due in great part to political trouble and discontent, and to apprehensions of war. The wave of liberalism that swept across Europe in 1848 and thereabouts resulted in sending to our shores a large body of people of a desirable class. Our own financial and economic reaction, culminating in the panic of 1857, together with the gathering of storm clouds over our political skies, sharply reduced the volume of immigration in the years immediately before the Civil War. But from 1845 to the outbreak of the war, we had received in fifteen years a million and a half Germans, two million Irish people, and more than half a million people of other European nationalities.

At the time when the westward movement had fairly set in after the opening of the Northwest Territory and the new country south of the Ohio, there was an almost even division of population between the North and the South. But in 1860, when the country had reached a population of 31,400,000, 21,000,000, or more than two-thirds, were in the free states and territories, as against a little more than 10,000,000 in the slave states, of whom more than 3,000,000 were slaves. European immigrants had not been willing to go to the slave states (with such limited exceptions as the German accessions to St. Louis and some other commercial towns). The North and West, on the other hand,

were building railroads and developing farm lands and new population centers. There was a great demand for labor such as the fresh contingents of Irish and Germans afforded.

Our cities were then relatively small, and the new foreign elements came so rapidly as to create new and difficult problems. "Know-nothingism," a form of organized opposition to foreign domination, provoked chiefly by the voting strength of the Irish in the cities, made its brief political sensation, only to be lost in the more serious controversies of a stormy decade. Statisticians differ as to the number of people North and West who, at the outbreak of the Civil War, were of foreign birth or the descendants of immigrants who had arrived within thirty or forty years. It is at least conservative to estimate that of the 21,000,000, fully one-third, or from 7,000,000 to 8,000,000, belonged to what we may call our foreign element. Many of them had come to escape European wars, but they were drawn into our contest, and they clearly turned the balance.

With the conclusion of the war, we entered upon a period of unprecedented expansion. The death losses of the war had been great, but the development of capacity and energy in the surviving two million or more of young men who had borne arms was speedily transmuted into a wonderful national asset. The opening of the West was entered upon with stupendous energy, the industrial life of the nation grew more mature and complex, and the demand for labor far outstripped the home supply. The Western states set up official immigration bureaus; the Western railroads, which had obtained vast land grants, conducted immigration bureaus of their own; and the steamship companies, finding the business profitable, did everything in their power to stimulate the movement of population

to America. Most important of all, however, was the propaganda conducted by the immigrants themselves. Thus, immediately following the Civil War, there was another large accession, reaching its climax just before the period of hard times that followed the panic of 1873. In 1880 the movement set in again very strongly, and in 1882 nearly 800,000 landed at our ports. Not until 1903 was this number exceeded or nearly reached, but there had been for many years an average annual arrival of about half a million. In 1905 the number exceeded a million, and in 1906 it was beyond 1,100,000.

For some years past, moreover, there had been a total change in the racial character of immigrants, due to changed conditions in Europe. Ireland was now under-populated, and Irish political and social discontent had been allayed through numerous political reforms. German industrial progress had become so great as to have improved economic conditions at home, and the tide of emigration had been much reduced in consequence. In Italy, on the other hand, there had been large growth of surplus population, with small corresponding development of industrial opportunity. Just as in this country at certain periods the migratory spirit has affected entire districts, as when northern New England poured into Illinois and Iowa; Ohio into Kansas and Missouri; or Iowa into the Dakotas, so in like manner from time to time the American fever has swept through particular districts or countries of Europe.

It affected Sweden and Norway to such an extent that there are perhaps more Scandinavians in our Northwest than are left in Europe. It was now affecting the lower half of the Italian peninsula, and entire neighborhoods were being depopulated. An equilibrium will in due time be established

in Italy, the migratory fever will abate, and we shall have here several millions of Italians and their descendants, to whom for our own well-being we must apply our principles and methods of leveling up.

In place of the former influx of people from the German Empire, we were now receiving hundreds of thousands from the strange and varied nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Previous to 1880, that empire did not furnish us with 1 per cent of our immigrants. It was in 1906 supplying 25 per cent of them. Italy was also supplying 25 per cent, whereas the movement of Italians was very small up to 1890. In the twenty years previous to 1880, about 1 per cent of our immigrants came from the Russian Empire. Since 1890, the movement from Russia had been large and steadily growing, until it constituted 20 per cent of the total. At the present time (1907) our newcomers from Europe are arriving at the rate of about a million a year, of whom nearly 700,000 are from southern and eastern Europe, including about 150,000 Hebrews, nearly all from Russia.

In proportion to our total population, immigration was larger in the movement that culminated in 1854 than it has been at any time since. But the intensity of life in the Civil War period, and the strength of the agricultural and industrial movements that followed the war, undoubtedly had a fusing and transforming effect that greatly quickened the process of Americanizing the foreign elements. Having in mind its early colonization, — which, besides the main factors from the British Islands, included German, Dutch, Swedish, and Swiss, as well as French and Spanish elements, — the composite American nationality did not lose faith in its power to assimilate all comers.

Our schools, our free economic life, and the practice of self-government in our townships and villages were relied upon to turn the first generation of foreigners into sympathetic, law-abiding, and useful members of the body politic, and to bring the second and third generations into complete unison and accord with all the distinctive notes of American life.

This surely was a great deal to expect. Whatever might have been the origins of the major part of the early American stock, we had trained it up to a higher average of moral, intellectual, and economic well-being than could be found prevailing anywhere else. Our definite object, furthermore, was not only to maintain this average, but to advance it as the nation spread out across the richer territories of the Mississippi Valley. Yet we were proclaiming the doctrine of free asylum for all the world, were welcoming hordes of laborers, regardless of nationality or previous condition, and were proposing to assimilate and absorb them without deteriorating our resulting racial composite. It was a daring experiment, and one never tried elsewhere on any similar scale of variety and magnitude. Upon an impartial statement of the facts it would have seemed not merely paradoxical but disastrous, if not impossible. Yet, in so far as we can judge of it, up to a recent period, it has been successful.

And this success has been largely due to the very circumstances which might have seemed the most discouraging. Between the years 1820 and 1906 we received more than 24,000,000 foreign immigrants, who with their descendants to-day undoubtedly constitute much the larger half of our 75,000,000 white population. A few of these people came with the advantages of education, and a few with property.

But these were rare exceptions. There were many farmers and skilled workmen, but the vast majority were from the humble ranks of European laborers. They were ignorant, like the general class from which they had come, and many of them were in other respects ill-conditioned.

We learned by degrees to enforce certain minimum standards in order to protect ourselves against the arrival of notorious criminals, habitual paupers, and those manifestly belonging to the dependent, defective, and delinquent classes. But, otherwise, the doors were wide open. The very fact that the immigrants were ignorant and poor, — that they had no pride of ancestry and no memory of fortunate conditions at home, — made it the easier for them to accept the conditions of a new country and to cherish great hopes for their children. They came at a time when we were building railroads, creating industrial and manufacturing centers, and rearranging our population by a twofold movement, —one to the commercial and manufacturing towns and one to the new lands of the West. They found here an ample reward for industry and thrift, and were willing to enter our industrial school in the lowest class, so to speak. This gave us opportunity for a much more rapid development of complex economic life than would otherwise have been possible.

For a good while the Germans engaged in a variety of humble callings, and the Irish supplied the demand for unskilled manual labor. The older American element found an increased opportunity for leadership and direction in business, social, and political life. In the midst of these changing conditions, there remained a sufficient social and economic mobility to prevent the formation of class lines or race groups. The farm-hand could learn farming, save

money, and reasonably hope to become a landowner. If the wage-earner in mill or factory or mine could not well expect to change his own occupation for the better, he could center his hopes in his children.

The public schools became more than ever the essential institution of the country. However imperfect their methods of teaching, they were at least making it certain that the children of all classes of immigrants would adopt the English language, reading and writing it as well as speaking it, and would acquire the American point of view.

If these immigrants had come to us in association with a great number of men of wealth and high intelligence from their own countries, they would almost inevitably have been drawn into geographical groups, where they would have perpetuated their own languages and customs. They would not merely have introduced new racial elements, but they would have altered the social structure. Wisconsin would have become a permanently German State, like portions of southern Brazil. We should have had Italian elements retaining their own language and characteristics, like the Italians of Argentina. Minnesota would have become Swedish, and the Dakotas Norwegian.

Our experiment hitherto has shown us the transforming power of democratic institutions and ideals under favorable conditions. It does not follow, however, that the incidental evils and difficulties of what in the main has been a fortunate and successful movement, may not grow until they require, not merely ordinary remedies, but also sharp preventive checks. Time and experience alone can tell us. It unquestionably remains the general intention of the American people to adhere to their old views regarding the essential solidarity of American citizenship.

III

FURTHER REMARKS UPON IMMIGRATION AND RACE QUESTIONS, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE SOUTHERN PROBLEM

From the beginning we had carefully guarded the principle of free migration within our own territories. And, although we did not express the principle in a formal way, we also cherished the idea that this country should always afford free asylum to those who chose to come here because of religious, or civic, or economic disadvantage in Europe. So deep-rooted was this idea, that even those extreme Protestants who formed the Know-nothing party in the fifties, to check the growing power of the Irish Catholics, had no more thought of putting restrictions upon immigration than of limiting the freedom of movement from one state to another.

It was not until the influx of Chinese labor on the Pacific coast became very large that the doctrine of universal asylum was brought into serious dispute. Laborers in great numbers were needed for building the Pacific railroads and other tasks of Pacific coast development. Fewer than one hundred thousand Chinese laborers had been imported before 1870, but in the following years the number increased with great rapidity. American workmen contended that the very essence of our institutions depended upon the maintenance of our accustomed standards of living. They argued that, with sources of supply so

vast, Chinese labor threatened not merely to disturb economic conditions temporarily, but to change permanently the social character of the Pacific coast states.

It is needless to rehearse the now familiar facts and arguments. I wish only to recall certain points of view. The issues of the war and the controversies of Reconstruction politics had intensified the New England view of human rights as such; and to deny the Chinese the right of free access to this country seemed like a base betrayal of a sacred cause which had triumphed in the emancipation and enfranchisement of the negroes.

But the saner and more logical view carried the day. If the presence of the negro in a great democratic brotherhood of white men had proved so divisive, and had wrought such incalculable mischief, with endless trouble yet in store, why should we run the risk of adding to our future troubles by admitting a large Mongolian population to the Pacific coast, which would of necessity remain alien and distinct?

At length, in 1879, Congress passed a bill limiting the number of Chinese who could be brought to the United States in any one vessel, to fifteen. President Hayes vetoed it because of its violation of treaty obligations. After due negotiation with China, another bill was passed in 1882, suspending the admission of Chinese laborers for ten years. And that suspension has been extended from time to time. The period was a critical one, and the action taken was opportune. Chinese labor served a temporary purpose of importance; but if the preventive check had not been applied a quarter of a century ago, it is reasonably probable that by this time conditions would have been beyond practical remedy. White labor would have avoided

the Pacific coast, just as it avoided our Southern states in the slavery period. And the recent economic developments of Oregon, Washington, and California, as well as of a series of states and territories adjacent to these, would have been dependent upon ever increasing relays of Asiatic labor.

It is wholly probable that by this time the Chinese would have outnumbered the white population of our states west of the Rocky Mountains. Meanwhile their groups and colonies would have steadily increased in our Eastern cities, and every population center would have had its Chinatown, with all attendant features. I am firmly of the opinion that the Chinese exclusion act was of inestimable importance, from the standpoint of our original American purpose to create and maintain a great unified nationality. In excluding the Chinese laborers, we decided rightly a constructive problem of great magnitude, and kept the Pacific coast for our own citizenship.

More recently, the Pacific coast has been stirred up over the increase of Japanese immigration. The demand for labor is great, and the existing rule of exclusion has not applied to any Asiatics except Chinese. The influx of Japanese had not as yet reached such dimensions as to be alarming, although it had increased of late. The Japanese government understood the spirit of our policy, and was seeking to utilize the expansive and migratory energy of its people for the development of territories under its own control in Asia, especially Korea. Thus it prefers to check the movement of Japanese labor to the United States. If, however, such a check should not be put into effective operation, and the stream of Japanese immigration should greatly increase in volume, it is by no means unlikely

that the arguments which led to the exclusion of Chinese labor twenty-five years ago would prevail as against immigration from other Asiatic countries. Meanwhile, a practical way to reduce the incoming of Japanese laborers was found by President Roosevelt and Secretary Root early in 1907 by a passport regulation. Its chief significance lay in the fundamental policy of exclusion that undoubtedly inspired it.

As respects the desirability of putting a radical check upon the volume of European immigration now arriving, it is difficult to view the question with any sort of perspective. In times past when rapid influx might have suggested limitation, natural causes have so suddenly reduced the swollen stream as to dismiss the question in its immediate aspects. It is to be remembered that present tests keep back great numbers whom the steamship companies decline to receive at points of origin.

If the test of literacy were added, we should further reduce the present movement by perhaps 30 per cent. Yet the illiterates come from disadvantaged regions, rather than from exceptionally degraded classes. Our labor market absorbs them, and their children enter the schools. The illiterates show no peculiar criminal or anti-social tendencies. If their lack of intelligence unfits them for anything, it is for the political franchise. An obvious remedy would lie in the direction of our attaching much greater importance to the process of naturalization, and restricting the franchise, in the case of the foreign-born, to those showing positive fitness for participation in our political and governmental life.

The inconveniences due to the massing of new population elements in our great cities will probably prove to

be transitional. They put the greater burden on our public schools, and they give opportunity to the corruptionist and the demagogue in politics. The English language remains our great necessary bond. Our Constitution and our laws are written in that language, and it would be absolutely reasonable to admit no foreign-born citizen to the franchise who cannot read the laws in the language of this country. The more polyglot the newer immigration becomes, the more reasonable and desirable is an insistence upon the common use for public purposes of one language.

Whether or not we find it desirable to adopt any sweeping form of restriction upon the freedom of honest working people to make their homes in this country, we shall continue undoubtedly to extend and to perfect the existing forms of regulation. We shall have better inspection and sifting at the points of embarkation. We shall greatly increase our efforts to promote a better distribution of immigrants throughout the country. We shall encourage the renewed efforts of Southern and Western states to divert immigrant population from the Eastern cities. We shall watch with extreme interest the experiments which are soon to test thoroughly the newer forms of demand for European labor in the Southern states.

In spite of the difficulties caused by his presence, the Southern states have upon the whole accorded to the negro the amplest opportunities in economic directions. He is not only permitted but encouraged to own land, and all occupations are open to him. There is no working class in any European country possessing a tithe of the advantages that are at the hand of the negro working class of our Southern states. Their leaders have failed to perceive this, with a few exceptions. From this time forth the

negro will be subjected to a new and increasingly severe competition with white labor of recent European origin.

If the negro cannot meet this test, he will gradually lose relative position. Negro slavery was destroyed by Irish and German immigrants, who became a makeweight that gave the North and West an irresistible preponderance. The ultimate solution of the negro question in its more recent phases will probably come about through the diversion of European immigration to Southern states. Of the twenty-four millions who have come here since 1820 very few have gone into the area of the old slave states. They have entered into the complex industrial and agricultural development of the North and West. The South has remained agricultural and has made limited demands upon the world's labor market. But it is entering upon a new industrial period, and it will undoubtedly secure great accessions of European-born workmen. The new competition will be good for the negro, because it will result in the survival of the fittest, although it will restrict the relative growth of negro population. It is the most interesting of our future problems.

The negro race question in some of its relations to political parties is one to which I shall have to recur in a subsequent chapter. I am here and now discussing problems of population and race in their more fundamental aspects. I have endeavored to show that from the very beginning it has been the object of the American people, organized as a state in the large sense of that word, to develop a unified nationality. The carrying out of this great object could only have been accomplished by positive political action. It required the national extension of domain in order that contiguous unoccupied territory might be developed upon

a uniform plan of American institutional life, and with a population essentially homogeneous.

I have shown briefly how the problems presented by the existence here of aboriginal Indian tribes — problems that seemed so formidable to our forefathers — have been gradually overcome until their final solution can be readily foreseen. I have tried to point out the significance of the arrival here before and after the Civil War period of great bodies of Irishmen and Germans who have become, in their younger generations, so assimilated with the older American population, as to have disappeared from the distinct place they held for a time in our political life. Some differentiation of tradition is a desirable thing in any nation, for it gives color and variety to life; and long may St. Patrick's Day be remembered and observed in America. But Mr. Redmond finds here a younger generation of sons of Ireland who are quite ignorant of the present phases of Irish politics, and almost hopelessly indifferent to them, while intensely alive to the problems of this country. The younger generation of German ancestry, moreover, while keeping alive a certain tradition of distinctive traits and qualities, is losing even a slight acquaintance with the German language.

In short, the descendants of the great German migration to this country in the period from 1850 to 1880 are now more completely Americanized than many of the descendants of the Germans who settled in Pennsylvania almost two hundred years ago, because drawn into the main currents of the national life. These great population elements of Irish and German stock are too deeply engaged with their functions in the economic, social, and political life of America, — these functions now including the work of

Americanizing the new hordes of Italians, Hungarians, Poles, and Russians, — to maintain those distinctions and prejudices which for a time gave us German-Americans and Irish-Americans, as factors to be reckoned with in our political life. It may be added that in like manner the Scandinavian-American is destined soon to become extinct. The Scandinavians of the Northwest are becoming fully American with a rapidity of assimilation that leaves nothing to be desired.

These processes of transition are critical, somewhat in the measure of the contrasts to be overcome. Some temporary evils are not to be wholly avoided. We are careful, indeed, to exclude so far as possible the coming of criminals from European countries. But speaking generally, our criminal elements have not been so much recruited from the ranks of immigrants themselves as it is customary to believe. The criminal recruits have, rather, come from the American-born children of immigrants, and they have spent some years in our public schools. It is a passing phase, due to natural difficulties of adjustment.

This fact relates to a very important and fundamental problem of our present public life. From the early days in this country, in whatever terms we may have expressed it, we have recognized the fact that the permanence of our institutions depended, not upon the forms of our written constitutions and laws, but upon the transmission of our best ideals from one generation to the next. In the early days this preëminent task of turning the younger generation into Americans was shared, with the school, by the home, the church, and various institutions of neighborhood life. The stupendous influx of foreign elements, and the positive decline in the birth-rate of the older American

stock, has now changed and intensified the problem of maintaining American standards and ideals. During the transitional periods a greatly increased burden of responsibility must rest upon the public schools.

Prevailing standards of American life are much higher in most respects than those of the European laborers and peasants who make up the great part of our more recent immigration. The arriving adults enter honestly and hopefully into our industrial life. Whatever problems of an acute or immediate sort their arrival in large numbers may present, the continuing and serious problem is that which looks to the next generation. These arriving laborers cannot themselves dominate the country or very seriously disturb its public condition. Their labor assists in our development and enrichment. Their ignorance often leads to their political exploitation by demagogues. But this belongs, again, to those passing phases of political life that, though often acute, are superficial and transient.

The deep and abiding problem is that of the transformation of the Scandinavian, or Italian, or Polish child into an American citizen as firmly loyal to our ideals and as capable of doing a citizen's part as if his ancestors had lived in this country for four generations under favorable conditions. Fortunately, the opportunities afforded by American life still have their power to kindle the imagination of the newcomers. They soon find that they have everything to gain and nothing to lose by a complete merging into the life of this country. This hopeful receptivity on the part of the immigrant has only to be met by wise plans and provisions on our part for his full adoption into the American family.

If we find that the process of assimilation is not seriously disturbed, there would seem no sufficient reason for attempt-

ing to place severe and arbitrary restrictions upon the flow of European immigrants to our shores. The fact that our industrial activities have readily absorbed the new labor supply of the past decade would not permanently justify so huge a volume of immigration unless it were reasonably certain that these strange people would cease to be alien and would in due time become merged and blended and altogether American.

Heretofore, as I have said, our European accessions have come in periods bearing some relation to our waves of business prosperity. This was true of the great migration that reached its climax in 1854. It was similarly true of that which set in after the Civil War and attained its maximum in 1873. The next year of climax was in 1882, which brought us nearly 800,000 immigrants. This was five or six times as many as came in 1877 or 1878. It is true that the average from 1903 to 1907 has been about a million a year. But from 1894 to 1899 the average was only a quarter of a million. The changes of this human tide come with startling abruptness; and while we are discussing ways and means to prevent a complete inundation, the situation is likely enough to alter of itself, so that, instead of a million a year, we may be receiving a half or a quarter of that number.

It would probably be advantageous if the graphic line that indicates these changes were less violent in its fluctuation. A steadying and an equalizing of the current of migration would be beneficial. It is, of course, to be remembered that all checks are expected to operate at the point of origin, so that the disqualified would suffer no hardship from rejection. Tests should therefore be of a simple kind, easy to understand. The idea that adult

immigrants should know how to read and write their own language and should have a small amount of property is not unreasonable in itself, and might in times of prosperity operate rather desirably than otherwise. For, in the seasons of maximum influx, the limit is fixed by the capacity of the steamships. If tests of education and property were established, immigration would still be very large in periods of great demand for labor. Another method of equalizing and somewhat limiting immigration is found in the tendency to require a larger cubic air space for each person in the steerage of ships. And along a similar line is the proposal to fix the maximum number which any ship may bring at one time. The new immigration law of 1907 requires more ship space, and in other ways extends the oversight of the government.

It is possible by regulations of one kind or another to retard somewhat the inflow, and to discriminate somewhat in favor of the more intelligent and thrifty as against those who in Europe always live close to the pauper line. But all the burden of proof thus far must rest with those who assert that harsh and severe restrictions are necessary. So long as our labor market can make good use of the arriving adults, while our school-teachers report that their efforts — together with the other assimilating forces of American life — can mold the children into a safe and responsible type of American citizenship, we have no cause for grave apprehension.

The structure of our political life is such, thanks to the foresight of the founders of the Republic, that we have been able thus far to receive foreigners into our citizenship without detriment. And the structure of our economic and industrial life is such in its variety and complexity that we

have been able to utilize all classes of foreign labor without impairing freedom of movement and change. We are not hardening our population into classes or castes or groups, whether of different trades or callings, or of different nationalities. The Italian, coming now in the twentieth century, finds the same freedom of opportunity that the German or Irishman found half a century earlier. He begins as a common laborer at excellent wages, finds promotion in certain special callings, whether as a cobbler of shoes or a dealer in fruit, and moves easily and readily forward in every line of craftsmanship or trade or professional pursuit. Such is the process; and without undue optimism I am bound to say that it seems entirely safe and wholesome.

Even to the complaint that of the recent newcomers the great majority are at present retained in the East, and add to the foreign character of our larger cities, there are hopeful answers to be made. First, these cities are the centers of certain forms of industry that give the newcomers immediate employment and a safe introduction to American life in close contact with many earlier comers of their own nationality. The forces of attrition and assimilation in a metropolis like New York are very great. From the necessities of the case the public schools of such a city recognize and accept the function of training foreign children to be Americans. If one were searching for a preeminent focus of patriotic American enthusiasm, he would find nothing to answer that description more satisfactorily than a representative public school of New York or Chicago, where more than 90 per cent of the children are of non-English-speaking foreign parentage.

From the beginning the Americans have been a composite

European race, and we must reconcile ourselves to the idea that the earlier stock is to be superseded by the later. The French race in France holds its own in numbers. It gains a very little, by absorption of a few immigrants from Italy and other Latinic peoples. But the early American stock east of the Alleghanies and north of Virginia does not thus hold its own. We are witnessing a veritable transformation of the American people, so far as race and stock are concerned. But through it all, American life seems to have more, rather than less, of its old power to assimilate the newcomer. The public schools and the contacts of the playground, the street, and the shop give all children the fluent use of the English language, and the newspapers do the rest.

The hundreds or thousands of papers printed here in other languages merely serve the convenience of the first generation of newcomers. They are useful in their way, because they give knowledge of American institutions and life to naturalized citizens in the only language they have learned to read. But from the larger standpoint they are transient and negligible. The second generation reads English by preference, and the third generation is unable to read anything else.

While, therefore, the whole great tendency is just what should be desired, and precisely in keeping with the hopes and aims of the founders of the country, it follows none the less that there are many problems of serious importance growing out of this unprecedented task of assimilation; and these problems are to be dealt with in the course of the day's work. Education under these circumstances becomes the foremost task of enlightened statesmanship. Not only must schools be universally provided at whatever

cost to the public treasury, but the best thought of the country must concern itself to see that the schools employ the right means to reach the desired ends. For the schools no longer exist principally to impart instruction in the art of reading, or in arithmetic, or in geography, thus merely supplementing the work that was done for the child in the home life of our earlier American society, — but the schools exist nowadays to perpetuate the elements of American life, and to maintain its ideals and its traditions.

Moreover, this work of assimilating new elements of population, on so vast a scale, justifies and requires special social and public movements, such as that for the prevention of the employment of young children in factories and mines. In earlier periods, the state could safely neglect some forms of social control and oversight. It could tax the community to provide the public school, while leaving it entirely to the discretion of parents whether or not their children should attend. And in like manner it could leave the industrial employment of children without public regulation. But under these newer conditions, while the state may endure the burdens and the difficulties thrown upon it by the presence here of millions of adults of little or no education, of slight acquaintance with our language, and of no fitness or aptitude for the political life to which we so readily admit them, it is plain enough that such conditions are endured because they are considered transient, and that the state cannot and will not permit them to become perpetuated or intensified through neglect of the children.

It belongs, therefore, to a sound program of constructive politics, first, to provide ample school facilities for all children; second, to see that the schools have such a character as to train children for American citizenship and for useful

places in the economic life; third, to see that all children are actually taught and trained, directly or indirectly, under the auspices of the state; and fourth, as a necessary corollary, to prevent parents and employers from depriving children of their rightful opportunities of instruction and training. This program is a very large one, and its urgency cannot fairly be questioned.

Hitherto it has been deemed sufficient to leave both the expense and the control of this work of elementary education to the respective states, — although this remark admits of some important modifications. From the very beginning the nation itself recognized the free neighborhood school as one of the foundation stones upon which its institutions must rest; and in the disposal of the public lands, the national government — presupposing the establishment everywhere of such free school systems — gave certain sections or square miles in every township toward the creation of school endowment funds. In other and analogous ways, the nation has recognized the schools as an essential of American life, and has made further grants, usually in the form of lands, to the respective states for educational purposes.

The conditions of life in the South before the Civil War had not been favorable to such a development of free public schools as had been attained in the North and West. In the period following the war, it became manifestly necessary to provide schools in the South, and prevailing sentiment required a separate system for negro children. In the impoverished condition of the South, it was manifestly impossible to make suitable provision at once even for a single system of common schools, and the added expense of a double system meant a practical failure of both. The

percentage of illiteracy had been high among the poorer white people of the South before the war, and the conditions that existed from 1860 to 1870 greatly increased this percentage. A wiser and more philosophical national statesmanship in the period from 1865 to 1885 would have recognized the economic and social rehabilitation of the South as the most important of the nation's public duties.

But the passions and prejudices that culminated in the great war were destined to survive for a long time in the political life of the country. The North had not only emancipated the Southern negroes, but it had enfranchised them, and through delay in the granting of amnesty to the Southern white men, it had for a time placed the negroes in political control, with consequences that were appallingly disastrous. The withdrawal of federal troops from the Southern states, in 1877, had been followed by the immediate exclusion of the negroes from the prominent place they had assumed in politics and government for ten years. The processes by which the white race not only asserted and gained political supremacy, but completely excluded negroes of all classes from participation in political life, were more than summary and drastic; they were revolutionary.

The negroes had been enfranchised without any training to fit them for political responsibilities. Furthermore, they were arrayed in politics as one solid, numerical factor against everything that had previously constituted the political structure and life of the Southern states. It was not merely an unwise situation, but it was unendurable, and it would have led to a race war of extermination, if white supremacy had not been able to assert itself when once the federal hand was withdrawn. Despite their losses in the Civil War, the whites were about twice as numerous as

the negroes throughout the South as a whole, although in South Carolina and Mississippi the negroes were more numerous than the whites.

History can always be trusted to interpret these movements with justice and without passion. But it is not easy for contemporaries or participants to see the full bearing of political events. It was natural that the Southern race question should have become involved in party controversy. The granting of political suffrage to the emancipated negroes followed the New England theory of abstract human rights, that had gained strength with the abolition movement, and it also appealed to the Republican leaders as a practical political measure. If the Southern states were to be readmitted to their places in the Union, it seemed to the Northern politicians necessary to enfranchise the negroes as a preliminary, by amendment of the national Constitution, for two reasons: first, to give the negroes themselves a political and legal method of self-protection in the states where they lived, and, second, to give the nation a constitutional method by which in future case of need it could support the negroes against harsh discrimination and could also control federal elections.

The great historical opportunity had come to make American citizenship *national*, in express terms of the Constitution, and to make the political franchise equal and universal throughout the country. In their broad significance, the 14th and 15th Amendments added to the Constitution those very principles, as respects equality of American citizenship, that had been at the basis of the country's entire political and social development.

The presence of the negro race had always formed the one extreme and dangerous exception. The prohibition

of the slave-trade, which took effect in 1808, must be regarded not merely as due to scruples against an iniquitous traffic, nor alone as an admission of the fact that human slavery was objectionable, but must also be regarded as a far-sighted restriction upon immigration. It was definitely intended to build up a homogeneous society in America, and the presence of great numbers of negroes, quite apart from their status as slaves, would have been out of keeping with such aims and ideals.

The prohibition of the slave-trade was, in its way, the precursor of the Chinese Exclusion Act which took effect about seventy-five years later. Unfortunately, the laws against the slave-trade were imperfectly enforced. The growth of cotton culture and the plantation demands of the South made the smuggling of slave cargoes very profitable and tempting, and the West Indies afforded a convenient rendezvous for this illegal traffic. Nevertheless, I will venture to express an opinion, perhaps a novel one, that the prohibition of the slave-trade was the most important of all public acts in the history of this country, from the standpoint of constructive policy in the development of our citizenship. For in spite of its imperfect enforcement, this prohibition made the slave-trade outlawed, piratical, and extremely hazardous, and in the main it was successful in its object.

So great became the later demand for slave labor in our Southern states, that if the slave-trade had been left free and open, there is ample reason for thinking that the traffic from Africa direct, from the West Indies, from the Turkish Empire, and from all parts of the world where human beings were objects of barter and sale, would have expanded upon a very great scale. What the Constitution politely called

"the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit" would have gone on with ever increasing energy. When the New England sea captains had to give up the slave-trade, they brought white European laborers over to our Northern ports and sold them in the open markets to the highest bidder for a term of years as the method of collecting their passage money. This influx of white people to the North would have been paralleled or outstripped by the great influx of negroes to the South.

I am looking at the race problem in its fundamental aspects. Slavery under the American flag was bound to be self-limiting and temporary. Its abandonment did not depend in any manner upon the outbursts of anti-slavery sentiment in the North, nor upon the proclamation of freedom as a war measure. It would have been given up in due time as an obsolete form of human relationship. From the standpoint of the longer movements of history, the important thing was the importation of large numbers of people so alien in origin and characteristics as the negroes, irrespective of their earlier status. And the virtual ending of this form of immigration in 1808 is of incalculable significance to the subsequent course of American history. So great was the demand for more negroes in the forties and fifties that the repeal of the law of 1808 was openly demanded by representatives of the slave power; and in the years just preceding the war the illicit slave-trade had undoubtedly assumed rather large dimensions.

The conditions of the plantation system of the lower South and of the domestic slave-trade were not favorable to a very rapid increase of numbers. There were about 1,200,000 slaves in the country in 1810, just after the

suppression of the slave-trade. The number had doubled by 1840, and it reached nearly 4,000,000 in 1860. Since Southern representation in Congress allowed three-fifths of the slaves to be reckoned, there was no temptation to make the census figures too small. I do not hesitate to express the belief that if the slave-trade had remained open, there would have been at least twice as many slaves by the census of 1860, and probably as many negroes in the country then as there are now. The negro population would have vastly outnumbered the white throughout all the lower South, and the outlook for the future would have been something very different from that which now exists.

The abolition of slavery would have come, but it is probable that a number of the great states of the South would have remained permanently negro communities like San Domingo, Haiti, and Jamaica. The social difficulties that pertain to the Southern race situation will be serious for a long time to come. But it is probable that the worst of the political difficulties have now been met. The Constitution provides for a national, universal citizenship that includes the negroes, and these provisions will stand. Many negroes have come North, and their votes count in the balance between parties. The great necessity of the South was to find some way of restoring order and the appearance of legality, while putting political power — where it could best be exercised — in the hands of the white population during the period needful for negro training and development. Having disfranchised the negro first by intimidation and fraud, the Southern states, with only one or two exceptions, proceeded to disfranchise him by enactments providing educational and property qualifications, advance

payment of poll taxes, and various discretionary powers vested in registration and election officers.

Under the new provisions of the federal Constitution it is required that representation in Congress should be reduced in proportion to the number of citizens excluded from the franchise by any state. This mandate, however, could be put into effect only by acts of Congress recognizing the facts and proceeding accordingly. But although Republican party platforms have from time to time demanded a reduction of Southern representation, no serious attention has been given to the subject by Congress, and it is not likely that any steps will be taken to reduce Southern representation in the new apportionment of seats in the House that will follow the census of 1910.

The solution as it stands is by no means unstatesmanlike. Every negro citizen of the United States retains his theoretical political rights. In the South he does not at present exercise those rights except in certain districts or communities, such as eastern Tennessee. But, meanwhile, the negro has full opportunity to educate his children, and to work freely and securely at any trade or calling. The South is still poor, and it is with great effort and sacrifice that it can by degrees improve its very imperfect system of elementary education. The laws of the Southern states require an impartial per capita division of school funds between the two races. And although the negro schools do not in all cases actually receive their share of school money, the provision made for negro education by these states, in view of all the circumstances, is both generous and broad-minded. Negro illiteracy is gradually diminishing, and economic progress is clearly perceptible. In the more prosperous cities and towns, school conditions

have greatly improved for both races within recent years. By degrees there will develop a considerable element of conservative negro population, possessing intelligence, property, and character. And such negroes will probably, by common consent, come into actual exercise of their present theoretical rights as citizens.

The North has gradually learned to recognize the inherent difficulties of the race situation, and to see the need of allowing the Southern states to work out their own problems through the changes that can only come about with the passing of the years. The states which were so eager just before the war for the further unrestricted importation of African labor are now beginning to exert themselves to secure the importation of Italian and other elements of European white labor.

One of the great recent constructive policies of the United States government has been directed toward the diversification and improvement of Southern farming. In Louisiana, Texas, and other Southern states, remarkable results have followed the scientific and practical demonstrations of the Department of Agriculture. While there is room for the negro in this improved farming, there is — even more importantly — a great and growing opportunity for the white man. In many regions where the plantation system once prevailed, the smaller farms, owned and successfully cultivated by white farmers of the Northern type, are multiplying rapidly.

Furthermore, the development of manufactures throughout the South is bringing into existence the complex industrial life which affords opportunities in many directions for an increased population, that can only be derived from European sources, since there is no available negro supply,

even if negroes were more desirable than white men. The logic of the situation is that from this time forth the white population of the South is destined to grow very much more rapidly than the negro population. The advance of industry, wealth, and population will improve the general conditions of social and political life. Schools will be better supported, and the disorders illustrated by riots and lynching will diminish as industrial society becomes more advanced, and as police administration is more thoroughly organized. These disorders are, indeed, very deplorable, and they must be contended against by all the serious forces of politics and civilization. But it is philosophical to view them as transitional in their nature.

There was a time when the negro population of the United States was almost 20 per cent of the total. This percentage has been gradually diminishing until it was about $11\frac{1}{2}$ in the year 1900. If the present rate of immigration should continue, the negro percentage will have been reduced in the census of 1910 to about one-tenth of the whole population.

The slavery system lifted perhaps one million Southern white people to the position of a favored class, and led to the neglect and relative decline of the South's most valuable possession, namely, its five or six millions of plain white people of old American stock, who had very little property and few advantages. For the great majority of the four million negroes, slavery meant an immeasurable improvement in their lot, when compared with their conditions in Africa. In any just estimate, the disadvantaged people — for whom the philanthropists and reformers of the North should have lifted up their voices — were not the slaves, but the disinherited and neglected mass of white population.

It is slowly dawning upon the minds of the political leaders of the South that the redemption of their communities lies in the full restoration and development of their own white population. The cotton-mill, the school, the improvement of agriculture, every agency of progress and civilization, must be invoked to make the poor whites of the South prosperous and intelligent. The progress that is now evident along all these lines represents the most important and transforming movement in American society and in fundamental conditions that the new century can show. The economic and social upbuilding of the Southern white population will bring about conditions attractive to white immigrants from Europe and the North, and the structure of Southern society will by degrees come to be similar to that of other regions where white men live and work on a high level of intelligence and democratic equality.

The negro race will decline steadily in relative numbers, will remain socially distinct, and will be greatly improved by the sheer necessities of a situation that will subject it to a competitive struggle for existence. There will probably be some apparent tendency toward concentration of negro population in the so-called "Black Belt" and other districts for a time; but the larger tendency will be toward a dispersion of the race. Thus the most difficult social and political situation with which we have had to contend in the formative process of building up our continental American democracy will have been reduced to a fairly workable solution, by the resistless dynamics of our onward movement.

We had acquired a vast, favorable domain; we had created a free political system; we had opened wide our doors to the kindred nationalities of Europe, and the result

was a new, composite nationality, with unity of language, with similarity of local institutions, with pervasive intelligence, with social and industrial mobility. A society thus constituted could not tolerate the disarrangements that would arise from a large Mongolian influx on the Pacific coast. Nor would it permit large fresh accessions of negro population from the West Indies or directly from Africa. But it can accept the burden imposed upon it through its own faults and errors of the earlier period. It can deal justly and in a helpful and loyal spirit with the negroes already here and with their children after them. Their presence will continue to be anomalous, but the difficulties arising from it will grow less critical and less baffling from this time forth. No single solution of a magical sort, but a host of less perceptible remedies all making for normal progress and national unity, will by degrees bring about a condition endurable for both races.

IV

PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE SETTLEMENT AND USE OF THE NATIONAL DOMAIN

When the nation acquired the Western lands of Virginia and the other original colonies, it also assumed their Revolutionary War debts. From the standpoint of Alexander Hamilton and other constructive statesmen of that period, the assumption of the debts was more important than the acquisition of the lands, as a unifying measure. It was indeed expected that the Western settlements would develop rapidly, and bring new and important states into the Union, but the men charged with the problems of finance naturally thought of the Western lands as a lucrative asset and expected much from their sales in large tracts as a source of public revenue.

This anticipation was never, in fact, justified. The public lands have probably cost the government of the United States, from first to last, $150,000,000 more than they have brought into the treasury. It was realized by degrees that the public domain would have to be regarded as virtually free to those who were willing to go and live upon it and bear their share in overcoming the difficulties of frontier life. The land laws came to be looked upon as providing a method for regularizing the occupation of the land and for settling conflicts between rival claimants, rather than as a means of putting money into the national

exchequer. Pioneers and so-called "squatters" were constantly pressing well beyond the lines of the surveyed areas that were regularly opened to sale and settlement, and ways were almost invariably found to enable these frontiersmen, without undue hardship, to obtain legal title.

Over the whole face of the land there was extended in legal theory a form of ownership vested in tribes of Indians. Before the government could regularly survey and open to sale a given district, the Indian title had to be extinguished through a treaty made with the chiefs or heads of the occupying tribe, which treaty in turn had to be ratified by the tribe itself on recommendation of the chiefs. This process involved in each case an arrangement for the occupation of other lands by the receding tribe, and usually a considerable money payment besides. Thus, in the aggregate, very large sums of money were paid out by the national government in order to open the lands to white settlement.

In addition there were the costs of surveying the land and of administering the arrangements for its orderly disposal. While no comprehensive system was at first adopted, the successive laws and rules for the disposal of fresh areas took on a similarity of essential features.

Obviously, it was not to the advantage of new states and territories, most of whose lands still remained a part of the unsold national domain, that such tracts should be expensive or difficult to acquire. The new communities were eager for population and development. If the general government had held its land at a high price, settlement would have proceeded slowly. As a question in purely speculative politics, it would be interesting to consider what might have happened if the government had from the outset pursued a different policy with regard to its

unoccupied domain. What really happened was the adoption of a policy that made the public lands virtually free in comparatively small tracts for actual settlers.

By degrees there came to be attached to the arable public domain the conventional price of $1.25 an acre. This was to be looked upon as the settler's share toward extinguishing the Indian title and toward the actual expense of surveying the land and giving him a recorded and guaranteed patent. It was by no mere accident, or through no argument for convenience in designating and selling the lands, that the six-mile-square township was adopted as the unit of land measurement when Congress first began to provide for distribution of its domain beyond the Ohio. The very name "township" was expressive of the expectation that these surveyed squares of wilderness land would in due time, each for itself, become the territorial basis for a self-ordering neighborhood life. The township contained thirty-six sections, or square miles, and the quarter-section of one hundred and sixty acres came in due time to be regarded as the standard or average for the extent of a single farm or homestead.

Thus almost from the beginning the doctrine that the public lands were an endowment for the benefit of the national treasury was abandoned. A very different theory took its place, namely, that the public domain was to be carefully prepared, and distributed to actual settlers on terms so favorable as to encourage a rapid Western development. Methods were adopted that would tend to keep the lands from falling into the hands of large landed proprietors, and would, on the contrary, distribute them to farmers who would build up their own equal democratic communities, while clearing the forests, making their homes, and

creating their estates. This idea that Uncle Sam had land enough to give everybody a farm who would live upon it and occupy it, appealed very strongly to the imagination of the country in the middle part of the last century. It played a greater part in the development of our social and political life than is generally remembered.

It was not, however, a view that was welcome to the slave power of the South, because it had a tendency to build up the free farming states of the West more rapidly than the slave system could grow in its southwesterly empire. The Louisiana Purchase, as it turned out, had done far more to extend the system of free farming that had become standardized in the settlement of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, than to give new room for the expansion of slavery. This vast domain purchased from Napoleon was wedge-shaped, with the narrow end touching the Gulf of Mexico. All that slavery obtained from it was comprised in the area of the present states of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri. Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, and all that lay west and north of these were successfully claimed for the free farming system of the old Northwest. The destiny of Kansas was in doubt for a time, but the superior colonizing energy of the free farmers carried the day under the squatter-sovereignty struggle of the late fifties.

It is true that the demand for additional slave territory had helped to secure the annexation of Texas; but this annexation had brought on the war with Mexico, which in its turn had led to the acquisition of California. And the discovery of gold on the Pacific coast had brought about conditions of settlement that precluded the slave system. Thus California was admitted to the Union without having gone through the probationary period of a territorial

government; and as Texas had come in with slavery as a preëxisting system, so California was admitted under its own constitution of 1849, forever prohibiting slavery.

Meanwhile, our title to the Oregon country had been confirmed, and a territorial government had been erected in 1848, under conditions in every way favorable to the settlement there, as in California, of free farmers upon the great public domain. Even before this time the government had adopted the practice of granting two square miles in each surveyed township to the new state or territory for a permanent endowment of common schools. Thus in spirit and in practical working, the land policy of the United States had been designed to create free agricultural commonwealths in the Mississippi Valley and farther west; and their progress had obtained such headway and momentum before the land hunger of the slavery system had become insatiate, that a preponderance had been obtained beyond all chance of reversal.

It was this policy of public domain, in conjunction with our immigration policy and those conditions in Europe that had sent us millions of Irishmen and Germans previous to 1860, that preserved the country for its original ideals of a free and homogeneous democracy. Such, however, was the strength of the compact influence of the pro-slavery elements in Congress, that it had never been possible to enact the broad, free homestead legislation for the whole public domain that had been strongly advocated for many years in the North and West.

Such legislation quickly followed the withdrawal of the Southern states from the Union. The land legislation of 1862 stands as a great monument in the history of American development. While still permitting the native or

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naturalized citizen through actual occupancy to obtain title to one hundred and sixty acres of the public domain after a limited period of residence and the payment of $1.25 an acre (a system adopted in 1841), it further provided that the permanent homesteader who had built his house and cultivated his land in good faith, might at the end of five years obtain full and free title to his quarter-section farm without payment of the $200 or any other sum whatsoever.

Under these liberal provisions, with some further additions and modifications of the land system, the great Western prairies were settled as if by magic, when, at the end of the Civil War, the awakened energies of the nation were turned toward economic development. The restless energy of hundreds of thousands of young soldiers from the Confederate as well as from the Union armies found an outlet in the opportunity to go westward. The new land laws facilitated the most rapid possible settlement. The movement was further stimulated by an era of unprecedented railroad building, the new lines radiating in all directions from central Western points like Chicago and St. Louis.

Almost from the moment of gold discovery in California, there had been a widespread agitation and discussion of the possibility of overland railways to unite the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Several routes were projected and partially surveyed in the decade before the Civil War. It was proposed to secure the construction of such roads through the granting of broad belts of public land, which would become valuable by reason of the means of access which the railroads would provide.

Throughout all the Western states in the thirties and forties there had been a wild speculative furor for quick

growth and aggrandizement. Billions of dollars' worth of canals and railroads had been projected on paper, and all forms of subsidy and public aid had become thoroughly familiar. The Western states as a rule had pledged their credit freely for the promotion of such new ways of communication, counties had issued bonds to secure railroads, townships and villages had subscribed, and Congress in a number of instances had conferred favors upon particular Western states by giving lands to promote transportation enterprises.

Excessive enthusiasm for such undertakings had been largely responsible for the reaction that culminated in the panics of 1837 and 1857. In the settlement of a new country, speculation is inevitable. It is one phase of that buoyant optimism without which such difficulties as have been faced in the subduing of our American continent would have been prohibitive.

In the outbursts of titanic energy necessary to the rapid opening up of the West, followed by successive periods of inevitable reaction, have been born very many of the political problems and controversies which have been peculiar to the life of the American people and which have marked the course of our political and economic history. The South, which had not been favorable to a national free homestead policy, had also been consistently adverse to the development of the West through a policy of land subventions to transportation companies. New York had built her own Erie Canal; and other enterprises for linking the East with the West had simply grasped at whatever aid they could secure, whether national, state, or local. But the breaking out of the war had emphasized the isolation of our Pacific coast country, and a Congress without

Southern members and with a great Republican majority was ready promptly to subsidize not one transcontinental road merely, but as many as could bring forward serious claims to consideration.

The first to offer were the Union Pacific, building westward from Omaha, and the Central Pacific, building eastward from Sacramento to meet this Omaha line. Congress granted these companies great loans in the form of gold bonds, and gave them some thirty million acres of land in addition. Their activity was further stimulated by an arrangement which left the point of meeting indefinite, and based the amounts of land and money subsidy upon mileage of construction actually achieved. This method resulted in the completion of a transcontinental line in seven years, whereas twice as long a period under other conditions would have been required.

The high pressure, however, of such efforts — pressure financial and political as well — centered upon our public life at Washington, with results that blasted reputations and that helped to make honesty in public life itself a political issue embarrassing to our self-respect but too serious to be disregarded or covered up.

This, however, from the larger view of history making, was only an incident. The building of the Pacific railroads and the lending of government credit, together with the use of railroad companies for inducing migration and distributing public land, were great substantive acts of public policy, magnificent in the largeness of their conception and, upon the whole, splendid and beneficent in their working out. The land grants to the Union and Central Pacific systems were followed by even more extensive grants to the Northern Pacific and to the Southern

Pacific, not to mention the great grant to the Atlantic and Pacific, and still other assignments of domain along the same policy.

It was carefully arranged that, in the distribution of these lands, the homestead principle should be followed in so far as possible. In the aggregate, the grants to railroads reached something like two hundred million acres. These lands, however, were not given in continuous tracts, but in alternate square miles. Those not familiar with this colossal phase of the history of our nation-making will understand it if they have in mind any given township or six-mile-square tract falling within the zone of a railroad land grant. Eighteen of the thirty-six sections were assigned to the railroad company on an alternate checkerboard plan. Of the remaining eighteen sections, two were set aside for the benefit of the local school fund, and sixteen were further subdivided into four quarter-sections of one hundred and sixty acres each, to be open to settlement under the preëmption and homestead laws.

This method gave the government the opportunity of locating its homesteaders in the general belt served by a railroad line, while on the other hand it practically compelled the railroad to dispose of its lands in competition with the government, and made it certain that the bringing of population and settling of the country would be the governing motive. Thus the railroads became colonizers and immigration agents on a great scale. The rapid settlement of the western half of the Mississippi Valley in the twenty years following the war lay at the foundation of many problems which have had great significance in our public life, and some of which I must present more particularly in subsequent chapters.

Much of this territory rapidly settled was an open prairie country of rich soil and favorable climate, susceptible of very quick agricultural utilization under two important conditions, namely, that it be provided with railroads and with the capital necessary for farm operations. It was a country that could not be quickly developed without railroads to bring in the lumber necessary for building and the fuel necessary for winter use, besides manufactured supplies of all kinds. On the other hand the roads were equally necessary to transport the cereals and other farm products, that were destined for Eastern and European markets. It was under these conditions that the problem of railroad control had its origin in this country. A full understanding of the railroad question in our American political life has required the preliminary consideration of these problems of population and of domain, which have thus far occupied our attention.

Furthermore, as I have remarked, the rapid development of Western agriculture required capital. A very small percentage of families which settled upon the public domain had means sufficient for more than a rude pioneering start. In order to farm advantageously, it was needful to have buildings, fences, implements, and live stock. Surplus capital from the East and from Europe was drawn westward by high rates of interest and the assurance that farm mortgages were a safe kind of investment. Within a comparatively short period, an area which had been unoccupied, save for roving bands of Indians and herds of buffalo, became a factor in the production of the world's supply of food. Several hundred millions of bushels of cereals, each year, were moving eastward to compete with the farm products of the older states, or to be shipped to

Europe. Every country in the world was profoundly affected.

Farming became unprofitable in the East, and this fact stimulated the flow of population westward. The cheapening of food products hopelessly deranged the relations between landlord and tenant in Ireland, created violent agrarian troubles, and increased the exodus from the British Islands to America. On the European continent, the effect of American competition in supplies of bread and meat was so depressing that it similarly increased the outward flow of population, while leading to the erection of anti-American tariff walls. As for our new West itself, it could not wholly escape the pains and penalties of world-wide economic readjustment. Its free lands and rich soil brought new people constantly from the older agricultural regions which had suffered from the new competition.

Thus the West became the victim of its own over-production. In bountiful years, prices were so low that the cost of railroad transportation became vital, and part of the corn crop had to be burned for fuel. In years of drouth or excessive rainfall, of grasshopper scourge, or other visitation of nature, it was impossible to pay interest upon the universal ten per cent mortgage. These conditions were making themselves felt in the period after the war, when the country was endeavoring to resume specie payment. It was under similar conditions that the great silver movement of more recent years had its strength, if not its origin.

When vast regions of a country are in the process of maturing a new agricultural and industrial life, through the use of capital borrowed from other regions, questions of money

and currency come to have an almost life-and-death importance, if crops are bad and prices are low for a series of years. For the payment of interest and the repayment of principal become practically impossible; and the question is bound to arise whether the purchasing power of the nominal unit of value has in any manner been materially changed since the contract between debtor and creditor had been originally made. Thus the problems of money, currency, and banking, which have played so striking and peculiar a part in American political life, have arisen through the sectional differences of economic condition brought about by our rapid westward movement.

The European countries had within a hundred years passed through the rapid stages of economic development which have quadrupled their populations and changed them from old-time farming conditions to their present intense and complex industrial life. But they have not been troubled by questions of money and currency, as great popular issues. It has remained for the United States to take the abstractions of monetary science, and the technical forms of knowledge and erudition that belong to public and private banking systems, and make them the subject of political debate and passionate controversy in every village and every country school district throughout the land. It has all been a part of a valuable training in democratic self-government, and it has had a profound effect upon the character and course of our political life.

The emergence of such issues in our politics has been solely due to the conditions of population and of domain which I have been endeavoring to describe. The necessity of dealing with such questions explains something that has puzzled the foreign student of our American system and

that has not been always sufficiently clear to our own philosophers. This necessity has had results so far-reaching that I may be pardoned for a brief digression to dwell for a moment upon the significance of it.

In England, it would not be considered possible at any given moment to name more than a handful of men capable of dealing effectively upon short notice with the problems that belong to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Yet the problems that present themselves for consideration to the American Secretary of the Treasury, have a much wider range than those that must usually be faced by a European finance minister. Where a hundred men in some countries might be regarded as students of the varied theoretical and practical problems of money and currency, as related to public and private finance, we have many thousands in the United States who have arrived at convictions upon almost every important phase of those abstruse and technical matters.

Let it be granted that most of these people have read and thought superficially and crudely. Nevertheless we have a vast number of citizens who have been accustomed through many years to bring minds of great strength and ingenuity to bear upon the study of such questions. They have felt it necessary for them to understand a series of subjects that in European countries are relegated to experts, and that even statesmen and men of affairs do not as a rule trench upon, regarding them as they might think of certain abstruse questions of mathematics or astronomy.

It is impossible to understand truly the course of American politics until one has to some extent grasped the conditions under which practical necessity has affected the

training and intelligence of our citizenship. While it is natural enough that the drift of opinion through great regions of country should in the main coincide with self-interest, it is notably true that the very strength of political controversy, when such questions have been brought into our politics, has been due to the fact that on both sides essential justice has been considered the issue.

In their earlier periods, the Western states, however diverse their elements of population, were simple in their economic and social structure, and rested wholly upon the basis of agriculture. While more devoid than any other equally prosperous communities in the world of a class of capitalists, or owners of realized wealth, they were on the other hand more free than any other communities of importance from the presence of a non-possessing or servile class. We had succeeded beyond the dreams of the most sanguine in creating on our arable lands, under the homestead system, communities — as in Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, the Dakotas — of average similarity of status. They were communities of a lower percentage of illiteracy than any others, and were more susceptible, probably, than any others to the play of public opinion.

The conditions of life had given the slaveholding planters of the South a training and an aptitude for politics that had been highly conspicuous through the period before the Civil War. And in turn, the conditions of Western farm settlement and life had for different reasons built up a series of communities which trained themselves to a zest and an aptitude for political questions and public life on the national plane. This must be appreciated in order to obtain a fair understanding of our political life since

the year 1870. In due time these sensitive, responsive, high-spirited populations that settled the arable states of the West after the Civil War, brought their communities up to a level of relative maturity. They had paid off their mortgages and had begun to develop a more varied industrial life. The free lands of the arable Middle West had been disposed of, and the homestead and land system of the period following the war had been successful in its main objects.

It was well known, from the earliest periods of exploration, that a wide stretch of country lying to the east of the Rocky Mountains was of limited rainfall, and that a part of it was so arid as virtually to constitute a desert region. But there was such variation of rainfall and of natural vegetation in different years that it required a generation of experiment, part of it extremely painful and disillusionizing, to learn what were our real economic problems of domain throughout a region several hundred miles in width and extending from the Canadian line to the Mexican borders. The period of rapid settlement in the Dakotas, Nebraska, and Kansas happened to coincide with a decade of unusually abundant rainfall. Thus the margin of settlement on the homestead plan was pushed beyond the line of permanent safety. A succession of dry seasons drove back hundreds of thousands of settlers and destroyed not only a long north-and-south belt of homesteads, but also brought ruin and desertion to many flourishing railroad towns.

It was learned that the semi-arid zone, while unsafe for standard American farming, was fairly well adapted to grazing. Thus a vast area, covering from a quarter to a third of the whole territory of the United States, came to

be regarded as suitable chiefly for cattle and sheep ranches. This condition was found to apply to the western parts of the states I have named, — the Dakotas, Nebraska, and Kansas, — and it pertained also to Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, parts of Washington and California, Utah, parts of Colorado and Nevada, New Mexico, and Arizona, as well as a great part of Texas. A reaction had followed the undue optimism of those who attempted to pursue ordinary farming in the areas of doubtful rainfall. Later in turn a serious reaction followed the speculative development of cattle ranching, where limited pasturage was easily exhausted, watercourses were few and far between, and winter conditions often extremely severe.

In due time it came to be perceived that the old land laws did not properly apply to the vast region of insufficient rainfall. In the arid and semi-arid belt, the water-supply is the chief public asset. The system of rectangular survey of public lands in townships and sections and quarter-sections, and their absolute disposal under the preëmption and homestead acts, which was admirable for a state like Iowa, did not suit the conditions of a state lying in the grazing belt. Those who were fortunate enough to locate their claims upon the watercourses were in a position to command for grazing purposes all the land that extended behind them for a considerable distance. It was perceived too late that the lands in the arid states should have been surveyed upon a different principle, the government retaining control of the watercourses, in order to give the holders of land on either side, to the utmost extent practicable, their reasonable use of the necessary water.

Since conditions favored the cattle business on a large scale, rather than the system known as "stock-farming"

on the smaller scale, the cattle companies were tempted to resort to various devices, some of them manifestly fraudulent, in order to obtain a monopoly of streams and waterways, and thus to command the undisputed control of a great range of grazing hinterland for their flocks and herds. Meanwhile it was discovered by degrees that the arid lands were extremely productive where brought under irrigation. Gradually in California, and to a smaller degree in other states, private individuals and companies obtained control of local water-supplies and demonstrated the possibilities of irrigation farming and fruit culture.

The states themselves were disposed to engage in such experiments, and to that end Congress granted a million acres of the arid public domain to each of these Western states in the year 1894. With much friction there was gradually coming about an adjustment of conditions among the great cattle producers, the homesteading farmers, the irrigation companies, and the other diverse interests of a vast empire containing more than a million square miles. In every one of the states concerned there had grown up a code of laws and regulations based upon the public importance and necessity of water. Political and social problems wholly different from those of the arable and well-watered portions of the Mississippi Valley were being worked out by several million people of a highly energetic character, scattered throughout a great country which they were endeavoring to redeem and utilize.

The greater part of the lands of these states and territories remained undisposed of, and under control of the national government. The public lands thus remaining included not only the unwatered stretches of sage-brush plains, but the mountainous regions, with their upland

belts of open timber or dense forest, including the headwaters of the streams and rivers. Western experience finally crystallized in the form of accepted views of wise public policy. Trans-Mississippi commercial congresses, irrigation conventions, and other agencies for the expression of Western opinion began to make demands. And although the country could not accept the views that for a time prevailed with something like unanimity in those Western communities regarding the silver question, it began to see the justice of their views touching certain problems of the public domain.

Accordingly there was adopted the principle of a permanent public retention of the chief sources of water-supply, and in place of the old subsidies to railroads and other government measures for the settlement of the prairie states, a new system of vast importance was adopted by virtue of the so-called Reclamation Act which became a law in June, 1902. This act, which bore the name of Senator Newlands of Nevada, and which was in accordance with the most extended and profound of the recommendations contained in President Roosevelt's first message to Congress, constitutes one of those great culminating measures in the course of our constructive politics, that it is one of my chief purposes in these pages to designate and to interpret.

The Reclamation Act itself was followed by an effort on the part of the existing administration to bring about a thorough revision of the land system of the country, in view of the fact that the remaining public lands were practically all in the arid states. President Roosevelt, in his message of December, 1901, had summed up the policy he advocated in these general terms: "The reclamation and

settlement of the arid lands will enrich every portion of our country, just as the settlement of the Ohio and Mississippi valleys brought prosperity to the Atlantic states. The increased demand for manufactured articles will stimulate industrial production, while wider home markets and the trade of Asia will consume the larger food supplies and effectually prevent Western competition with Eastern agriculture. Indeed, the products of irrigation will be consumed chiefly in upbuilding local centers of mining and other industries, which would otherwise not come into existence at all. Our people as a whole will profit, for successful home-making is but another name for the upbuilding of the nation."

The general constructive policy of the President called for the protection of the Western water-supply by the creation of forest reserves, and the actual developing of irrigation farming by the creation of governmental irrigation works. This policy of national investment in irrigation enterprises was so radical that it frightened the Congressional leaders of both great parties, although it had found expression in the political platforms of the year 1900. The Congressional rank and file, however, had been won over to the policy, and the Reclamation Act was carried as a non-partisan measure against the advice and the votes of the more conspicuous lawmakers. The act provided that the proceeds of the sale of public lands in sixteen great areas, namely, thirteen states and three territories, dating from June 30, 1901, should no longer go into the treasury as a part of the general revenues, but should be set apart for irrigation purposes.

The irrigated lands were to be disposed of in small tracts to actual settlers at a price large enough to cover fully the

cost of creating and maintaining the costly engineering projects. The money was to be repaid in instalments extending over a period of ten years more or less. The sums thus returned to the Reclamation Fund would be applicable to other engineering projects for further reclamation, and so on.

It is not strange that conservative statesmen should have looked with some alarm upon so striking an innovation. They were willing to encourage the states and territories in the local promotion of irrigation enterprise, but doubted the wisdom of adopting a national policy of irrigation. First, they foresaw its difficulties from the standpoint of practical administration. Second, they were impressed with the argument that such a policy involved a building up of Western agriculture at the expense of the nation, while Eastern agriculture was neglected and comparatively unprofitable. They remembered some of the more immediate disturbances of economic balance due to the policy that had subsidized railroads and in every manner hastened the upbuilding of the so-called granger states of the Mississippi Valley.

They failed to realize that the new reclamation policy, in the very nature of the case, could not operate rapidly enough to bring about such temporary disturbances of population and production, while from every standpoint the development of the arid states was an object of great concern. A number of these states had been admitted to the Union after a period of rapid development in the eighties which had created expectations that were wholly unfulfilled in the decade following 1890. These so-called cowboy states, with their scanty population and undeveloped conditions, had acquired an influence in the United States

Senate that, when compactly exerted, either to obstruct legislation or to promote it, was bringing a new sectional force into our governmental affairs that was neither wholesome nor normal in its tendencies.

The remedy for such a condition lay in the development of the latent resources of these states of mountain and desert, whose political conditions were in a state of violent local oscillation, at one moment exploited by cattle "kings," mining "kings," and railroad "magnates," at the next by populist orators, desperadoes in guise of labor leaders, or political demagogues. The Reclamation Act is a single feature of a large new program of public policy for the normal and permanent development of these mining and grazing states. The Geological Survey was prepared without delay to locate the initial undertakings and to direct the service of reclamation. These first projects were wisely distributed throughout all the states and territories concerned; and within less than five years more than $30,000,000 had been appropriated for projects which when completed would have cost more than $40,000,000.

The fund will steadily increase under the so-called revolving process, and it will in future be applied to larger and more difficult undertakings. In due time the resources of this fund will justify the creation of a series of dams for the storage of the flood waters that now go to waste in the rainy season. The land capable of irrigation is of unlimited extent, and, as I have already intimated, the problem of our Western domain is not a problem of land, but a problem of water. We have now committed ourselves to a constructive internal policy which would not have been possible in the earlier period of the Republic, and it will be productive of transforming results. In that earlier period we created

prosperous democratic communities through the plan of disposing of the public lands to settlers in quarter-section tracts. In the arid states our effort to dispose of lands under those same laws has had an effect opposite to that intended.

Homesteads by the hundreds of thousands had been located fraudulently, to enable corporations and syndicates to control watercourses and thus to monopolize the use of vast areas of the public domain. The desert land law, which grants six hundred and forty acres to one person for irrigation purposes, enacted thirty years ago, had been open to similar abuse. A complete revision of the land system had become necessary in order to make it suit in a scientific way the conditions that existed.

It is to be remembered that throughout the states of the arid or grazing belt, the greater part of the land area still belongs to the United States government. And it is probable that the government will retain permanently the ownership of hundreds of millions of acres. The grazing lands, which the great cattle companies have appropriated for themselves, and which they have parceled out by private understandings and agreements, with the indirect support and sanction of the state authorities and of state laws regulating the cattle and sheep industries, will in due time have been brought under a system of leasing.

Some million of acres previously granted by Congress to the individual Western states are thus leased, notably in Colorado, Montana, Wyoming, and Utah. The extension of irrigation will be limited simply by the financial and engineering aspects of the great projects of the reclamation policy as these will develop in the future, the chief object of which will be the storage of water in the forest areas of

the mountain slopes, in order to utilize it during those parts of the year when the streams naturally run dry. With this water conserved and used, the sandy desert would be as productive as the valley of the Nile, and lands now worth nothing more than a rental of a cent or two an acre for cattle ranges, would be worth a thousand dollars an acre for agriculture.

In pursuance of this broad policy of public use of the great national domain, we are now moving far more rapidly than most people are aware toward a complete reversal of our old-time land system. In former times, it was the avowed object of the government to distribute its great domain to private owners as rapidly as possible. The country as a whole was well wooded and its forest resources were deemed inexhaustible. The public ownership and administration of forests, whether for the sake of regulating the lumber supply, or for the better control of the sources and flow of rivers, were wholly foreign to American ideas. In the settlement of the East and of the Ohio country, the clearing away of dense encumbering forests was the chief burden and expense that the pioneer farmer had to undergo.

The rapid settlement of the prairie states was made possible by the existence of immense tracts of white pine timber in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. One of the chief purposes served by the earlier railroad systems of the Northwest and the masses of Eastern capital sent for Western development was to be found in the transformation of those pine forests into a million houses in the prairie states, with the farm appurtenances of barns and fences. The destruction of those forest areas was at a rate in exact proportion to the rapid upbuilding of the prairie states. A certain compensation — unconscious, and unforeseen —

was to be found in the planting of trees on prairie farms. In twenty or thirty years, trees attain a large growth in the rich prairie soil, and the landscape of states like Iowa has been completely transformed by the maturing of millions of trees.

While this is commendable, however, it does not constitute afforestation, or serve the peculiar purposes that render forest tracts necessary to the well-being of the country. If the government had retained ownership of the white pine forests and had sold the standing timber on a scientific plan, the needs of prairie home-makers would have been served just as well, and the forests themselves would have remained, yielding a perpetual supply of lumber, and meanwhile conserving and regulating the flow of rivers. The American Forestry Association came into being at a fortunate time to give focus and direction to a growing intelligence upon the subject of the management of the remaining forest areas of America.

Certain of the states, notably New York, adopted a forest policy based principally upon the permanent retention by the state of lands in the Adirondack forest which had been cut over by lumbermen and were forfeited through nonpayment of taxes. By 1890 the New York forest reserve had grown to the dimensions of about a million acres. It was through such action, and the gradual advance of public opinion, that many renewed attempts to induce Congress to enter upon a national forestry policy were at length rewarded in 1891. It is frequently the case in public affairs that after the failure of careful and elaborate proposals, a policy of immense consequence is brought into effect by some incidental enactment scarcely noted at the time.

In 1873 Congress had passed the Timber Culture Act.

It allowed the homesteader to secure an additional one hundred and sixty acres on condition of planting a part of it successfully in forest trees. It was conceived in total ignorance of the principles of forestry, and was a complete failure except from the standpoint of individuals who desired a pretext for acquiring valuable lands in their neighborhood. In 1891 this Timber Culture Act was very properly repealed. As an amendment to the simple measure of repeal, it was proposed: "That the President of the United States may, from time to time, set apart and reserve, in any state or territory having public lands bearing forests, any part of the public lands wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth, whether of commercial value or not, as public reservation, and the President shall, by public proclamation, declare the establishment of such reservations and the limits thereof."

Under this provision, the movement went steadily forward until within a period of fifteen years, up to the end of the fiscal year 1906, forest reserves had been set apart to the number of one hundred and six separate tracts, embracing one hundred and seven million acres. The extent of these reserves was thus greater than the whole of New England, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and Virginia. The policy was endangered in its earlier years through Western opposition due in part to a misunderstanding of its nature and in part to the pressure of private interests, and conflicts arising from imperfect administration. But successive Presidents showed enlightened views and followed scientific counsels. Proper legislation was adopted for the administration of the forest reserves, and the policy became established beyond danger of serious reversal, although Presidential power was lessened in 1907.

These great areas and their lumber resources are small as compared with the vast tracts of American forest that are privately held and that are under profitable exploitation by the so-called "lumber kings," who were, in 1906, charged with having formed a trust and established monopoly prices. Such conditions merely gave further impetus to the movement for the reservation of government areas of timbered land, which — by virtue of additional proclamations by President Roosevelt — embraced 127,000,000 acres, or 200,000 square miles, at the beginning of 1907. This is just equal to the area of the whole of France. It is almost twice the area of the kingdom of Italy.

The government is developing an administrative service that will be competent to administer its immense forest domain for various objects of common welfare. The maintenance of the forests is vital to the advantageous use of the people who occupy the lands of the lower regions which derive their water from the wooded uplands. Although the subject is a tempting one, it is not my purpose to forecast the elaborate economic development that must result from the present and prospective forest policy of the government.

Experience acquired in the management of the resources of large Indian reservations has forced the government to study and administer methods of leasing grazing lands, of selling standing timber to lumber companies, and of granting mining privileges to coal companies and other corporations. Gradually these experiences have prepared the way for a great and permanent national policy under which many hundreds of millions of acres of the public domain will be permanently retained and administered, our government thus becoming a landlord upon a scale of magnitude

that very few practical men would have deemed possible until very recently.

A phase of this movement had illustration in President Roosevelt's order (1907) withdrawing from further disposition to private owners all the public lands which had been indicated by the Geological Survey as containing deposits of coal. The area of such lands was estimated at about fifty million acres. This temporary order of the President was followed by a carefully prepared bill, providing for the permanent reservation of lands estimated at one hundred million acres in extent, on account of their richness in petroleum, coal, and various minerals. Senator Nelson's bill, which represented the views of the President and of the experts of several administrative departments, provided methods for leasing these lands, and at the same time attempted to guard against monopoly, or combination, or unreasonable prices in the sale by the lessee of the oil, coal, ores, or other products of the public land thus reserved.

Here then is another area of extent greater than a European kingdom, to be held by the government in order that its resources of mineral wealth may be developed for the general good. It is easy now to see that if the value of such a policy had been appreciated in an earlier period, particularly as respects coal lands, great public benefit would have resulted. It is not long since the iron ore lands of Minnesota and the Lake Superior region were a part of the public domain. They passed to private ownership through a misapplied use of the existing land laws, with no compensation to the government or the public. Yet with scarcely any lapse of time, those iron ore lands are valued at sums which in the aggregate would probably reach a thousand million dollars. Colossal private fortunes

have already resulted from their exploitation, and they have come under a monopoly control which levies a permanent tax upon the entire country in the cost of iron and steel products.

It is obvious that the government should have retained those mineral lands, just as it should have retained its coal lands, selling the ore to those who needed it, upon a simple system of leasing and royalties. The government will henceforth be selling standing timber to lumbermen, water power for electrical transmission, water for irrigation rights, and oil, coal, and mineral privileges, on an ever increasing scale of magnitude, while it will rent grazing lands equal in extent to the greater part of the country east of the Mississippi River.

All this change from the policy of private ownership to the policy of landlordism and collectivism on a great scale, in the management of the public domain, signifies no change whatever in the spirit or purpose of our American democracy. Our principle from the beginning has been a constructive one. Our government has always definitely occupied itself with the task of creating a great nationality. In the diversity of physical and climatic conditions, we have had to change our laws and administrative methods in order to achieve the building up of true American communities in the vast regions of mountain and plain and unequal rainfall, extending from Western Nebraska to the Sierras. The principles of democratic equality and personal initiative will not be destroyed by this new policy, but, on the contrary, will be promoted and kept alive.

The new policy has had to await the advance of scientific knowledge, the development of administrative efficiency and skill, the growth of capital for the conduct of large

enterprises, and a general maturing of the country. Associated with this rapidly developing new policy in the administration of the public domain will be found the political discussion and treatment of various economic problems, such as the regulation of railroads and interstate commerce, the extension of government ownership and operation to certain services in which the public has a large interest, and the perfection of various parts of our political and governmental machinery.

V

PROBLEMS OF THE FRANCHISE, PRACTICAL PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS, AND THE WORKING OF PARTIES

THE fundamental object of the political life of a people is to secure general harmony and well-being in human relationships. The contentions of politics may seem intense and even bitter at times, yet in a country whose development has been favorable and fortunate, the matters of agreement and accord should be so great and substantial, when compared with the matters of difference and of clash, that the play of controversy can be kept within safe limits.

As I have endeavored to make emphatic in the preceding pages, the controlling purpose of our development through more than a hundred years has been to create a series of conditions of population, of citizenship, and of opportunity with respect to the land and natural resources of a new country, that would make for unity and harmony. The immigration problem in its present and future aspects must be dealt with from this standpoint. For so long a time as experience may show that fresh relays of immigrants can be admitted without disturbing in any serious manner the blending and unifying process which tends to make the American population homogeneous, the doors will remain open. That is to say, a population using the same language, having the same average degree and kind of educa-

tion, mingling freely in all pursuits and callings, and showing no marked tendency to crystallize into classes or to become segregated in localities, will require no checks upon immigration except such as are in the nature of orderly and wholesome regulation.

I have drawn upon our experience with the race question in the South in order to show how two kinds of political problems of the extreme and dangerous sort may be brought into the life of a nation, — the one economic, the other racial. The toleration of slavery created rival economic systems that interfered with the normal play of political forces. Under such conditions there was lacking that stable equilibrium, due to a general agreement about fundamental things, which makes ordinary political controversy a harmless outlet for energy, and even a useful instrument of progress.

The abolition of slavery ended the radical, underlying antagonism of economic systems, that had intensified political differences touching concrete questions, such as nullification of federal laws by states, the return of fugitive slaves, the settlement and government of the Western lands, the tariff, and so on. Even after the slavery system was ended, there remained a series of transitional economic problems, abnormal in their sectional aspects, due to the labor conditions following emancipation.

Far more serious, however, as I have previously shown, than the economic controversies in our political life due to the development of the Southern slavery and plantation system, has been the discord arising from the extreme divergence of racial type and social condition between the white and negro populations of the Southern states. Where such differences exist, political life works under

conditions of dangerous tension, as through the Reconstruction period following the war, and in more recent manifestations of the race problem.

Thus we have learned by experience that in the process of nation-building we must, in so far as possible, guard against the creation of permanently discordant conditions, whether racial or economic, on a scale great enough to endanger the general harmony of our future political life. It is upon considerations of this kind that the philosophical statesman must justify measures to prevent the migration of large bodies of Asiatic workmen to our Western states. Their presence must mean both economic and racial antagonisms that would cause the political pendulum to oscillate too violently.

I have endeavored, furthermore, to show that recent policies looking to the permanent retention in government hands of immense areas of forest land, mineral land, and grazing land, have had as their object the far-reaching purpose of building up stable, democratic communities, preventing extreme inequalities of social and economic status, and avoiding the further development of undesirable conditions that would in time have created permanent sectional differences and given a dangerous intensity to certain political problems.

We have perceived that whereas party and political differences in Europe have been due in great part to the struggle of the masses against the classes, we have been steadily striving in this country to prevent conditions that might lead to the formation of classes. At the same time we have been trying to harmonize differences arising in the process of the westward movement and the development of new areas. Differences between the East and the

middle West disappeared with the maturing of the Mississippi Valley. No trace of sectional character remained — as between Massachusetts and Illinois, for example — in the alignment of parties or the practical issues of politics.

In short, it is the business of statesmanship in a developing country so to control the factors of nation-building as to secure a constantly diminishing field for the play of political controversy. It has not been many years since the chosen leader of a great national party, at the height of a Presidential campaign, declared that he had come into "the enemy's country" when he took the platform in the state of New York. A single decade has brought about a vast change in the sectional feeling that then prevailed. The natural course of business development, together with the fortunate operation of public policies, has removed one subject after another from the field of sharp and extreme political controversy. Thus great strength has been added to that general foundation of harmony and social content, to establish which is so prime an object in the political life of a nation.

As I have endeavored to show, the elements of progress now at work will from this time forth bring Southern political life into a more normal condition. By degrees those more dangerous phases of the race problem that have not merely dominated the political life of the Southern states themselves, but have affected indirectly the higher politics of the nation, will be outgrown and will disappear.

Thus we have been building our Ship of State for permanence, for safety, and for steadiness of average movement. The elements of human nature cannot be greatly changed. The winds will blow from prevailing quarters,

and the storms will rage in their seasons. But if the builders well understand what conditions the ship must meet, they may minimize the risks. We shall never have a perfect ship of state, nor can we expect long periods of ideal weather in our political life. But we can be constantly improving the ship, and minimizing the disadvantages and dangers due to variations of wind, weather, and tide.

I cannot dwell too strongly upon this consideration as one that should be kept clearly in mind both by students of our political history and also by those who participate in our political life from public-spirited motives. For it is consoling to believe that every time an impending evil is averted by preventive statesmanship, or an existing evil is cured or arrested in its progress by some timely application of remedies, there is solid ground gained and permanent improvement made, with a resultant shrinkage of the bounds of controversy.

So long as there is a pervading intelligence in the body of citizenship, there can be no danger of the kind of harmony that would suggest stagnation or decay. It is not harmful to arrive, now and then, in the progress of a nation, at periods termed in American political parlance "eras of good feeling," when, along with a high degree of confidence in the ability, effectiveness, and good faith of those charged with official duties, is to be found a disposition to lay aside political controversy and dwell upon points of agreement rather than upon points of difference. In the nature of things, such periods cannot last very long, but they serve some useful purposes.

There is a wide range of political and governmental work to be done that requires diligence and skill and disinterested

public spirit. And in periods when the flame of controversy burns low, it often happens that excellent political progress is made in a spirit of candor and coöperation, through the united efforts of men who have more usually spent their energies in the strife of parties. I am firmly of the opinion that these periods of comparatively smooth seas and bright skies can be rendered more frequent in their recurrence and longer in their duration.

But to that end we must continue to follow two main lines of constructive policy in our further work as a nation. One of these lines I have sufficiently indicated in my illustrations of the means we have taken thus far to create unity in our citizenship, through the building up of a blended and homogeneous American type, with absolute faith in democracy, and with unlimited stress upon the education and training of the children as factors in political and social life. The other line of policy is of the subjective rather than the objective kind and has to do less with laws and with measures employed by the government in the shaping of its citizenship than with the democracy itself in its attempts to maintain its own efficiency and to make its organs of government responsive to its will.

For, as I have said repeatedly, it is the great business and concern of government to look ahead and shape its citizenship aright; while it is the business of the citizens constantly to perfect and improve the government either in the details of its structure or in the quality and efficiency of its law-making and its administrative work. I wish at this point to dwell upon this relation between the people and the government as of itself in this country constituting, when viewed in its entirety, one of the greatest, if not the very chief, of our political problems.

Consider what the government does to create the citizen body. It has provided the landed domain and the various means of a constitutional and legal sort for maintaining equality of economic, social, and political opportunity. It has controlled the conditions of migration with a view to the essential solidarity of the people who owe it their allegiance. It has set up a standard of national, universal suffrage, the state governments being allowed to modify the standard within reasonable limits. It has allowed the foreigner to become naturalized upon easy conditions, and it has given the states a wide range of liberty in their efforts to create conditions favorable to the growth of communities capable of wise self-direction.

The government has attached so much importance to the status of citizenship, that it has tried to safeguard the humblest laborer, in order to improve his standard of living, and to save his dignity as an equal member of the great body of freemen. Government mediates between capital and labor to an ever increasing extent, not merely to protect the larger public from the inconvenience of strikes and labor disputes, but to aid constantly in the process of improving the conditions of labor, in order to sustain the standards of American citizenship.

Through a long series of progressive steps, government has improved the social, economic, and political status of women. As teachers in the schools, they now constitute the most important body of public servants in the employment of the state. In many of the states they are entitled to vote in school elections, in other states in municipal elections, and in a few states they have obtained the full political franchise.

The underlying object has been to secure a high condi-

tion of democratic society. Women, as well as men, must be enlightened and capable of a part in organized social life. Government expects them, in the home and in the school, to supply the most important part of the training of its future citizens. And as I have said again and again, the chief business of constructive politics is to make sure of the future through the training of the young and the transmission of ideals. The enlightened modern government, therefore, spares no effort to fit its women for their paramount duty in this regard.

It becomes a question of experimental detail, whether women assist in the carrying on of the mechanical tasks of government, or whether they leave the business of voting and office-holding to men. Social organization becomes ever more intricate as civilization advances. There are many forms of activity, some of them comparatively new, in which women can advantageously occupy their increasing margin of leisure and freedom. Thus far, it seems to be the prevailing view that there is social and political advantage in leaving to men the more formal errands and functions of politics, in order to avoid duplication of effort and to reserve to women a greater freedom for those even more important domestic and social activities that are at present regarded as their necessary sphere.

In a community where the forces of public opinion are working in a somewhat ideal way, the voters on election day can — in the nature of the case, speaking in average terms — merely register the social will. Going to the polls under such circumstances constitutes a family errand. In a normal society based upon freedom and intelligence, the most convenient and effective machinery of government becomes simply a matter of experiment. Unquestionably,

it is the object of government to develop the social and public capacity of women as well as of men, and when all adults are so trained as to be fit for the suffrage and for eligibility to office, it will come to be a less rather than a more important question, precisely how the electorate is made up.

It is necessary in our democratic state so to adjust conditions and to provide opportunities as to enable every individual to exercise all the social and political influence of which he or she may be capable. In this way, public opinion is built up; and such public opinion, based upon intelligence and character, will find a way to put its determinations into effect.

There is nothing absolute or final, therefore, in the prevailing rule which gives the political franchise to male voters above the age of twenty-one, merely excluding criminals and vagrants. In the earlier days of the Republic, the more conservative people were afraid of unrestricted suffrage, and desired to confine political enfranchisement to those who were manifestly respectable and competent, — the possessors of property, the heads of families, the members of churches, and so on.

But with the nationalizing of the American type in the westward sweep of pioneering progress, came the spirit of confidence in the people, and — what was a wholly new thing in the world — the belief in something like universality of intelligence and character, and in equality upon a high level. Thus, unrestricted male suffrage prevails throughout the country with exceptions notable only in the addition of woman suffrage in Colorado and other Western states, and the exclusion of negro illiterates in the South.

The exclusion of illiterates in Massachusetts represents fastidiousness rather than important statesmanship. The essential thing in Massachusetts is the true statesmanship of its advanced educational system, its laws excluding children from factories, and its attempts to throw safeguards around the employment of women.

As for the exclusion of negro illiterates in the South, it is to be treated as a policy looking in the end toward a real enfranchisement. A dominant and resistless determination on the part of the white population of the South had excluded the negroes altogether from participation in politics, except in a few localities, and the negroes had in practice accepted the situation. But the negro still possessed the theoretical right to vote, and there was instability and constant danger in a situation brought about and sustained illegally, that offered peculiar temptation to demagogues in times of factional controversy between elements of the white population.

Thus, the legal disfranchisement of negro illiterates paved the way for a more stable political condition in the South, and gave opportunity for the gradual building up of a normal public opinion and a proper play of political life among the citizens of the dominant race. When, after another decade or two, the political life of the white voters of the South has reasserted itself in a wholesome way, the negroes who possess fitness will undoubtedly be admitted to the exercise of their legal political rights by the voluntary action of their white neighbors.

The acquisition of the franchise by the emancipated slaves of the South was abnormal, and it came about through the exercise of a power that was extraneous and arbitrary. To be useful or permanent, the exercise of

political privilege must find its local and inherent reasons. The negroes of the South will never arrive at a valuable exercise of the franchise until they come into it upon their recognized merits as useful members of their local communities, and are invited into it by their white neighbors.

So much for the conditions of citizenship as the state ordains and provides. But, even as the state makes the citizens, so the citizens in turn must make the state; that is to say, they must keep the government effective, and responsive to their real purposes and wishes. And to understand how this is done in practice, we must consider two elaborate sets of machinery, the one set official and the other voluntary.

The voluntary machinery consists of the more permanent organization of political parties, and the more temporary or special groupings and associations of citizens for particular or local political purposes. The official machinery consists first, of the government of the United States, regarded as a "going concern"; that is to say, of its legal structure and its personnel of several hundred thousand officials, from the President in the White House to the letter-carrier or the apprentice-boy on a warship. Then comes the machinery for the government of the states, the government of the counties, that of incorporated cities, towns, and villages, and that of country townships and of road and school districts.

When we look at politics from the voluntary side, it is best perhaps to begin with the presidential campaign as the culminating point in what an able student of our system describes as our "quadrennial political cycle." When, on the other hand, we study political mechanism on the official side, there are some advantages in beginning with the

smaller units of self-government and administration. It is obvious that the voluntary political structure cannot be understood at all unless one has somewhat clearly in mind the characteristics of the official mechanism.

As I have already stated, it is no part of my plan to dwell upon the formal structure or operation of our government. But there are some characteristics of it that we must keep in mind in order to appreciate the nature of certain problems with which the political life concerns itself.

We have always been a very busy nation, and, upon the whole, a sober-minded one. But our people have been buoyant, hopeful, and of resilient spirit, and they have found in politics many of the features of a great national game, besides finding opportunity for the play of ambition and for the achievement of distinction. In countries where the primary objects of modern political life are not fully achieved, — that is to say, where democracy is still fighting its battle against aristocracy and intrenched privilege, — it is impossible in the nature of the case for political life to assume as it does in the United States the stimulating and exciting qualities of a public diversion, into which men may enter in a spirit of competition that is in its main aspects neither dangerous nor unwholesome.

But a more important explanation of many of the phenomena of our political life is to be found in the training and opportunity given by the government of our smaller political units. We have several thousand counties in the United States, each with its governing board of supervisors, its sheriff, its treasurer, its auditor, its superintendent of schools, and its other officers. If we have, say, 4000 counties, we have perhaps 50,000 or 60,000 townships, each with its elective board or group of officials; and we have a far

greater number of school districts and road districts which in most parts of the country elect their public servants by popular vote. When one makes reckoning of the villages and the larger municipal corporations, and attempts to find out how many people are officially serving their fellow-citizens in elective offices under our political system, it would be conservative to estimate that there must be considerably more than a million.

For every fifteen or twenty voters, there must be upon the average at least one man who holds a position to which he has been chosen by the votes of his fellow-citizens, and who may rightly feel that he is in a place of public trust and has achieved some local distinction. What all this means in our political life is better understood when one brings it into comparison with conditions as they have hitherto existed in England, for example.

Until very recently the opportunity for the ordinary citizen in England to serve his fellow-men by holding public office, or to gratify his ambition by entering political life, was extremely limited. A few men, very favorably placed, might hope to enter the House of Commons. In the larger towns and cities, a few might be elected to membership in municipal councils. There was practically nothing else.

Under recent legislation there are elective county councils in England and elective parish councils corresponding somewhat to our township boards. In the course of another generation, the opportunity to serve upon these local boards will have marked effect upon the political life of England. But hitherto the whole spirit of English political life has been aristocratic. There has been no such thing as the regular holding of elections, except for members of municipal councils. And the great complicated structure

of popularly worked political machinery has been practically unknown.

It would be impossible to overestimate the influence upon our actual political life of the opportunities afforded by the existence, for example, of fifty governorships of American commonwealths, along with the other elective state offices of dignity and influence, and the numerous judiciary positions, elective in most of the states and carrying with them great consideration. In its practical working, the system has had a marvelous effect in stimulating effort and developing capacity in the ordinary citizen.

In European public life the opportunities are too few and the gradations too severe for the ordinary citizen, who, in consequence, can seldom hope to leap across the broad gulf that separates private from public life. But with us it is wholly different. With a million or more of elective offices, and the tradition of rotation in such places, every ambitious boy may be able to secure a fair test of his political aptitudes. He may not merely join the torchlight processions, attend the barbecues, applaud the orators, and come under the spell of party rivalry in heated national campaigns, but he may find himself useful and in due time important in that local fraction of the party that is representative of voluntary political life for his township, or village, or city ward, or voting precinct, while he may also make his way into official place and rank through the opportunities afforded by the political structure of the smaller governing units.

In his political life, both on the voluntary side and on the local official side, he becomes acquainted with the parliamentary forms under which political meetings are conducted, and he acquires the ability to stand upon his feet

and argue for his public views, whether upon the management of local roads and schools, or upon the national tariff, the control of railroads, or the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the acquisition of the Philippines.

In performing the simple functions of a township treasurer or of an elected assessor of property for purposes of taxation, he acquires a certain training and capacity as respects the problems of public finance that in thousands of instances have a remarkable educational effect, when taken in conjunction with the habit of carrying our national problems of taxation, finance, money, and banking, into popular discussion. The practice of financial administration in townships, municipalities, and counties — aided by the habitual discussion of larger financial problems, either as party questions or as a matter of intellectual diversion — have given us a set of capable citizens in almost every county and smaller community in the United States, who could be translated into high office and positions of great authority, with the reasonable certainty that they would show fairly good judgment, maintain proper dignity, and quickly grasp the more technical, as well as the more general, duties of a state treasurership or a position in the national government.

The young citizen showing aptitude and trustworthy qualities in his township or village may become a factor in the government of his county; then a member of the state legislature; and thus he may go forward upon his merits and abilities to the higher places of state and national life. Along with the opportunities readily in reach of hundreds of thousands, even millions, of citizens afforded by the multiplication of local elective and appointive offices, are also to be reckoned the opportunities for influence, power,

and diversion afforded by the non-official organizations, built up through the voluntary association of citizens for the choice of candidates, the formulation of policies, and the effective control of the official machinery.

This vast complicated double system of political life makes its strong appeal to almost every citizen of the land from one motive or from another. Americans are preëminently political animals, with a fondness for organization; and almost every healthy citizen feels the attraction of politics as a diversion, — a great continuing game, with its national, its state, and its local phases, its great culminating periods every four years, extending from the national conventions of June or July, to the elections of the following November, —an exciting pursuit that is followed with less intensity through the succeeding years, with its state and local objects, until the quadrennial cycle is completed and the Presidential year again comes around.

To most citizens this great game is fascinating if only as a form of social diversion, appealing to the universal instinct for politics. To very many the political life makes appeal through the motive of ambition, success being a mark of personal distinction. Other devotees it enlists because of the opportunity it gives to impress one's views upon the community and to perform actual public service. And others cultivate it through a sincere devotion to certain fixed trends of opinion, out of which party spirit and organization have been gradually evolved.

Finally, with so many offices to be filled, and so many points of contact between the political and the business world, it is natural enough that politics should have become in itself a form of business activity, and that the politician and the office-seeker should have emerged by the hundreds

of thousands as a distinct type or class, looking upon public employment as a means of livelihood, and also pursuing partisan and other non-official political activities from the pecuniary motive. The growth of the party system in the United States is to be attributed to all these motives and conditions.

The European observer is constantly trying to find some essential analogy between American parties and those with which he is familiar in other countries. He pursues his inquiry with some confidence for a little distance, and then finds himself completely baffled. As a rule, he desires to find one great American party radical in its tendencies and the other conservative.

What he really finds in existence are two great permanent institutions, constantly undergoing modification, sometimes violently affected by internal revolution, but somehow maintaining continuity through the decades and through the generations. These American parties are political agencies or vehicles. With respect to a public question that may strongly affect public opinion at a given moment, one of these great mechanisms is likely to be taken possession of for radical purposes, while the other, from force of circumstances, will lend itself to conservative uses.

Where neither one of the great traditional organizations has shown itself responsive enough to some comparatively sudden wave of conviction regarding a particular subject, new organizations have been launched to represent a point of view and to make a propaganda or a crusade for a special cause, unencumbered by the burden of general responsibility belonging to the older political organizations. Sometimes these new movements have so coincided with internal revolution in an older party that they have drawn to themselves

vitality enough for permanence. But in that case they have ceased to represent the special cause which explained their origin, and have come to serve the more general purposes of an American institutional party.

Thus the Federalists broke down and reappeared in the later Whig organization, which, in turn, after some brief special movements, like that of the Free-Soil party in the fifties, found new birth in the great Republican party, which is entering on the third generation of its existence.

The great Democratic party, meanwhile, has kept its name and its essential continuity through more than a hundred years, with many an internal struggle and constant modification through changes in the drift of public opinion. Most native Americans have found themselves by birth or by natural association affiliated with one or the other of these great party systems. They have found very considerable room for play of opinion within the structure of the party.

Most naturalized citizens, on the other hand, have found themselves drawn into the one organization or the other through accident, or instinct, or tribal clannishness. The Democrats in New York, Baltimore, and other Eastern cities had perfected a form of party organization which was both congenial and advantageous to the Irish immigrant. A different set of circumstances drew the German immigrants largely into the Republican organization. For like reasons, the Scandinavians of the Northwest became Republicans for the most part.

In the westward movement, the name Democracy had identified itself with the ideas of personal and local freedom and state assertion. The leaders of the slave power had by degrees and with much political skill

captured control of the machinery and the higher councils of the Democratic party. When Secession came, the Republican party found itself identified with the cause of the Union and an unbroken nationality. Naturally, a vast number of so-called "war Democrats" of the North, either through conviction or advantage, passed by degrees into the Republican ranks.

The Republican leaders of the North had enfranchised the slaves, and naturally sought after the war to retain a political domination through negro votes in the Southern states. The more determined and drastic their Southern policy, the more certain was it that two things would happen: first, a reaction in the North, with a strong and permanent revival of the Northern Democratic party; and, second, a union of Southern white men for defensive purposes under the Democratic banner.

Thus there arose a situation which had a tendency to intensify party life and organization and to keep sectional and race questions to the front in such a way as to hamper the true progress of the country. Republican leadership found it expedient to play upon Northern prejudice by warnings that Democratic success would mean a virtual reënslavement of the negroes, and the payment by the nation of the Confederate war debt. And other like apprehensions were aroused.

The Democratic politicians, on the other hand, sought to keep the South solid in support of their party through constant reminders of the evils of the Reconstruction period, and assertions regarding the future purposes of the Republican leaders. Circumstances had brought the two great parties to opposing attitudes with respect to the tariff question, and this question had also assumed certain sectional

phases, so that in campaigns of acute tariff discussion, public opinion had driven masses of voters from one camp to the other.

Again, when the great Prohibition wave swept across the country, those old elements of moral reform which had opposed slavery and had, for the most part, associated themselves with the Republican party, were strong enough in many states to bring the official force of their party into line against the liquor traffic. This attitude drove scores of thousands of Germans and other voters of foreign descent into the Democratic organization. Meanwhile, the more intense adherents of the Prohibition cult, brooking no compromise or delay, and invoking the spirit and example of the irreconcilable Abolitionists of an earlier day, formed themselves into a third party, destined, of course, to a gradual decline as the question of the moment lost its intensity.

In like fashion, the Greenback movement had arisen, protesting against the payment of the war debt in gold, and the resumption of a specie basis. Then came the Western Granger movement, based on opposition to railroad domination and monopoly influence. The acute phases of these agitations expressed themselves in independent temporary Third Party movements, while the questions at issue affected profoundly the character and conduct of the older parties, while also causing a considerable change in their membership. The later Populistic movement had a somewhat similar career, its chief historical results having to do with the conditions of party in the Southern states.

When, in 1896, the gold standard wing prevailed in the Republican organization, and the free silver wing seized firm control of the Democratic machinery, there was a great drift of Eastern Democrats to the Republican camp, while the

Republicans of the Far West by the hundreds of thousands transferred their allegiance to the party led by Mr. Bryan. Meanwhile, the increased production of gold settled the money question outside of the political sphere. The conservative wing of the Democracy nominated Judge Parker for the presidency in 1904. The younger and more vital forces of the Republican party nominated Mr. Roosevelt. And the Western Republicans, who had in previous campaigns followed Mr. Bryan as an exponent of their financial and economic views, returned with enthusiasm to the Republican fold.

All this I have set forth, not by way of a summary of party history, but rather for illustration of the nature of the two great dominating parties. They are institutional and organic. At moments when public opinion is greatly stirred by some question of the hour, the parties seem to exist for the sake of representing the opposing views and fighting the resultant battles. But, in reality, the parties exist simply because the great business of politics in America is so extended, so complex, and so continuous, that it requires permanent organization.

It is conceivable that this permanent voluntary organization might go forward, with a single party, inside of which different tendencies and views should from time to time assert themselves. This, indeed, is exactly what is now going on in a number of the Southern states, where, for all practical purposes, the Democratic party occupies the entire field, and where the official election merely ratifies the decisions that have been arrived at in previous conventions or primary elections of this dominant party.

There have been brief periods in the larger national life when a single party was so dominant that the preliminary

struggle of opposing elements within the party had more significance than the formal campaign and election which expressed the relative strength of the two party organizations. But, generally speaking, there have been reasons growing out of differences of public opinion on the one hand, and out of the practical conditions of the business of politics on the other hand, to justify the existence and continuity of two great rival organizations.

Their instinct has been to align themselves with the larger and more permanent trends of cleavage in public opinion. They have endeavored to keep their national character by popularizing the controversial aspects of public questions. Their appeals from time to time to enlightened public opinion, or to wide-spread prejudice, have been made through the resolutions, or so-called "platforms" adopted every four years by the great party convention that nominates the Presidential ticket. The Presidential nominee harmonizes and expounds party opinion. If elected, he is recognized by both parties as virtually bound to carry on the affairs of the country in accordance with the general views of the party that supported him.

But while it is thus the business of a great party to formulate views of public policy, and, when in power, to make the laws and administer the government in some manner consistent with those views, it is also the business of the party, for practical purposes, to concern itself with the political life of the states, the counties, and the minor political divisions. At every point, from the Presidency down to the petty road district, as our system developed, the voluntary organization of political life found itself in contact with the official business of government.

The parties were organized with their central committees corresponding to political divisions. The national committee was made up of a member from each state; the state committee was composed on a corresponding plan; and for lesser territories, — congressional districts, counties, townships, or municipalities, — the party had its organization, represented by officers and standing committees. While the governing work of counties and villages had no necessary party relationship to that of states or the nation, the tendency to use party machinery in the selection of local candidates and the carrying on of campaigns, was too strong to be successfully resisted.

Party political life associated itself, in the nature of the case, with the whole structure of government from top to bottom. With the development of the economic and professional life of the country, the management of political machinery tended more and more to become an absorbing and specialized form of business. With a million or more of officials to be chosen by popular election, and many hundreds of thousands of places to be filled by appointment, — all the way from a cabinet officer or an ambassador, down to a policeman or the janitor of a school building, — the political life of the United States assumed an exceedingly practical aspect.

The "outs" wanted the offices, and the "ins" wished to retain them; while from a variety of motives, the leading spirits in the business of politics, whether themselves office-holders or not, desired to keep their places of influence and control in the voluntary organization as well as in the official business of government. The salaries of officials and the other expenditures of government meant the assessment and levying of taxes and the collection and dis-

bursement of hundreds or thousands of dollars in the smallest divisions, of scores or hundreds of thousands in the towns and counties, of millions in the state, and of hundreds of millions in the nation.

It is not strange, then, that what had grown to be so vast a business undertaking from the standpoint of personnel and of cost as the carrying on of government, should have resulted in the development of a professional class of politicians whose motive, to some extent, was personal gain. It did not follow of necessity that this was their sole motive, or that they pursued it by corrupt methods. But it is obvious enough that a situation of that kind would at times offer strong temptations to those seeking to gain or to retain political power.

Furthermore, as the country expanded in wealth and in complexity of economic life, the opportunities of private life became more and more alluring and absorbing. This fact contributed not a little to the tendency of political life to become professionalized under the lead of men not wholly actuated by public spirit.

The power as well as the necessity of party organization was increased not merely by the number of elective and appointive offices and the elaborate structure of the official machinery of government, but also by the circumstances which had tended to concentrate the holding of elections upon a single day. This concentration was due partly to reasons of public economy and convenience, and partly to the influence of the professional politicians, whose control was better assured by such a method. When, on the same Tuesday in November, the citizens in a given voting precinct must cast their ballots for a national Presidential ticket, a member of Congress,

a governor of their state, and other general state officers, judges of several state courts, an entire set of county officers, and various municipal, or township, or other local functionaries, it becomes extremely difficult to do anything else except to make a choice between the long line of candidates offered by one party and the long line offered by the other.

Such conditions have tended to strengthen parties and perpetuate them, through their control of the organization, apart from which political life has had no full and effective means of expression. Thus we have found a very important series of American political problems arising from the tendency of the mere voluntary organization of the political life to become obstructive and arbitrary. From this condition has arisen a series of efforts to reform the machinery and to secure elasticity and freedom for the expression of the will of the democracy.

The deeper remedy for all such evils must, of course, lie in the development of the individual citizen. While the two great party vehicles — as common carriers, so to speak — may compete in perpetuity for popular patronage, the individual citizen need not always ride in the same wagon. The "bolt" has always been recognized as a party corrective. The more valuable bolt is that which is due to the awakening of an independent mind and spirit in a well-instructed voter, who is superior to the average of character, or standard, or opinion, that controls his party at a given moment.

The less valuable form of bolt is due to some prejudice or susceptibility that affects races or classes or localities, whose standard is lower than that of the average that dominates the party. A dozen illustrations of both forms

of party insurrection will readily occur to any one familiar with our recent politics.

With the earlier development of party spirit and party organization, there appeared, first, the theory that party solidarity must be maintained, and, second, the practical consequence that party divisions were carried into local elections. In rural communities, with average conditions of intelligence, it was easy to develop the habit of rotation in office. Public duties were simple, and the honors and emoluments of office were distributed not merely by alternation between parties, but also by brevity of tenure and rapid succession within the ranks of a given party organization.

Gradually there developed also in the holding of appointive places — as well as in elective ones — the principle of change by alternation of parties and of further change by rapid rotation. These principles became crystallized in phrases. The party principle was embodied in the assertion that "to the victor belong the spoils." The principle of short tenure and rapid succession found embodiment in the dictum that "we must have no permanent office-holding class in America." But, as the country advanced, and life became more intense and specialized, we learned that the spoils system and the rotation system were actually creating a political and official caste or class of an inferior and dangerous political type.

Office-holding and office-seeking began to dominate party organization. The vast expenditure made possible by the strife of parties and the conduct of campaigns was largely turned to vicious ends. The party in power levied assessments upon all office-holders to procure funds with which to contest doubtful states or districts, or smaller divisions. On

the other hand, the candidates of the opposition party for elective office and the aspirants for future appointive place, were expected to provide the sinews of war for the great contest that, if successful, would admit hundreds of thousands of applicants to coveted places at the public crib.

The Civil Service Reform movement made its way, slowly at first, but with increasing influence, with a view to emancipate the voluntary political life, on the one hand, and to improve the character of government work on the other. From the time of President Jackson to the time of President Grant, the office-seeking influence had been steadily growing, until it had taken on the dimensions of a great evil.

I am dealing with these questions in principle rather than in detail. The purposes of government in America have not been to carry on all sorts of elaborate undertakings, but rather to secure freedom and to provide and regulate conditions under which the private enterprises and voluntary relationships of human society might develop equitably and prosperously. Government was to be a positive force in its provisions for national progress and the permanent success of our institutions. But otherwise, the functions of government were, in the main, to be of a negative kind. Sentiment was against the building up of highly trained, permanent administrative services, because we were not accustomed to the idea that the business of government was of a kind that required any such system. In a nation where every boy was familiar with the use of the rifle and the shot-gun, we were disposed to rely upon the quick improvization of armies, in case of need. Our regular army had been reduced to a mere skeleton for use as a national police against the outbreak of hostile Indians in the Far West. In like manner, we were accustomed to

think of the civil tasks of public employment as open to everybody, requiring no particular training, and to associate office-holding with political activity.

But even with no radical change of theory or practice regarding the functions of government, the most restricted forms of public work of necessity grew elaborate and required a large personnel as the country expanded. The great central offices of administration, like the Treasury and the Post-office at Washington, required thousands of clerks. The post-offices in the larger cities were employing hundreds of carriers, as well as clerks. The custom houses and the other branches of the revenue service were employing great numbers of men whose work required skill and knowledge.

We began, furthermore, to discover that, however far in advance of Europe our development of a great equal democracy might have gone, Germany, France, and England had brought order and system into their administrative work, with many resultant benefits. The great struggle to overthrow the spoils system, and the history of the steady development of the merit system, are matters of familiar knowledge. I mention them only as illustrating a phase of political life through which our democratic institutions had to pass.

I may add that a reform of this kind also illustrates another sort of voluntary political organization, apart from political parties, in which American citizenship of the best type finds constant opportunity for the exercise of public spirit and the expression of opinion in an effective way. The National Civil Service Reform Association, with its state and local branches, was in a position at all times to instruct public opinion through the press, to urge its views upon law-making bodies and high executive officials, and

to make propaganda within the lines of party. Little by little the reform grew, until parties endorsed it, Congress and the legislatures were willing to sustain it, and high appointive officers welcomed it for the relief it afforded them and for the heightened efficiency it brought to the public service.

The spoils system, as it formerly existed, was one of the chief factors in our political life. It is not yet completely eliminated, but it is no longer dominant. Hundreds of thousands of public servants in the United States — federal, state, and municipal — are now appointed for reasons of fitness and retained for efficiency and good behavior. It is now contrary as well to law as to public sentiment to assess them for campaign funds, and they are free both from the fear of the clean party sweep, and also from the danger of losing employment under the old custom of quick rotation in office.

VI

FURTHER PROBLEMS RELATING TO PARTY MACHINERY AND THE FREEDOM OF DEMOCRATIC EXPRESSION

THE business of politics, as carried on by the extensive groups and hierarchies of politicians controlling the rival party organizations, had become accustomed to a large use of money. The gradual shrinkage of contributions from the contingents of office-holders and office-seekers did not seem greatly to affect the prosperity of politics as a leading American industry. The machinery of parties seemed more powerful and more permanent than ever, and there was ample evidence of the abundance and constant use of money in carrying on this political machinery.

It was further to be seen that so much money in politics could not have been supplied by candidates for elective office, nor could it be traced to the voluntary gifts of unselfish and devoted party members. Party machinery seemed ever more rigid, and less responsive to the higher trends of public opinion. Party platforms were of such a sort, and nominees for office of such quality, that the voter came to feel that however excellent our democratic institutions might be in their theory they were somehow clogged and obstructed in their practical working. The thoughtful voter seemed to be limited to a choice of evils. The professional element in the parties had gained too firm a control, as against the ordinary citizen, usually occupied with his private affairs though enrolled as a Republican or a

Democrat. The local party members who worked at politics as a trade were able to control the caucuses and primary elections, to name the delegates to conventions, and to select the nominees for local offices and for the legislature of their state.

There had grown up a ramified system of professional politics in each party, unaffected by the play of public opinion, and evidently under direction from a central authority. This development of our political life came to be known as the "machine" or "boss" system. From a wholly different system and theory of party leadership and regularity, there had developed an arbitrary and tyrannical organization, never exactly alike in different states, yet similar enough to be characterized in the same sweeping terms. It simply meant that the organization of political life had been seized upon by private interests, for private advantage, whereas the original and natural purpose of political organization was for public ends and for the general welfare.

The chosen sphere of a distinct organization under the machine, or boss, system was the separate state. The private interests concerned were twofold, namely, those of the professional political class itself, which directly or indirectly found its sources of livelihood and gain in the control of politics, and, second, the large private interests of various sorts which could be so harmed or so benefited by legislative or governmental action as to make them a growing factor in political life.

The country's economic activities had grown to immense proportions, and the rewards of business life had drawn away thousands of men who otherwise would have been available for public service or for the quasi-public life

of the learned professions. These business activities had, to an increasing extent, taken the form of joint stock companies or corporations. As such, they were the creatures of the state and subject to its regulation. As the cities grew in population, the companies that held franchises to supply light, or transit service, or some other form of local need, became powerful and began to rank with the railroad, telegraph, telephone, insurance, banking, and other large corporations, whose methods were subject to public regulation.

Obviously, a session of the state legislature was a matter of deep concern for such corporations. In the earlier stages of their interest in public action, they were represented at state capitals by agents, sometimes of good repute, sometimes of bad. To obtain a law that they desired, or to prevent a measure that would injure them, they were prepared to spend money, sometimes in good faith, sometimes corruptly. But as their interests grew in magnitude, the political system began to adapt itself to a changing situation. It was a crude and dangerous method, as well as a merely stop-gap and temporary one, to maintain lobbies and attempt to bribe law-makers at the seat of government. A better method was to help secure discipline and authority in the political organizations, and then to deal quietly with the chiefs of a professionalized political system. Thus the lobby in its more offensive aspects began to grow obsolete, and the party machine became a thing of method and discipline, recognizing some form of autocratic leadership.

The machine would have defeated its own ends if it had become too cynical, or too intolerant of the well-meaning members of the party who still regarded the structure as

capable, from time to time, of serving useful public ends. The machine was supplied with money by the corporations and various private interests, seeking either favors or immunity. The object of the system was to put in control leaders who knew how to maintain discipline and secure desired results. The corporations expected no accounting for the money. As a rule, it took the form of unrecorded and unacknowledged party campaign funds.

The boss or central authority of the party secured such a use of the money as would lubricate the machinery and give assurance of continued control. The system concerned itself quietly with the selection of candidates for the legislature, and supplied them with funds in a way that was meant to put them under personal obligation. Country newspapers were subsidized on a plan that was carefully intended to be flattering to their usefulness and independence, rather than humiliating to their self-respect.

The system made it possible to give such attention to details and such forethought to every phase of political life that the control of caucuses and conventions was, under ordinary circumstances, fully assured. The one party could not be used to expose and break down the machine control of the other party, for the obvious reason that both were in the same condition. They were supplied with funds from the same sources, and were, in the nature of the case, bound to be subservient to the same interests. Thus it would happen not infrequently that a state legislature almost equally divided between the two parties would not have one member in twenty, or one in fifty, whose nomination and election had not been agreeable to forces behind the two machines, and whose legislative action could not be counted upon by those who held the party reins.

Such a system is not necessarily one of deliberate invention. It is the growth of a variety of conditions, and many of those who are most obedient to it do not understand the nature of the yoke they wear. The corrupting and demoralizing effect of these methods is not always perceived at first, and the extent of their harmful working will naturally vary in different states according to circumstances. It is probably within the bounds of truth to say that there is not one of our states which has not, to a very considerable extent, come under the baneful influence of this system, by means of which the political life of the people is dominated and exploited for private ends by rich working corporations in alliance with professional party politicians.

I am not discussing the question whether or not the corporations desire undue privileges, or whether their participation in politics has been in the nature of a defensive movement against unjust and hampering restrictions. Readers will remember that my theme is the political life itself, and that I am discussing the methods by which the citizen operates his government. And I am endeavoring to show that a great part of the problem of the political life of a democratic people lies in their keeping a proper control over the means by which they may get at the official work of government and may secure and maintain the freedom and elasticity of democratic life.

With health and vigor in the body politic, with intelligence and virtue in the citizenship of the country, and with a press not wholly controlled by private interests, the reaction against machine politics could only be a question of time. The non-professional political elements in our parties began to assert themselves, and their success in one

place emboldened their efforts in another. Various devices were proposed and some of them brought into effect to weaken the control of professional party machines. It was evident enough that the holding of municipal elections at a separate time would make it far easier to deal with local candidates and questions upon their merits. Thus, many of our larger cities are gradually finding a free political life of their own, not wholly detached from parties and their working, but no longer hopelessly subjected to such machinery.

The use of an official ballot paper has made the wholesale bribery of voters far more difficult than in former times, but in most of our states the voting paper still lends itself too much to the purposes of party machines by the arrangement of names in party columns. There has been a great growth throughout the country of the primary election system as a means by which to enable the voters of a party to select their candidates for important offices, this being regarded as a remedy for the evils of a convention system, controlled by the professional politicians. To give security to such a primary system, it is becoming the rule to give it an official character and standing by enactments which expressly recognize the existence of political parties as a part of our governing machinery. It remains to be seen whether the voluntary association of citizens in parties should thus come under detailed regulation of law.

The essential remedy for evils in the practical working of politics does not lie in the change of systems. In many states the substitution of primary elections for nominating conventions may have excellent results for a time. It remains for experience to improve methods and to change them from time to time. The real remedy lies in the

awakening of public opinion and the political assertion of good citizens.

Many states have passed or else are considering laws regulating political expenditure and requiring publicity as regards the source and the use of money in carrying on elections. There is also a movement on foot which will result in the prohibition of political contributions by private corporations. The collection of money from corporations was very large in the Presidential campaign of 1896, and it was excused on the ground that the business interests of the country required the defeat of the free-silver movement. Every one can see clearly enough now that directors and trustees should not have appropriated the money of stockholders for political uses. Laws and public regulations affecting these matters are timely and to be encouraged. But the endeavors to enact such laws are chiefly important for what they indicate as regards an aroused public opinion.

The alliance between corporate business interests and professional politics cannot be wholly broken up, because there is so much at stake for both parties to the bargain. But honest and public-spirited politics can so strongly assert itself, by the side of the politics of private interest and profit, as to restore something like old-time freedom and elasticity to the life of parties. The rival organizations are put upon their good behavior by the great growth of independent voting and by the new vigor of those men in both parties whose motives are public-spirited and whose ability in political work is so great as to have broken the spell of professionalism. It has become the fashion to make more direct appeal to the people, to cultivate the plain voters, and to break down the tyranny of the party machines.

Along with the movement for greater freedom in the play of voluntary official forces is a corresponding movement for a more responsive and elastic character in the official business of government. It is natural, when the people feel that the bosses and machines select the members of the legislature and dictate much of the work of the law-making bodies, that there should be demand for methods to secure a more prompt and certain expression of the popular will. Hence the movement for the election of United States senators by the people; for a direct popular vote upon various measures of a statutory character through constitutional amendment; and for direct democratic participation in law-making through the device known as the "initiative and referendum."

Although a vast majority of the people of the United States are in favor of the direct election of United States senators, it is almost hopelessly difficult to overcome the inertia that stands in the way of amending the federal Constitution. Meanwhile, many states are adopting methods of one kind or another to secure an unofficial popular choice of senators, and the force of public opinion is compelling the legislatures to ratify such selections.

The state constitutions are no longer confined to a brief setting forth of the organic structure of the state government, but contain an ever increasing number of provisions of a statutory character regarded as of permanent public importance. Such provisions in most states require a cumbrous process for adoption. As a rule, they must pass two successive legislatures, then be submitted to the people. In spite of difficulties, a large number of provisions are thus voted upon every year in one state or another. Many states require the submission to the people of a question

involving bonded indebtedness. A recent illustration is afforded by the vote of the people of the state of New York to spend $100,000,000 upon the canal system.

There is an increased feeling that more questions of public concern rather than fewer ought to be submitted to direct popular vote, and that the processes should be simpler and more rapid. In Oregon, where the usual process of amending the constitution requires five years, a new alternative system has been put into effect which takes only three or four months. A given number of voters may initiate an amendment to the constitution by sending a petition to the Secretary of State, which is followed by a proclamation of the governor calling for an election.

In 1906 five amendments were thus offered in Oregon, and four of them were adopted. This innovation is regarded with so much favor that we shall probably witness a considerable development of the movement for giving the people a quicker and more direct means of dealing with important matters in their laws and constitutions. While this movement is upon the formal and official side of government, its chief significance lies in the relation it bears to that larger movement — chiefly in the voluntary and unofficial organization of politics — to make the public will effective and to find means by which to break down the tyranny and power of party machinery.

Obviously, if we are to have the party system maintained, it must be made truly democratic and responsive. There must be free play within party lines for those wholesome and normal motives which make the political life interesting and inviting to American citizens in general. When the spoils system became intolerable, the proper

correctives were applied. And again, when party organization and work become too much a separate and professional interest, dominated by private and business motives, public spirit becomes aroused, a revival of genuine political life follows, various methods are found to weaken machine control and liberate political life, and thus normal conditions are once more in control.

The domination of the political life of the country by rigid party machines, maintained by lavish funds exacted from private interests, was a gradual development due to complex conditions. That being true, it is evident that the rescue of politics from that form of tyranny could not be accomplished by any momentary wave of agitation, nor by any mere device or concurrence of devices for the restoration of a true democratic freedom.

Yet various devices will have been found useful; and wave after wave of agitation will have been salutary in a high degree. At the basis of everything lies the general honesty and good intention of the people. With such a basis, the reformer in politics must succeed in the long run. Devices for making it difficult to bribe and corrupt the more ignorant mass of voters will always help, on the negative side, that good work of the more positive kind which consists in the efficient training of the children for citizenship and in the use of all sorts of agencies for the advancement of social conditions.

Devices for protecting the voting system are of great practical use when they coincide with popular movements, courageously led, of revolt against absolute and wanton tyranny of party control. Pennsylvania affords a good illustration. A recent correction of voting methods has brought to an end a system in Philadelphia under which

the dominant machine could maintain itself, at any moment of peril, by casting scores of thousands of fraudulent votes.

This improvement of machinery will be of inestimable value in the future political life of that important state. It could not have been secured apart from a general agitation for freedom and reform in politics. Insurrection against the machine and boss systems was needed to secure the device of perfected voting arrangements, while the opportunity for an honest casting and counting of the votes was necessary in order to give revolt from party tyranny any fair chance of success.

A period of extreme subjection to the party system in its disciplined and professionalized form has been followed by a period of lively revolt within party lines, and of attack from without by associations of independent voters. These independents have been able in most states to secure reasonable freedom of opportunity. The laws now make it possible for them to nominate candidates by petition and have their nominees placed upon the official voting paper. Persistent work on the part of the professional party machines has been met by almost equally persistent work by organizations of political reformers. These groups have made it their business to expose the selfish and venal practices resulting from the alliance of private interests and party machines, and to work unceasingly for particular devices in the field of reform methods, or for the general freedom and improvement of public life.

An admirable instance of such work is afforded by the Municipal Voters' League of Chicago, which has accomplished much not only for the betterment of the governmental business of that great city, but also for the improve-

ment of the politics of the state of Illinois, and thus for a higher tone in the political life of the nation.

For, although at times there has been much venality in the political life of the rural neighborhoods, especially in New York and the Eastern states, the worst evils of the machine and boss systems have been intrenched in the great cities. It has been evident that if democratic principles could maintain themselves with some measure of freedom and effect in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Chicago, and San Francisco, the country as a whole could keep its faith in the permanence of our American institutions of self-government, and could apply itself with confidence to the correction from time to time of such evils as might grow up with changing conditions.

It is encouraging, therefore, to note the fact that there is great vigor of democratic life in these fast-growing centers of population. Almost countless faults of political method and governmental administration can be found remaining in these great communities, but the saving feature of the situation lies in the fact that all these faults are known, exposed, and publicly criticized and combated. However great may be the faults of a sensational press, it is generally to be found ready to expose, if not to magnify, the faults and scandals of a professionalized party system and a corrupt alliance between private corporate interests and the control of law-making and administration.

Even the minor parties and the less regular movements, led sometimes by fanatics and sometimes by demagogues — not excepting the coteries of extreme Socialists — have a certain value, because they are to some extent a protest against the stifling of democratic expression by the machine control of the great parties. They are compelled to

make their appeal to the convictions of the plain citizen, usually to working-men whose political education they are helping to promote.

In the period before we had secured in the great cities, as in New York, a concurrence of public opinion on the one hand and legal devices on the other, to protect the ballot box and make certain of honest elections, the political corruption of the great cities endangered the working not merely of local institutions, but also of national. For, as I have already remarked, the climax of our political system lies in the quadrennial election of the President, and our method of electing a President puts an enormous strain upon the working political machinery of a few of the larger and so-called "pivotal" states. This is particularly true of the state of New York.

The conditions which I have already described have for a long time made it reasonably certain that in presidential years the Southern states would support the Democratic party. It has been less certain, but fairly probable, that the New England states, Pennsylvania, and most of the Northwestern states would be carried by the Republicans. Under our prevailing system, with rare exceptions, each state gives its entire electoral support to one presidential candidate or to the other. Where, on account of its great population, a state has a large number of electoral votes, its importance in the presidential year is obvious.

Thus the state of New York has a larger electoral vote than any other, and its party complexion has usually been regarded as doubtful in presidential years. It is divided between two almost equal bodies of population, namely, the four millions living in and near the great metropolis, and the four millions living elsewhere in the state. In normal

presidential years, the voters of the metropolitan district are Democratic by a great preponderance, and the voters of the rest of the state are Republican by a similar majority. If New York were divided into two states, the two would be practically equal in electoral strength; the one would usually be Democratic, the other usually Republican; they would offset one another in the general result, — just as Iowa and Kentucky have always practically offset one another, — and thus no extreme or abnormal pressure would be brought to bear upon the political life of New York in quadrennial national campaigns.

But, as matters have stood in the past, a result affecting profoundly the country as a whole was likely to turn upon the success of one party or the other in the great state of New York. And that success might in any presidential year turn upon the count of a single ballot box in a small voting precinct dominated by a Tammany politician in a lodging-house neighborhood off the Bowery.

The great contest of 1876 between Hayes and Tilden turned upon the prevalence of fraud and corruption in the voting machinery, chiefly in several reconstructed Southern states, but also to some extent in other parts of the country. This strain was so great that our institutions were subjected to a serious test. We were in some danger of revolution from what was then called the "Mexicanizing" of our forms of government. The party in power was quickly mobilizing the army, and the party out of power was threatening a great volunteer movement upon Washington. The crisis was tided over through a practical though extra-constitutional compromise, and the result was accepted by a democracy that had learned the need of some forbearance and patience through the experience of a terrible

Civil War brought on by the rashness of theorists and the narrow selfishness of special interests.

Another illustration of the danger of imperfect political machinery came in the great campaign of 1884, which turned wholly upon the count of the votes in the city of New York, or the metropolitan district in general. The balance was almost even, and a few votes either way would carry the entire electoral strength of the Empire state to the Republican or the Democratic side, and determine the national result. The Republicans had been in power at Washington since 1860. It was an intense struggle. Apart from a great tide of genuine political sentiment and party feeling, there was enormous pressure on both sides from office-seeking politicians and from diverse private interests. Mr. Blaine was defeated, and the Democrats, under Mr. Cleveland, came into power. The defeat of Mr. Blaine was at the moment attributed to the effect of an offensive phrase — an alliteration coined by a Protestant clergyman — which offended Catholic voters.

But it was afterward found that in spite of the clergyman's tactless remark, Mr. Blaine would have been elected but for ballot-box frauds perpetrated by a politician who in due time languished in the penitentiary for his crimes. Republicans at that period believed that ballot-box frauds and similar offenses against fundamental political honesty were almost wholly confined to the Democratic politicians. The Democrats believed that bribery and the improper use of money were essentially Republican offenses. But the plain fact is that we were living through a period of corruption in our politics, from which neither party was free, although one party may have been more proficient than the other in particular forms of wrong-doing.

The business of politics had been absorbed by the professional politician and office-seeker, who exploited it for purposes of gain. Meanwhile, the economic life of the country had grown more complex. Business interests were passing from the ownership of individuals and simple firms and partnerships, to large corporations. The relationship of political life to economic interests was taking on new forms.

Hence the growth of professionalized politics and the venal alliance between political machines and private interests. And hence the emergence of a series of political problems having to do with the reassertion of honesty in public affairs, and the rescuing of the political life by the citizens. Resort was had to various legal devices and particular reforms to enable the people to liberate themselves from the bondage to which they had been subjected under the guise of party system and regularity, and under the pretense of allegiance to great principles and policies for which the parties professed to stand as necessary sponsors and guardians.

One needs only to revert to the struggles of 1876 and 1884 to see that substantial progress has been made in several essential directions. The civil service reformers have won their case in theory, and, to a very great extent, in practice. The reformers of ballot methods have made enormous progress, so that the grosser frauds that once prevailed in New York, Boston, Baltimore, and Chicago, are eliminated, while even Philadelphia seems to have won the battle for real and honest elections. Both great parties, even in critical elections, expect fairly honest voting and counting in the city of New York.

To a very considerable extent municipal elections have

been made separate, so that they occur in the spring, or else, if coming in November, they fall in years when there are no general elections. In many states, moreover, the more important elections affecting the commonwealth, as for the governor and the legislature, are arranged to occur in the years intervening between important national campaigns, as for the presidency or for a new Congress.

In a rapidly increasing number of states, the people have insisted upon a more direct control of party methods by substituting primary elections for the time-honored nominating conventions. The great number of states in which the people in one way or another now insist upon a preliminary selection of United States senators, illustrates the many-sided movement in progress for securing to the ordinary citizen his share in the control of his party. The better public opinion of the state is learning to regulate the selection of candidates for high office, in order that the voter at the polls may not be limited to a virtual choice between two sets of men known to be either the obedient servants of party bosses and machines, or else the clever agents and tools of private interests.

With the complex and specialized organization of party politics, has come into recognized and important existence a series of correspondingly well-organized movements intended to redeem and purify politics from one standpoint or another. And concurrent with all this systematic work to improve the legal and official devices through which democracy expresses itself, we have been witnessing in state after state a wholesome spirit of revolt against bosses and their corrupt methods, both within party lines and from without. This great struggle for a free democratic

life and an honest government is far from being ended, and it will pass through many successive phases. But one reform after another has been largely gained, and, above all, the instrumentalities of reform have been created.

Public opinion, both local and at large, has been wonderfully developed of late, for improvement and progress in political methods. The public schools have created a nation of readers. Newspapers and periodicals have been multiplied, and the habit of newspaper reading is almost universal. Professionalized politics and selfish private interests have constantly endeavored in all sorts of ways to administer narcotics to the public through a subsidized or controlled newspaper press. Such efforts have gone far, but in the main they have failed. In a country where the freedom of the press is a constitutional prerogative, and where there exists a public and general interest that is distinct from the aims of a venal politics, the press will always sooner or later throw off its trammels and serve public as against private ends.

The very profession of journalism makes for the public point of view. Even the party newspaper must maintain its measure of freedom; and, if trammeled for a time, must in the end assert its normal liberty not only to publish the news, but also to represent the public interest and to combat the forces of tyranny and of wrong in politics and government. It is true there is no principle or motive working automatically to bring every newspaper or periodical into the service of good government and a free democracy. Nevertheless, in a country of wide-spread popular intelligence, there is a demand for publicity to which the press must respond from the very nature of the case. And in the service of this right-minded demand, there is

always a tendency toward sound working opinions about public affairs on the part of those whose business it is to purvey and interpret the news.

With the expansion of the metropolitan and local newspapers and the universal habit of reading them, there has also grown up a periodical press of national circulation, dependent for its success upon the belief of the intelligent public in its accuracy of statement and sincerity of view. This larger development of the press has proved to be of immense power not only in nationalizing public opinion, but also in synchronizing discussion and agitation for a particular reform or against a particular evil or abuse. Not to mention present-day exponents of such nationalized opinion in matters of politics and government, it is enough to call attention to the influence of the New York *Weekly Tribune* throughout the country in the days of Horace Greeley, or to that of *Harper's Weekly* under the editorship of George William Curtis.

The dissemination not only of the local newspaper but also of the periodical detached from local interest and devoted to affairs of national concern, has been promoted by a remarkable and unique policy on the part of the American government. The Post-Office Department for many years past, under direction of Congress, as a matter of deliberate public policy, has delivered newspapers and periodicals throughout the length and breadth of the land at a uniform rate of one cent a pound, regardless of the actual cost of the service. It has further promoted the newspaper press, as a local agent of public opinion and social and political progress, by giving it free distribution within the county where it is published. And, last but not least, it has created a vast system of rural free delivery

of postal matter which carries the newspaper and periodical into the homes of millions of scattered farmers.

A public policy such as this is undoubtedly susceptible of serious practical abuse. Yet the good ends that it serves are so vast in their consequences when compared with its abuses, that this postal policy must stand as one of the great monumental landmarks in the development and maintenance of our free democratic political life.

With a vast continental domain, and a population soon to reach a hundred millions and of highly diverse origin, it has become true that the foremost single agency for unifying and nationalizing American life is the local and general press of the country. That the press has its great faults is too obvious for discussion. The food supply may be imperfect in character, and the air we breathe may be somewhat contaminated, but we must have our supply of food and drink and air, nevertheless.

In like manner the press serves an indispensable need in our political life, and the public policy which gives it freedom, together with that policy of government which promotes its dissemination, are to be set down as of incalculable benefit to the forces that are keeping alive our democratic institutions in their original purpose and pristine virtue, while modifying their working from time to time to meet the changing conditions of our social life.

To sum up, then, this stage in my discussion, we seem to be finding the necessary solutions for the problems that have grown up in the natural course of our development due to the increased complexity of life, the necessary professionalizing of politics, and the natural pressure of large pecuniary interests, either to secure political favor or to escape some disadvantage. We shall continue to have

institutional parties and professional politicians. But they will be checked and, in the main, controlled by the great mass of citizens who obtain their livelihood in private pursuits, yet assert their right to a part in the normal play of political life and force.

Every organized interest in the community, whether economic or religious or of other character, will seek to promote its special views and interests through positive or negative political action. Thus, in one way or another, the great business corporations will continue to concern themselves about politics. But their attempts at a cynical control of the practical political life of the country through their financial relations with the bosses and machines of both parties will have to cease. Their partial withdrawal from politics will give a better tone to our public life, and this better tone will, in turn, relieve them from the more plausible pretexts upon which they had built up their corrupt political activity.

For it is obvious that the corporations had been the victims of their own system. A professionalized political machine which could render improper favors to business corporations could also, in turn, threaten them and blackmail them. An improvement of political and business morals, making for a better social equilibrium, helps the sane and sober view to prevail, and tends to bring divergent interests together on the simple platform of fair play and justice to all interests. The evolution of political life must proceed in a certain order. It was necessary that we should have made this long fight for the purification of politics and the freedom of democratic life and expression, because of the new tasks to which the agencies of government had to be applied.

VII

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC REGULATION, ESPECIALLY THOSE RELATING TO RAILWAYS AND TO INDUSTRIAL MONOPOLIES

It had been from the first a fundamental principle of our energetic, self-directing, and capable democracy, that it was not the task of government to assume the functions of the economic life. We held, rather, to the view that government should regulate conditions in such a way as to give to each citizen the largest range of freedom and initiative in his business affairs that could be made consistent with the like freedom of his fellow-citizens. In order to maintain this cardinal principle, it has been of ever increasing importance that government should maintain its unquestioned supremacy; that it could be relied upon to dispense justice with reasonable certainty as between conflicting private interests; that it should be able to grasp changing conditions and show a firm hand in making new applications, as occasions might require, of the underlying principles.

At the very outset of our American life, it was the business of the government to harmonize conditions, to promote the general welfare, to protect liberty, and to mediate between conflicting private interests. It would seem evident that these aspects of our governmental life and character could not grow less important as our economic life became more complex, and as private interests became

at once more assertive and more prone to conflict among themselves. And if, under these later conditions, any group of private interests should have fastened its clutches upon the political and governmental machinery for its own benefit as against the rest of the community, it would seem clear that government must, at all hazards, free itself from such control in order to carry on its normal functions.

A large part of that recent growth of opinion in favor of extending the business activities of government,—with a view to the public ownership and operation of many forms of business service or economic production,—has been due to the belief that government could not successfully regulate private activities and fix the rule of justice as between conflicting interests. Regulation of economic forces, for the general welfare and for the largest average freedom of private initiative, is the accepted American policy. Absorption of economic enterprises by the government itself with a view to a higher social welfare is a very different proposal. The line between state socialism or collectivism on the one hand, and the sphere of private enterprise on the other hand, is not one of absolute principle. It may vary somewhat with practical experience. But it is reasonably distinct. The considerations that govern public policy in such matters are not always theoretical.

Thus, in certain European countries, governments have come into the ownership and operation of railroads for reasons quite different from those that have usually been advocated in the United States. These European reasons have been largely of a military, strategical nature. They have also been found in the fact that — in eastern and southern Europe especially — public initiative was more

highly developed than private initiative, and the only way to procure a system of railroads and telegraphs was to create it as a government service, or else to allow it to be exploited by capitalists from other countries on disadvantageous terms. Our country, in contrast with eastern Europe, has come into the modern facilities of life with a higher development of private than of public business energy, and with a growth of private capital adequate usually to large undertakings.

When, therefore, men have argued in this country for governmental operation of railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, and services of local transit, they have not, as a rule, complained of the lack of such modern services or of the insufficiency of private capital for undertakings of such magnitude. Their argument has generally admitted the magnitude and adequacy of private capital, and the great energy of corporations engaged in rendering such services. Their complaints have been of a twofold character: first, that private interests in the control of these enterprises were not serving the public fairly and impartially; second, that they were interfering dangerously in the business of government, all the way up from the affairs of cities and local corporations to those of states and of the nation at large.

Sometimes there are great enterprises of national moment that private capital cannot finance: for example, private capital found it impossible to construct a ship canal either at Panama or across Nicaragua, and it was only after the full demonstration of such failure that the government of the United States undertook to provide the capital for that enterprise. The earlier transcontinental railroad lines required the loan of public credit and the grant of lands.

But generally speaking, private capital and energy have sufficed for the creation and carrying on of all large business undertakings in America. Some railroad lines have been projected and owned by states, and some, either partially or wholly, by particular cities. But the uniform practice has been to turn over the operation of such roads to private companies; and the later tendency has been to transfer ownership, also, to private hands.

In the period of rapid westward development, both before the Civil War and after it, the demand for railroad facilities was insatiate on the part of the new communities. All sorts of public and private subventions and subscriptions were extended to the promoters of new railway lines. The railroads in turn, having been built, were eager for business and were ready to offer inducements to manufacturers and large shippers. Special rates were promised to those who would locate their factories or warehouses along the new lines, and railroad agents sought both freight and passenger business by constantly changing rates to meet the competition of rival lines. It was a speculative era, during which railroads from time to time went into bankruptcy and submitted to processes of reorganization. It was inevitable that there should have arisen, finally, a definite conflict of interests between the Western railroads and certain classes of shippers.

The farmers, for example, did not compete with one another, but had a definite, common interest. The difference between the price they could get for their wheat and the quoted market price at Chicago or Liverpool, represented almost exactly the price per bushel exacted by the transportation companies for the service they rendered. The position of the farmers was favorable for a contest.

They had nothing to lose, and something to gain. They were the most powerful element in agricultural states like Minnesota and Iowa, and they proceeded to lay stress upon the public aspects of the railroads as common carriers. The Granger movement and the anti-monopoly movement in Western politics in the early seventies and in the eighties declared it to be the right of government to fix rates as well as to regulate, in other respects, the business of railroad companies. After a memorable contest which forms another great landmark in our political history, the railroad policies of these Western states were upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States.

With the development of the country, the question of excessive rates became less acute. Contrary to their expressed fears, the railroad companies did not find any disposition upon the part of the states to use the rate-making power in a confiscatory, or even in a radical, spirit. Meanwhile, the railroad systems were growing more extended, and many of the more difficult questions of regulation lay outside of the sphere of individual states. Then was called into a new use the power conferred by the Constitution upon Congress to regulate commerce between the states. In this respect, as in many others, the founders of our government builded better than they knew. They had laid down a broad principle capable of many unexpected future applications, but not likely to be invoked for improper uses.

Surely, one of the chief purposes of modern government is to regulate the play of economic forces. The states, respectively, are at liberty to fix the conditions under which business life is carried on within their borders. But the founders of the general government were creating a

great nation within the boundaries of which there was to be a free and unhampered economic life. Any proper regulation of the conditions of trade and commerce on the interstate or national plane must necessarily belong to the national government. Such a power would have belonged to the national authorities by necessary inference, even if it had not been expressly conferred in the Constitution.

The need of a national regulation of railroads found definite expression in the enactment of the original Interstate Commerce Law of 1887, and the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Besides various powers of inquiry and regulation conferred upon the commission, was the power to declare particular rates unreasonable, subject to a final action by the United States courts. The law forbade discriminations in rates and treatment for or against individual shippers. It undertook to protect localities against harmful treatment under its famous "long and short haul" clauses. It also forbade the system of "pooling" which had grown up among the competing trunk lines, — a method by which they had endeavored to break up the ruinous practice of rate-cutting, and to remove the pressure of competition by equitably dividing the through business.

The private rather than the public aspects of railroad investment and operation had, as a rule, accorded with the American way of thinking. But the new producing interests of the West had forced the public view upon the country, had carried legislatures and federal courts, and had at length secured national railroad regulation. Following the fight for reduction of excessive rates on farm products, came that for fair treatment of growing towns along the railroad lines which were disadvantaged by the

more favorable through rates accorded to the larger centers where railroad competition existed. The next stage in the struggle for equitable railroad service came with the demand of smaller shippers for protection against the unfair advantages accorded to their larger competitors in business.

In the earlier days, every manufacturer or more extensive shipper of commodities had negotiated for as favorable a rate as possible, and favors generally took the form of rebates and discounts. The more important the shipper, generally speaking, the larger the rebate. The system grew up naturally in the process of creating new communities. Favorable rates were accorded as an inducement to locate business enterprises along a given line. But, as the country matured, the system became intolerable. It was extremely difficult to bring railroad men to the perception of the fact that their business was not a private one in the sense of justifying these discriminations. After stringent state and national laws had been enacted, the discriminations were continued in secret ways and by all sorts of indirect and evasive practices. The large shippers had grown so powerful in many cases that they were in a position to make threats, if not absolutely to dictate terms.

The practice of favoritism, furthermore, had so blunted the moral perception of the average railroad official, that it became a somewhat usual practice for officers and others connected with the management of railroads to hold stock in coal mines, grain elevator lines, and various other enterprises, which they were able to serve to great advantage, not only by the granting of better rates than were given to competing businesses, but also by a prompt supply of cars and facilities, whereas competitors were

subject to delay and neglect. This practice on the part of railroad men of turning aside from their strict duties as common carriers in order to traffic in the commodities handled by their roads, could but lead to a further loss of moral perception; and the same set of officials fell into a series of practices distinctly harmful to their own stockholders.

Thus, in many instances, they detached more profitable forms of traffic from the general business of the company and carried them on by means of so-called "fast freight lines," in which they themselves held the stock. They set up separate interests in terminal facilities here and there; they built short lines of railway as so-called "feeders" and sold them to the main company at a private profit. In a variety of other ways, they managed to deprive the stockholders of the road of benefits which, under strictly honorable management, should have been theirs.

Meanwhile, the opportunities afforded by rebates and discriminations in favor of large shippers had been producing their natural effects. In a country so vast as ours, with such abundance and variety of resources, there was needed no extraordinary business acumen to develop enterprises upon a vast scale, if conditions in a given case were so favorable as to put all competitors at a serious disadvantage. A protective tariff which kept rates so high as to prohibit effective outside competition in many lines of production, might, indeed, have been favorable to the development of domestic monopoly in some cases. But the tariff could not ordinarily affect the conditions of competition among home producers. There were many iron-masters in the land benefited alike by the protective tariff. If a few iron-masters grew enormously rich because they were

able to take orders for railroad iron and other supplies at a price lower than their competitors could make, there must have been some other reason for it. There were many prosperous refiners of petroleum, and the oil fields were somewhat widely scattered. If one company or amalgamation was able to drive competitors out of business and by degrees control the whole field, where the more obvious conditions of supply and distribution were so simple, and where no patented invention or peculiar skill of industrial process was involved, there must have been a reason in the nature of some marked special advantage.

It seems to be a matter of history, disputed by nobody, that certain firms or companies in the early seventies had bargains with leading railroads which gave them rates from 25 to 50 per cent less than those accorded to smaller competitors. Doubtless, they were able business men who could have secured these advantages in a period when everybody was bargaining for rates and obtaining all the privileges possible. It is, nevertheless, a fact beyond dispute that the vast development of the business of so-called trusts owed much to enormous advantages in the shipment of their commodities.

It is far from my purpose to say these things in the spirit of an indictment against those who benefited by these incalculable railroad advantages. The sovereigns of European states in earlier periods were accustomed to grant certain monopoly privileges to subjects who had won their favor. But never in all human history were any such priceless monopoly privileges conferred upon any man or any company of men as when the railroads of this continental republic gave favors which enabled particular groups or individuals to command the fields of supply, to

fix wholesale and retail prices, and to control the consuming markets for various articles which came into universal use. This obviously applies to commodities like petroleum and anthracite coal.

It is equally plain that men dealing in iron and steel products in that earlier period could lay the foundation of great fortunes if they were lucky enough to secure better shipping arrangements than their competitors. Again, it requires no unusual acumen to perceive that stupendous organizations and vast fortunes could have been built up by firms and companies which acquired a practical control of the great business of buying and slaughtering Western cattle and hogs and distributing meat products, where the railroad rates were decidedly in their favor and they were allowed, in addition, to operate their own lines of cars.

The companies that were authorized to establish systems of grain elevators,— with warehouses at every station for hundreds of miles through a country devoted to wheat and other cereals,— aided by low rates and a constant supply of cars, were assuredly in a position to establish a profitable monopoly. The relation of railroads to the anthracite coal district of Pennsylvania and to certain bituminous coal districts elsewhere, afforded further instances of a discriminating system which it is not my purpose to illustrate exhaustively.

I am presenting these matters in their bearing upon the problems of American politics. Railway discrimination, perhaps, more than any other circumstance, created the larger business enterprises of a more or less monopolistic character, popularly known as trusts and combinations. In any case we should have had a vast business development, with many large individual undertakings, by reason of the

greatness of the country and the magnitude of its opportunities. It was railroad favors, however, more than anything else, that enabled a particular combination here and there to assume undue proportions and to absorb its competitors or even to destroy them, in a period when otherwise they could all have carried on a profitable business.

The two questions of railroad control and the checking or regulation of industrial monopoly have made their way in very close association with one another. It was as a result of public investigations of the Standard Oil Company and other large enterprises that the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was followed by the Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890. Both of these conspicuous enactments were intended to have an effect upon railroad management and upon the monopolistic tendency of industry and trade. The trusts and combinations, however, were growing so powerful and so rich that they were putting their surplus capital into railroad investments, and their leading spirits were becoming railroad directors. A condition had grown up which was making it difficult to force the railroads into compliance with the spirit and intent of the laws requiring them to render impartial service to all their patrons.

Meanwhile, the situation was assuming unexpected phases through court interpretations and through the character of the more or less spasmodic efforts of executive officers to enforce the laws. The Sherman Anti-Trust Law had forbidden agreements in restraint of trade. The courts decided that this forbade even a useful kind of understanding between railroads to maintain reasonable and standard rates and to serve the public beneficially. The effect of the two laws taken together was to cause the railroads

to create a so-called "community of interest" by making joint investment in competing lines and in other ways. And, in a series of rapid developments, many hundreds of separate railroad companies and lines became fused into a half-dozen great financial and operating systems, each falling under the direction and control of one so-called "magnate" or else of a small group of men.

In its fundamental nature, the transportation business is only to a very limited extent competitive. From the earliest times, the principles affecting common carriers have been those of an equal and fair treatment of the public, with an appropriate and decent quality of service at standard and reasonable prices. A certain possibility of competition, direct or indirect, must evidently have a wholesome effect upon the business of the common carrier, in that it stimulates his energy to the end of a more efficient rendering of public service. But since the public interest in the business of transportation is always greater and more essential than any private interest, it is both right and necessary that there should be direct public supervision and regulation.

For a time there was confusion in the public mind and a determination to break up large railroad systems into their constituent parts, and to compel them by due process of law to set themselves into competitive array, and thereby the better to serve the people who patronized them. Even the judges who wrote opinions in railroad cases were evidently affected by this notion that an earlier sort of competition could be made to work effectively as against the later principles of unity and harmony. But, in the main, that idea has lost its hold upon the minds of more thoughtful men. The regulative power of government must apply

directly, in order to see that all interests are fairly served by the great highways of travel and trade.

At times there have been complaints of particular rates whether for passengers or certain classes of freight, as excessive. But, in general, American railroad rates have not been regarded as so high upon the average as to place a harmful tax upon the larger movements of trade. The great effort of the leaders who have sought through politics and government to regulate the railroads, has been directed toward securing an impartial service. In view of the more recent development of large systems, and the disappearance of certain phases of competition, it has also become a leading object of public regulation to secure an ample and efficient, as well as an impartial, service. Further than that, it is a recognized function of government in its relation to railroads to promote the safety of the traveling public and of employees by compelling the less careful and enterprising companies to adopt the methods and standards of the more advanced, in the use of safety appliances and in the treatment of employees as respects their hours of labor and their protection against needless accident.

In the course of the long struggle for the public regulation of railroads, it is natural enough that all interests concerned should have formed themselves into compact groups with a view to participation in political life. The farmers in the seventies and eighties were able to enforce their demands because of the absolute solidarity of their interests and the definiteness and simplicity of their aims. Through the Granger movement and other organizations they controlled legislatures and brought a pressure to bear that was sometimes unduly hostile against the transportation companies, by virtue of whose enterprise the Western agricultural

communities had been created. The railroad interests, in turn, became a powerful factor in political life. They were in position to retain the services of influential lawyers in every county of the Western states, and through a liberal policy in the granting of free passes and the placing of advertising they learned how to acquire a considerable influence over the local newspapers.

As political life and work tended to become systematized in party machines, the railroad interests learned to organize their own well-paid political agencies for service in the odd years as well as in election years. And since professionalized politics is based upon money, the railroads learned how to maintain close relations with the dominant party machines.

The motives of railroad capitalists in their political activities were not necessarily corrupt. They felt that hostile interests were organized to tax railways, to lower rates, to make vexatious exactions, and, sometimes, to levy blackmail. Not only the great agricultural organizations, but also the labor-unions were in position to attack corporations by political methods. The general public, consisting of the ordinary travelers and the ordinary shippers, being largely dependent upon railroads, were naturally critical and ready to make demands of one kind and another upon the railroad managers. The railroads' own employees were organized in compact groups and able to exert political influence at critical moments of dispute with their employers.

What, under these complicated conditions, is the true function and the practical duty of government in the American state and nation? There are to-day great leaders of popular opinion and party organization who declare that there

is no solution of the railroad question short of a revolutionary change of policy as respects the scope of government. They hold that the nation itself must acquire and operate the interstate network of railroads, and that the states must acquire and operate the local branches and minor network of roads connecting with the great lines. Against this doctrine of innovation — with its hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of adherents — there are two distinct forms of political opposition.

One of these forms is based upon the view that the railroad business is essentially private, that government should let it alone, and that the best ends of American economic life will be served by leaving economic forces unrestricted. This is the view of the railroad owners and managers themselves, together with that of the trusts and corporations; and it is supported either openly or secretly by groups of politicians, regardless of party, who have found the alliance between politics and corporations a profitable one for their own purposes.

The other opposing view holds fast to the doctrine that railroads are necessary public highways, the impartial use of which must be maintained, but that the practical business of operating railroads belongs in the domain of private enterprise. With this view is associated the idea that a quasi-public service of universal importance requires publicity in its financial transactions as well as in its operating methods. Since railroads are granted franchises to perform a public service, and are accorded a limited power of eminent domain, it is held that government may justly supervise them to the end that they shall perform well the services for the sake of which they were chartered.

In detail these tasks of public regulation are difficult.

They can never be performed in a perfect way. But it is to be remembered that the margin of difference within which government has to operate is usually narrow, because of the balancing of natural forces in the business world. As a matter of practice, it has been found that government does not need to play an arbitrary rôle with respect to the fixing of rates; that it has only to enforce the reasonable standards of civilized life in its demand for safety appliances; and that in its endeavor to abolish the evils of rebating and discrimination, it is only lending its aid to those evolving forces of a maturing business life which, in any case, must have found that a fair and impartial treatment of all shippers comes in the end to be a necessity from every standpoint.

I am well aware that in the very statement I have made of the opposing views, I have revealed my own opinions. Recent legislation has increased the power and authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and there is evidence of a greatly enhanced activity on the part of railroad commissions in many of the states. There would seem no good reason to believe that the final triumph of government in its determination to regulate railroads in the public interest, would be otherwise than beneficial, in the long run, to all the various interests whose rights are concerned and who must look to government as the final arbiter. National charters to interstate railways, with national control of new issues of stocks and bonds, are quite as desirable for all concerned, — including the railway companies themselves, — as the power to regulate rates.

It is one thing to check abnormal tendencies, and to help maintain a true balance between diverse social and business interests, and a wholly different thing to absorb any

of those interests for public exploitation. That the American people could, if they chose, turn their government into a vast public-service corporation for the carrying on of the railroad, the telegraph, the telephone, and other businesses necessary to the general welfare, I have no doubt. Government ownership might to some extent relieve the political life from a commercialized and a corrupting tendency.

It is conceivable, indeed, that government could operate a few essentially public services, which are fundamental to other business enterprises, and go no further. It could so exploit them as to favor the general freedom of economic opportunity and to promote the diffusion rather than the concentration of wealth. But with all its merits, our government is not as yet a successful business agency. It ought not to operate railroads if private enterprise can and will operate them efficiently and impartially.

It is often the case that great reforms come about of themselves in the mere fullness of time through the ripening of conditions. Action is followed by reaction. Excessive immigration finds its own natural check at the very moment when we are about to put up the barriers. The worst evils of railway mismanagement are tending to disappear through the coöperation of all forces, public and private. The railroad companies do not wish to play a losing game in politics, and they are ready to meet their adversaries fully halfway on a platform of fair treatment to every interest. As for the trusts and corporations, they have made complete surrender as respects unfair railroad advantages.

The true policy of government in its dealing with these industrial undertakings of national and international scope,

must be worked out in the light of experience. Mr. Bryan and his adherents declare that every large business corporation of a monopolistic character must be destroyed. The existing law forbids combinations in restraint of trade. Since few of the great trusts and corporations occupy the entire field, the public attitude toward them must depend to some extent upon their real conduct toward, and effect upon, other corporations or other individuals engaged in like forms of business.

It is clear that there must be large knowledge of the working of these newer forms of business activity. I must, therefore, call attention to the creation of the Department of Commerce and Labor, with its investigating Bureau of Corporations, in the year 1903, as another landmark in our political history. It is the growing opinion that the government should not only have the power to investigate the methods of great corporations doing an interstate business, and to prosecute them where they oppress or restrain others in legitimate business enterprises, but that it should also be able to enforce a more complete publicity in respect to their corporate finances and their general methods, and that through some form of national licensing or incorporation, it should be better able to supervise them as large factors in national commerce.

Competition will long remain as a powerful stimulus in the economic sphere. Yet, in many fields of activity, as business has increased in magnitude, competition of the old sort has proved too wasteful and has become obsolete. In many private or ordinary industries, as well as in the quasi-public business of railroads, we have entered an era of combination and, comparatively speaking, of non-competitive economic life.

If the government had been more far-seeing and alert at an earlier period, we should have accomplished these economic transitions with less political and social disturbance. If railroad discrimination had never been practised, we should still have come into a period of large industrial combinations, but with a much greater diffusion of ownership. The railroads and the financial institutions of a country like France belong, not to their officers and directors, but to millions of small investors.

If government in America had more carefully regulated the conditions of economic life, in order to maintain equality of opportunity, it would have been scarcely possible for those disturbances to have arisen which are due partly to the over-development of particular corporations, and partly to the undue extent of the personal fortunes and corporate control of particular individuals. I have shown in earlier chapters that a more far-reaching public policy would have saved us, in part, from the political difficulties growing out of the race question, and from the economic antagonisms that brought on the war between the states. I have tried to prove that a more statesmanlike policy as respects the sources of natural wealth in our public domain would have inured to the benefit of the national treasury, and prevented some of those harmful inequalities of fortune due to the acquirement by private interests of the iron ore deposits, the petroleum fields, the coal belts, the timber areas, and certain other factors of national enrichment, which only recently were the property of all the people, but which, through a slack and negligent public policy, have now become monopolized in the hands of a few, and are the sources of colossal private fortunes. In like manner, it is easy enough now to see that lines of public policy — wholly

equitable and in accord with our general principles of freedom and equality — would have prevented the development of the larger trusts and combinations, at least in the forms they have now assumed, with stupendous individual fortunes as the key to their economic methods.

The diversion of economic resources and social wealth, to so large an extent, into the hands of a comparatively small number of people, has been in the main due to the failure of government to exercise strictly and wisely its functions as a supervisor and regulator of conflicting economic interests. It does not follow that these neglects and mistakes have resulted in conditions in any manner fatal to our future welfare, political or economic. Certain counteracting tendencies must be encouraged, and the further concentration of wealth must not be facilitated through the sheer failure of government to protect the ordinary citizen from spoliation.

It still remains, as I have repeatedly said, the business of government in America to build up a homogeneous, well-conditioned citizenship. Wealth is not to be discouraged, but on the contrary, the application of capital to the development of our resources and the further creation of wealth, both for enlarging the average means of living and for adding to the sum total of productive capital, must in every reasonable way be fostered. To this end the government will spread enlightenment as to the best ways to increase our agricultural output. The geological survey will render its invaluable aid to mineral development. Through the reclamation service and all the other policies that relate to the public domain, the national wealth will be further promoted.

There will remain ample opportunity for the acquisition

of large fortunes. But this opportunity must not be at the expense of the man who would otherwise have an opportunity to acquire, through his own efforts, a moderate fortune. So tremendous and tumultuous are the present-day forces of the economic life, that both now and for years to come it will be difficult to make wise application of those principles of regulation and control that belong to government. With the great trusts and corporations well organized to secure their hearing and to present their case at the political tribunal, we have, on the other hand, the federated bodies of labor-unions, with large power intrusted to central officers, equally able to state their case and present their demands to those in political authority. Government must ever hold the man as more important than the dollar. Equal suffrage and the rule of the majority, in a democratic state, put the balance of power in the hands of the plain people, as against any narrower interests, whether of wealth or of class.

It is convenient for purposes of discussion — as well as for the judges of our state courts in times of need — to have resort to old principles of common law. Thus we have revived the almost forgotten rules affecting common carriers, monopolies, and so-called "conspiracies." But it is necessary to have in mind the vast change in real conditions. Transportation in earlier times was unimportant. Families and communities being well-nigh self-sufficient in their economic concerns, the common carrier had only a limited function to perform. Since then, the industrial application of steam power has revolutionized all the conditions of life. It has brought about division of labor, with concentration of industry and trade; and the exchange of commodities throughout extensive areas has become the

most essential of economic processes. Thus, transportation emerges as a separate and vital industry, upon which all other industries are dependent, and its public character cannot be neglected.

With the further development of these modern conditions in business, there came of necessity the vast development of capital devoted to railroads, and to the kinds of industry dependent upon transportation. Monopoly, in its earlier forms, was due to some special advantage or arbitrary privilege. But, in its later forms, it has been due to the natural working of economic laws. As I have attempted to point out, in the period of rapid development the larger shippers secured the best transportation facilities, and thus grew toward monopolistic proportions with undue rapidity and by undesirable means. But in Germany and other countries where railroad discrimination has not existed, the tendency to large combination in standard fields of industrial production has been almost as great as in the United States.

This change in economic conditions, due to modern inventions and the increase of productive capital, has given a wholly transformed character to certain political and governmental problems. In the earlier period it was a small and incidental part of the work of our state governments to regulate common carriers; it was to be classed with such functions as the oversight of inns and public-houses. In those days, the protection of the public against extortion by monopoly, or against conspiracies in restraint of trade, was to be classed with such matters as the regulation of usury and of pawnbroking. In point of fact, the protection of the borrower against the exactions of the money-lender, and such reforms as the

abolition of imprisonment for debt, were regarded as of vastly more importance than the protection of the public against any form of industrial combination or monopoly.

The immediate problem of government is to permit natural development, while lessening incidental evils. The transitional disturbances and restraints due to such development are serious; and to meet them there is a movement of opinion in favor of harsh and arbitrary restraints to be embodied in legislation. But the temptation to make such enactments should be resisted. Transportation, for example, is a great industry which tends toward harmony. Competition in such services brings about the very discriminations that the opponents of railway combination so strongly condemn. The telegraph and telephone, local transit, gas and electric lighting, are instances of services that are monopolistic in their nature, while public in their essential character; and for the present in this country they are not to be regulated by the forces of a wasteful and outgrown competition, nor are they of necessity to be taken possession of and operated as governmental institutions.

Meanwhile, there is no standard of ideal justice by which to determine precisely how far government is to go in regulating and controlling these quasi-public services. At the risk of repetition, let me say again that the margin of difference within which government must act is comparatively narrow, as a rule. Government should be alert, intelligent, and responsive; but with a highly developed citizenship, government may not have to be very aggressive. In the exercise of its latent power to make rates, for example, government should not, as a rule, anticipate. It should leave quasi-public corporations to adjust their own

rates, and carry on business in their own way, until clearly defined and important interests make definite complaints; in which case government will endeavor to act as final arbiter in a spirit of justice.

Where industries not having the quasi-public character of railroads are concerned, some, in the nature of the case, tend to vast combination, while others give much larger room for the play of old-time competition. Science is constantly changing the character of industrial processes; and competition appears, disappears, and reappears, in fields where combination or monopoly had been thought to have gained firm control. Government must do its utmost to maintain freedom of exchange, freedom of opportunity, and wide publicity. There must be unremitting effort to destroy every phase of corrupt relationship between great business enterprises and the forces of politics and government. But government can only moderate, protect, and maintain economic order.

President Roosevelt in his recent messages to Congress has made it clear that the present administration does not believe that government can successfully check the normal development of combination in business; and it has been shown by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Attorney-General, and the Department of Commerce, that the present laws, as the courts have interpreted them, could not be strictly and fully enforced without great harm. There are certain forms of agreement in the field of railroad transportation that are desirable, and that the Interstate Commerce Commission would be ready to sanction, provided they were given full publicity.

As regards the great industrial trusts and combinations, the officials charged with the administration of the

Sherman Anti-Trust Law make a sharp distinction between combination itself and certain improper methods and practices by virtue of which combination may interfere harmfully with the reasonable economic freedom of other producers in the same field, or with the rights and interests of the consuming public. Thus a line of public policy has been gradually evolved, under the present governing authorities of this country, which looks not merely toward the wholesome enforcement of law to break up harmful practices, — whether in the field of transportation or in that of industrial combination, — but which also shows how the law may be safely modified for the sake of a desirable freedom of activity in the economic world.

As against the policy which stands for great moderation in the making of laws, but high vigilance in their enforcement, is the policy which is represented by many sincere and influential leaders of political thought and action. This policy would transfer to the government the colossal business of operating the railroads, and it would meet the movement for combination in trade and industry by stringent artificial checks. An example of such check is to be found in the proposal that all corporations engaged in interstate commerce should be compelled to secure a federal charter or license under the specific terms of which they would be limited to a certain percentage of the total business of the country in their particular field.

These two lines of opposing policy are emerging in a clear, distinct way from the fog and confusion of many side issues. Each policy has its difficulties and its political problems. Mr. Roosevelt's policy requires constant effort to overcome the systematic political pressure of corrupt

corporation influences in political life. It is a difficult task to keep the government in a condition so strong and so free from undue influence that it can maintain its supremacy and regulate the mighty forces of economic life that are ever contending for greater mastery.

Furthermore, the American mind, like the French mind, and unlike the English, loves to see clear and definite solutions, and is tempted to follow maxims and generalized statements. But the Roosevelt policy, which says that railroads are at once public institutions of vital concern and private business enterprises, in which capital must be allowed its fair chance to secure profitable results, makes it largely a matter of experiment from time to time to discover the just degree and method of public control.

Furthermore, it is the Roosevelt doctrine that, outside of quasi-public corporations, there are some trusts and combinations that are good and some that are bad, and that the efforts of government must be made to conform to the facts and conditions of the expanding economic life of the nation. But this is a statement of the case which fails to satisfy the mind that seeks to discover conclusive and final remedies for economic evils. The Roosevelt view is one that imposes the duty of moderation and care upon the lawmakers. It forces unremitting vigilance and effort upon the executive departments, as well as high character and intelligence. It looks to an increased range of responsibility for judges and juries. From the political standpoint, it has the disadvantage of being merely a policy of patience, conservatism, and high public efficiency, at a moment when the atmosphere of politics is heavily charged with the electric forces of radicalism.

The opposing policy, represented by such prominent

leadership as that of Mr. Bryan, has for purposes of argument some of the advantages that go with clear maxims and the promise of definite solutions. It seems a clearer and easier statement to say that all monopoly and combination is evil and must be destroyed, than to analyze and discriminate and qualify. And to say that the public interest in railroads has become so fundamental that the lines must be operated by the government in order to keep free competition alive in all other directions, and in order to preserve our democratic institutions from control at the hands of corrupt corporations, is a position that lends itself most invitingly to the purposes of political argument.

It is to be expected that these issues must be faced by the people of the country at the polls in great national contests of the near future. They are likely to become issues of greater consequence and magnitude than the tariff question, or the question of aiding in the secure and orderly exchanges of business by means of a good system of money and banking. It is true that the tariff question has played a great part in our political controversies of the past; and that the money question has had a similar place in our political history, — while both have had real importance in our economic progress as well as in our governmental and political life.

But while the adoption of one policy or another in respect to the tariff or the currency may considerably affect the conditions under which private business is carried on, — just as a regulation of common carriers may also affect the conditions of private business, — it is plain that tariff and currency policies may be changed from time to time, and do not involve deeply the nature or

functions of government. The direct operation of the railroads of the United States, on the other hand, would mean, in practical effect, a vast extension of the public service in a new and unaccustomed direction, and a policy that could not be readily changed, like an outgrown tariff or an imperfect system of currency.

VIII

THE TARIFF, QUESTIONS OF TAXATION, AND PROBLEMS OF MONEY AND CURRENCY IN OUR POLITICS

The part that the tariff question has played in our political history has been due less to its intrinsic importance than to the relation it has borne to certain other controversies. Its exaggerated rôle must also be interpreted in the light of an understanding of the American political mind, with its doctrinaire tendencies and its argumentative habit. There has not been a village or a cross-roads hamlet in the United States, however small, which has not possessed for several generations its free-traders and its protectionists, accustomed to debate this subject from boyhood to old age as a foremost intellectual diversion. Thus the tariff question has outranked even the money question or the race question as affording subject-matter of debate and controversy in that universal and unending practice of popular discussion of public affairs which plays so large a part in the national life and in the training of American citizenship.

As I have already remarked in discussing the regulation of railroads and of monopolistic industrial tendencies, the normal play of government in such matters is confined to rather narrow limits. Economic forces of themselves bring about certain balances and adjustments that need only a

moderate amount of assistance at the hands of the state. Government can fix certain large antecedent conditions, can be dominated by certain far-reaching motives, and can afterward — by experimental changes of method or policy — affect somewhat the rapidity of economic development. What is true of railroad regulation is equally true of those phases of the tariff question which have been brought into political controversy.

The starting-point for a just understanding of American tariff policy is to be found in the conditions and purposes of our building of a new nation. The great steps in the early period were, not the placing of import taxes of a more or less discriminating kind upon foreign goods, but, first, the nationalizing of commerce by the establishment of free trade among all the states; second, the acquisition by the national government of the sole power to levy taxes upon imports; and third, the prohibition of taxes upon exports. We were not setting out to show the world an experiment in protectionism, but rather to show how we might develop a continent dedicated to the practice of free trade. Our business was to create a new country, in a period when nationality everywhere was a matter not merely political, but also of commercial and industrial significance.

Through its laws and policies every government of Europe had made an economic as well as a political entity of its domains; and we could not have done otherwise. Mr. Hamilton, in his famous report on manufactures, set forth in an impressive way the reasons why the tariff should be so arranged as to give incidental encouragement to the growth of varied industries in our new country. We were then a maritime people, nearly all of our population living

within a hundred miles of the Atlantic seaboard. Our shipping and our foreign commerce were our largest interests. There was no justification at that time for a tariff policy that would sharply have checked importation and ocean traffic. It was enough merely to aid somewhat a tendency toward the beginnings of our manufacturing growth.

The War of 1812 so seriously interrupted our foreign trade as to demonstrate the need of a certain degree of independence in the production of the more necessary articles of industry, especially textiles; and hence the tariff of 1816, which was broadly protective, with duties upon some kinds of woven goods, for example, as high as 30 per cent of their value. By successive enactments, the average rates of protective duties were increased until 1833, when a compromise tariff, providing for gradual reductions, was adopted, and in 1842, while we were still on the protective basis, the rates were comparatively low.

In 1846 an *ad valorem* revenue tariff was adopted, generally referred to as the "Free Trade Tariff," although a good deal of incidental protection lurked behind its rates. This was further reduced in 1857. But with the advent of a Republican administration and the outbreak of the war, there was adopted the Morrill tariff of 1861, largely protectionist in its theory, while designed especially to procure revenue for the government in a period of extreme fiscal emergency.

The change of policy during the twenty or twenty-five years preceding the war was due chiefly to the sharp divergence of interests between the North and South produced by the expansion of cotton growing under the slavery

system. The invention of the cotton-gin had, for the time being, revolutionized agriculture and commerce in the South. It had affected the world as profoundly in that period as the tremendous expansion of Northwestern wheat and corn production in the seventies and eighties disturbed the economic conditions of the world a generation later. It was to the clear advantage of the South, at least from the momentary standpoint, to form an alliance with the manufacturing interest of England rather than with that of our own Northeast.

It was just at this time that the British manufacturers — largely those of the textile industries and especially of the cotton spinning and weaving districts — had prevailed over the land-owning interest and secured the repeal of the corn laws. They were obtaining cotton in great quantities in consequence of the development of our Southern states; and with the opportunity to import free food, these English manufacturers were in a position more than ever to dominate the markets of the world. Whatever helped the development of the Manchester district in England, seemed to be good for the Southern cotton raiser; and it was obviously against the interest of the British textile manufacturer to have the United States maintain its earlier protective policy.

But for extreme sectional antagonisms, — due far more to the slavery system than to the fact that Europe was chief customer for the cotton crop, — the tariff question would not have played so bitter a part in politics, and the tariff laws would not have varied so much with the rise and fall of parties. The circumstances which had enabled the slave-holding power of the South to control the Democratic party of the country for other purposes during the

period before the war, enabled it also to control that party's action upon the tariff.

The war for the Union was waged by the North in a spirit of intense nationalism. All the earlier arguments for varied industries and national economic independence were intensified many fold. The policies that promoted the building of the Pacific railways and the opening up of the Western lands were scarcely separable in motive from the policy which maintained high protective duties for the benefit of American manufactures. As I have said in previous chapters, the period that followed the war was one of stupendous individual and social energy. It witnessed a great spreading out of the American stock over wide areas, and the absorption into our body politic of millions of strangers from Europe. A protective tariff at such epochs of national development is to be regarded as an effect rather than a cause. It was an arrangement that blended with all the policies and all the tendencies of the time for bringing about swift expansion and high development in a new country.

Under the device of a discriminating tariff, European capital by the hundreds of millions of dollars was transferred to this country to engage in iron and steel, textile, and many other kinds of manufacturing, and to help build and equip the railroads that were distributing the products of industry as well as those of agriculture. The tariff policy had a direct, as well as an indirect, influence upon the diversifying of agriculture itself.

The practical difficulties encountered in the adjustment of tariff schedules were, indeed, so great as to cast a serious doubt over the wisdom of the protective policy. It is always difficult for statesmanship in matters so technical

and complicated to supply itself with the requisite information. And a great variety of private interests are tempted to support paid lobbies and to use so-called "log-rolling" methods for their own immediate ends, regardless of the general bearings of the policy at large.

American business men not directly affected by a particular schedule have, as a rule, deplored periods of tariff agitation, because of the uncertainties involved. They wish to make their plans with a knowledge of the larger conditions affecting industry and trade. The intensity of the tariff issue has been lessened to a marked degree in recent years for a number of reasons. One reason is the relative maturing of the newer sections of the country. There was a period when the almost exclusively agricultural character of the Northwestern states — coinciding with a large European demand for American breadstuffs and provisions, created a strong Western sentiment in favor of free trade. This sentiment, which was universal among Western Democrats, was also strong among their Republican fellow-citizens at the very time when, as in the Blaine-Cleveland campaign of 1884, the tariff question was the most conspicuous issue dividing the national parties. For a considerable period, the Republicans of Iowa and Minnesota were in the anomalous position of having free-trade planks in their state platforms in years of presidential and congressional campaigning, when the country at large was fighting out the battle chiefly upon tariff issues.

But this period passed away with the rapid westward development of manufacturing, the immense increase in the value of Western lands, and a perception of the fact that, for a long time to come, the domestic trade of the United States would almost wholly absorb the energies of

our producers and distributers. Thus the Republican party came to something like unanimity upon the general principle of protection. In due time, the Democratic party, which had long been faithful to the ideals of free trade, began for some reason, at first scarcely defined, to grow lukewarm. And it was evident that the tariff was falling from its place as a first-class political issue to a place in the second rank, and that the tendency was to make it a business man's question rather than a vital part of the stock in trade of the professional party politician.

The chief reason for this change is to be found in the growth of Southern manufactures. When the South shipped all its cotton to Europe and to New England, it was for free trade. But now it may be said, on a rough division, that the South manufactures one-third of its own raw cotton, sends one-third North, and ships the other third to Europe. Moreover, the proportion kept for spinning and weaving in the South grows constantly larger. With its great deposits of coal and iron ore, and its abundant water-power in the streams falling swiftly from the Appalachian uplands, the South is changing its industrial character just as Germany in recent years has changed hers.

In short, the old strain of the tariff question in our politics was largely due to the strictly agricultural character of the South and West. It is not many years since the opposing views about the tariff were proclaimed throughout the land by bodies of propagandists whose fanaticism has scarcely been equaled in all our annals whether political or religious. Our political life and its problems, as I have had to say so many times in this brief survey, can never be understood apart from a sympathetic appreciation of the

temperament of the American people. Ours has always been a population capable of intense conviction on the intellectual side, and of great heights of enthusiasm and devotion on the moral side.

This must be remembered in its relation to the anti-slavery movement of the North, while it must also be borne in mind as belonging only in lesser degree to the pro-slavery and states' rights movement in the South. It explains the great wave of agitation for the prohibition of the liquor traffic that swept across the country. It manifested itself even in the agitation of a question of mere business expediency, such as the adoption of a revised monetary standard. For there was a time, not so long ago, when the "friends of silver," as they called themselves, seemed possessed by a sort of religious frenzy; while some of the opposing advocates of a single metallic standard really worshiped their golden calf with a solemn reverence that indicated a satisfaction of soul as well as of mind.

This capacity for absorption, and for temporary delusion, has its inconveniences; but it goes with that earnestness and passion for right solutions, because they are right, that are part of the essential life and vigor of our democracy. In due time the delusions pass away; the exaggeration of controversy diminishes; and practical common sense finds useful working solutions.

It has been part of the constructive mission of American politics to provide favorable conditions for the development of the national resources. Every great nation or empire in the present period is making use of a varied but systematized policy for the economic progress of its own population and domain, as a distinct sphere or commercial entity. Each government has its own reasons which it

must justify at the bar of national opinion. It is not unreasonable to look forward to a time when the nations will, by degrees, come to see the desirability of according something like the same freedom to the currents of international trade that is now recognized as necessary within national boundaries. But the doctrinaire aspects of the old controversy between protection and free trade have almost entirely passed away.

With us in the United States the question will take the form of a series of practical issues, with each of which statesmen and men of business affairs must deal as best they can. Our annexation of Porto Rico and the Hawaiian Islands has, at length, by general consent justified their inclusion in our economic zone. Our relations to Cuba have been followed by mutual tariff concessions, which are likely to be increased and to bring Cuba within the area of our domestic commerce, — although for her own revenue purposes, Cuba at present seems to require a moderate tariff upon imports from the United States. The tendency of all countries having colonial possessions is to hold their outlying territories for mutual trade benefits. It is not the desire of the American people to make commercial exploitation of the Philippines; but it is commonly desired to promote Philippine prosperity by giving those islands a preferential access to American markets for their sugar, tobacco, and other chief products.

Our best and most constant outside customer is the Dominion of Canada. At an earlier period in our history, we traded with her under the terms of a mutually beneficial reciprocity treaty. It was a narrow and unwise course, on our part, to discontinue that policy. The Democratic party, instead of working for ideal and universal free

trade, would have been wiser to have advocated approximate free trade with our nearest neighbors as a beginning. But, as I have shown, Democratic idealism on the tariff question grew out of the earlier conditions of the cotton market, and simply meant free trade with England, when expressed in business terms. Canada has now entered upon a period of constructive economic development on her own behalf, under the stimulus of high protective tariffs, and is far less inclined than formerly toward an arrangement which would admit American manufactured goods at reduced rates in return for our admission of Canadian coal, fish, lumber and forest products, and various farm crops and raw materials.

The McKinley tariff of 1890 contemplated a great extension of the reciprocity system, especially with South America. The Wilson tariff (Democratic) of 1894, while still a high protective system, made an average reduction of rates, rejected the reciprocity theory, and put stress upon the theory of free raw materials. The Dingley (Republican) tariff of 1897 was upon the plan of a consistent and complete high tariff on raw materials as well as finished product. The decade that has followed the adoption of that tariff has witnessed great changes in domestic and foreign business conditions, and it might well be assumed that the schedules then adopted would apply very imperfectly to the present situation.

We have, indeed, made great changes in the other parts of the national revenue system which was developed to meet the needs of increasing expenditure growing out of the war with Spain. But the business of the country has somehow adapted itself to the Dingley tariff law, and even yet seems to prefer that law with its many and obvious imperfections

to a period of tariff agitation with entire uncertainty as to the nature or extent of changes to be adopted. There is no indication that the Sixtieth Congress will seriously attempt to make any changes in the present tariff system. It is a somewhat curious and significant fact that Eastern Republicans, with Massachusetts as the center of their expression, and Western Republicans, in Iowa especially, seem to be more urgent in their demand for tariff reform than any group or section of the Democrats.

In 1896 the Democrats themselves diverted the national issue from the tariff to the money question. In 1900 they made it imperialism, apropos of our acquisition of the Philippines, with a continuation of the money issue. In 1904, with the radical Democrats writing the platform and the conservatives naming the presidential ticket, all other issues of the campaign fell into obscurity before the one great question whether or not the country would sustain President Roosevelt and keep him at the helm for another four years. The result was the greatest personal triumph in the history of American politics. Meanwhile, business prosperity has continued at high tide, domestic commerce has constituted 95 per cent of our total trade, other issues have had immediate prominence, and the tariff question has been from time to time postponed.

Quite apart from the far greater changes of tariff policy that must come in the future, it is evident that an expert commission could propose many changes of detail in the present tariff schedules that would be wise and beneficial if made on due notice and without agitation. The plan of a double tariff consisting of maximum and minimum rates has been adopted by several leading European countries, with a view to securing concessions from foreign govern-

ments. Such a plan is now advocated by many Americans.

It is probable that the Republicans in the campaign of 1908 will promise an immediate revision of the tariff, if continued in power. Mr. Bryan's railroad program and his proposed solution of the problem of the trusts and combinations, may force the fighting in so aggressive a way upon those issues as to keep the tariff in the background. Meanwhile, economic policies essentially protective in their spirit and purpose are characterizing the work of almost every modern government; and it is reasonable to believe that future changes in our own economic policy will come by way of modification to meet altering conditions, and not by way of sharp reversal. The Democrats had promised a radical change of tariff policy when they won their victory after the enactment of the McKinley tariff of 1890. But, although they were in full power in both houses of Congress, — with President Cleveland straining every nerve to promote the radical tariff reform which he believed to be needful, — it was found that the established business policy of the country could not be revolutionized. The resisting forces were too great to be overcome.

If once again the Democrats should come into full power, perchance in the election of 1908, it is not likely that they would even attempt a reversal of the protective policy, although they would undoubtedly make a sweeping revision of the present Dingley tariff. In their attacks upon the trusts and monopolies, it has been a favorite contention of Mr. Bryan and many other Democratic leaders that the tariff has greatly fostered industrial monopoly. It is evident that there are some industries which had taken root and grown in this country by reason of tariff protection,

and which have since combined to suppress domestic competition and maintain artificial prices under the sheltering wall of the tariff which keeps out the foreign competitor. How numerous such instances are is a proper subject of inquiry; and the results of inquiry might point to desirable reductions of the tariff.

But with Europe nationalistic and protective, with Japan growingly active in policies for the promotion of economic progress, with Canada in a similar mood by general agreement of statesmen and leaders of both parties, and with the three chief South American republics entering upon a new period of economic development under government auspices, it is not likely that the United States will soon abandon a system designed to promote production and trade on the national rather than the international basis.

There have been many attempts to explain the disappearance of what before the war was our vast ocean carrying trade. Our coastwise trade developed, like our railroads, as a part of our national transportation system, foreigners being excluded from it by law. The exigencies of the Civil War period drove us temporarily from the sea. After the war, the far greater rewards that American capital and labor could readily obtain in the internal development of the country afford an ample explanation of our failure to return at once to our abandoned business of ocean freighting. The maritime peoples of Europe, with fewer opportunities on land, were driven to the high seas, and were prepared to carry cotton and wheat to Europe for us at prices which saved us money on every bale and bushel, thus enabling us to devote our capital and energy to the more profitable tasks of growing the cotton and wheat, and developing our varied resources.

Our ability to hire others to carry on our ocean freighting has been a source of great and positive gain to us from the business standpoint. Thus far, it has been advantageous to us to participate in the triangular movement of trade which takes our surplus cotton and food to Europe, takes European manufactures to South America, and brings coffee, sugar, hides, and other products of South America and the West Indies to this country. But we shall, in due time, consume most of our own food supply, and shall steadily increase the surplus of our manufactured goods. It will then be desirable for us to trade directly with South America, and there would be advantages in carrying on such trade by means of ships of American register.

The completion of the Panama Canal will probably mark the beginning of a new era in our foreign commerce, and it may possibly be found desirable to promote a revival of American merchant shipping by some form of government aid. Quite apart from questions of business profit, there are reasons of national influence and dignity that might prompt us to a policy of mail subventions or other form of encouragement in order to secure frequent sailings under the American flag to both coasts of South America and to the ports of the Far East.

The economic policy of the government is not to be understood when detached from a study of the people themselves in their energy and business character, and in further relation to their conditions of soil and climate, agricultural opportunities, mineral resources, natural and artificial lines of transportation, and other conditions of environment. When government adopts an economic policy that is in keeping with natural tendencies, — a policy that neither creates nor thwarts, but that stimulates

and assists, — it would seem to have served fully its normal functions.

The expense of government is very great, and since it absorbs in the form of revenue so much from the current wealth produced by the joint effort of the factors in economic life, it must render in return as large a service as may be possible. When government collects money which it expends efficiently in the carrying on of schools, it is rendering a far-reaching benefit to society in its economic as well as its other aspects. What it expends for maintaining order and giving security to life, health, and property, is amply justified if means are well adapted to ends.

The cost of its larger defensive forces, — its army, and its navy, — while a heavy drain upon the economic resources of modern peoples, can only be condemned as facts and conditions may affect a given case. If preparation for war insures peace, an economic age is willing to pay a high price for such insurance. A self-sustaining service like the post-office may be so conducted in some of its branches as to stimulate very greatly the exchanges of the economic world, and to promote the diffusion of intelligence. A great expenditure for the improvement of rivers and harbors may be more profitable to commerce than burdensome in its tax upon resources. A vast outlay for pensions, such as our own government makes, at least involves no waste of social wealth, but somewhat equalizes conditions by returning to a large class of people (who are more or less dependent) what it took from the sum total of the people's income.

It is in the method of raising the money to supply its needs, almost as much as in the method of expending the

money, that governments may influence economic and social conditions. Thus the protective tariff after all is, in its origin, an incident of what at the outset was the only practicable means of obtaining a national revenue. The great public income derived from the internal tax upon spirituous liquors, has generally been levied with some intentional reference to the social effect of placing burdens upon the use of articles which are regarded either as harmful or as mere indulgences. The resort to the principle of the income tax is advocated either with a view to giving the government an additional source of certain and direct income, or else with the motive of securing a better distribution of the burden of taxation. A similar remark would be applicable to the proposal to levy taxes, progressive or otherwise, upon estates in process of transmission from their original owners to their heirs. A tobacco tax obviously bears chiefly upon the working classes. A progressive income tax or an inheritance tax would tend in its measure to lessen the inequalities of private fortunes.

As I have said, without apology for constant reiteration, the underlying purpose of the American government has been to create and maintain democratic institutions, based upon a high degree of average intelligence, capacity, and well-being. And it is, undoubtedly, quite as permissible an exercise of government policy to levy other kinds of taxes in such a way as to aid in the equalizing process, as to provide tariff discriminations for the benefit of American industrial development. Some questions of this kind, if just now below the horizon of practical politics, are likely to come into view in the near future.

I have more than once referred to the place in American political life that has been occupied by questions relating

to money and banking. The Constitution conferred upon Congress the power to coin money and regulate its value. The exigencies of the Revolutionary period had led to the issue of great quantities of government paper, the so-called "Continental notes," which had depreciated in value through the inability of the Continental government to redeem them. Such paper issued by a government is nothing else than a forced loan, the evidences of which are in small denominations, convenient for circulation from hand to hand; and it serves the purpose of money. Such promises to pay will be accepted with greater or less discount, according to the prevailing opinion respecting the prospect of their future redemption at par.

It is obvious that a widely fluctuating medium of exchange — based ostensibly upon some standard of value which has disappeared from actual use — is harmful in the extreme to the ordinary course of business, and almost prohibitive of intelligent contracts in which time is an element. It was a great triumph on the part of Mr. Hamilton and the early financiers of the Republic to have succeeded in helping the business community to reëstablish its exchanges upon a basis of gold and silver coin.

In the speculative period of the westward movement and the economic development of the Mississippi Valley after 1830, the actual currency of the country was chiefly supplied by issues of bank-notes under state laws. The earlier political controversies growing out of the establishment of a national bank as a fiscal agency for the central government — with the abolition of such a bank, and the establishment of the treasury and sub-treasury system — were related more closely to the government system of collecting and disbursing its income than to the country's

money supply. If all the states had carefully and soundly regulated the note issues of their banks, as a few of them did, the system could have been tolerated, although it would not have been a wise one. But in many states, local bank issues were without proper control and regulation, bank failures were frequent, and the business of the country was most vexatiously interfered with by the lack of a safe, standard currency.

Yet such were the sectional prejudices and antagonisms of that period that it was politically impossible to give the country a well-protected and uniform system of currency. It remained for the outbreak of the war between the states to force a nationalizing of the currency system. The government was obliged to market war loans, and it desired the aid of local bankers. The panic of 1857 had brought great numbers of state bank failures, and had finally discredited what came to be called the "wild-cat" currency, issued under state authority.

The national banking law of 1863 accomplished several great purposes at one stroke. It rid the country of the state bank-notes by levying a 10 per cent tax upon them, thus driving that form of currency out of existence. It provided for the incorporation of national banks, with the power to issue notes guaranteed by the national government and having, therefore, a uniform character and value throughout the country. For its own protection it required the banks desiring to issue notes to purchase United States government bonds and deposit them at Washington, the banks being allowed to issue notes approximately equal to the face value of the bonds. This plan helped to secure a market for the bonds. Meanwhile, the banks drew the interest upon the bonds, and the government levied a

moderate tax upon their note issues for purposes of a redemption fund in case of the failure of any particular bank. Great numbers of the state banks then existing took out United States charters, came under the general regulation of the national banking act, and became parts of a system which has continued to this day with much to commend it.

It was a vast relief to the country to have the note-issuing function transferred to the supervision and control of the national government. Unfortunately, the statesmen of the Civil War period, in their financial exigency, did not see how to keep the country's business upon its established standards of the gold and silver dollar. Taxes were increased in all sorts of ways, and bonds were sold as rapidly as possible; but the demands of war expenditure remained unsatisfied and the policy of issuing non-interest-bearing government notes for purposes of circulation — the so-called "paper money" or "Greenbacks" of the war period — was entered upon as a practical method of obtaining necessary war supplies.

As I have already said, the value for practical purposes of such government notes depends upon the prevailing confidence of the business community in the practical ability of the government to protect and redeem its issues at their face value. The government made its greenbacks receivable for taxes and declared them a legal tender for the payment of ordinary debts. Naturally, the circulation of government paper not limited in quantity and with no date fixed for redemption, put a premium upon gold and silver and forced them out of circulation. At the more dubious period of the Civil War, the depreciation of paper money was very serious. The price of gold in terms of

paper averaged 220 throughout 1864, and on one day reached 285.

After the war there came a period of financial readjustment and a tremendous political struggle over the proper place of the greenbacks in our currency system both in theory and in practice. The Greenback party arose as a separate movement, while both of the older parties contained many conspicuous men who sympathized with the greenback doctrines. The Greenbackers believed that interest and principal of the national debt should be paid in irredeemable government notes, and that such notes should be substituted for the issues of the national banks.

It was held that the government bonds had been sold at great discount under conditions of an inflated currency, and that to pay them off in gold would be an injustice to the producers and workers of the country, and a discrimination in favor of the people then popularly known as "bloated bondholders." The conservative elements, on the other hand, held firmly to the literal contract which made the bonds redeemable in coin, and to the world-established doctrines regarding the nature and character of money. The struggle was a sincere one on both sides. The West and South, with undeveloped resources, and representing the debtor rather than the creditor class, naturally feared the effect of what might be in the nature of contracting the currency and increasing the purchasing power of the dollar.

In the Sherman Resumption Act of 1875, which went into effect at the beginning of 1879, the conservative position prevailed, and it will be the verdict of history, beyond a doubt, that this act was one of sound policy and broad

statesmanship. The government notes remained in circulation, but their quantity was fixed; and the mere fact that the government could and would redeem them upon demand gave them the same position for ordinary use as the bank-notes, so that all parts of the sum total of our circulation, whether gold and silver coin, bank-notes, or greenbacks, circulated interchangeably and without prejudice.

But with the acceptance by the country of the metallic basis of its money system, there arose another controversy which, in the end, assumed deeper intensity and larger political proportions than had ever belonged to the paper money struggle. Before the war, both gold and silver had been monetary standards. The law had fixed the ratio of weight between them at 16 to 1. Before the great discoveries of gold in California and Australia, silver had been relatively more plentiful, and since the ratio did not fit exact bullion conditions, the real monetary basis was the silver dollar. After the sudden expansion of gold output, however, the bullion situation had changed, and at the existing mint ratio the gold dollar was a little cheaper, and it, in turn, became the actual standard.

In 1873 Congress, without much consideration of the question, had passed a law practically abolishing silver as an alternative standard. The bullion ratio in the open market was such, at that time, as to give the question a seemingly slight importance. But after the full resumption of specie payments, — with the practical policy fairly entered upon of paying the interest and principal of the public debt in gold, — bullion conditions rapidly changed. Not only were great deposits of silver found, but new methods and processes for the extraction of silver enormously increased and cheapened the supply.

The mints had, in former periods, been open to all comers who had silver bullion to exchange for silver dollars of a legal weight and fineness. All that was required was the payment of a small seigniorage for the expense of assaying and coining. Such dollars had been money of absolute authority for the payment of all public and private obligations. But with a large output of new silver, the mints were found closed, the perfunctory enactment of 1873 was popularly discovered, and a vast contention began in which sincere public conviction as well as powerful private interest was enlisted upon each side.

It was a contest that was waged through twenty years with ever growing intensity. Various conditions were coinciding after the panic of 1873, in a long period of depression, to influence the motives and the point of view of men in the farming regions. The railroad building and the land speculation following the war had been overdone. Hard times had set in after one of the sharpest financial panics in our history. Almost the entire country west of Pennsylvania had been carried away by enticing monetary doctrines, and Congress had voted in 1874 to inflate the greenback issues to a fixed amount of $400,000,000. The country had been saved from this mistake only by the veto of President Grant, who adhered to a financial policy that had been initiated by a great authority at the head of the Treasury Department, Mr. McCulloch.

In 1866, just after the war, Congress had approved the Secretary's policy of a steady retirement of greenback notes and contraction of the currency. The fresh confidence thus given to the credit of the government would in any case have increased the purchasing power of the greenbacks, and this would have expressed itself in a general fall

of prices. But a fall of prices always seems a hardship to farmers and producers; and there was a demand for a check in the policy of contraction. In 1868 Congress stopped the Treasury practice by fixing the volume of notes at $356,000,000, that being the amount then in circulation.

After the panic, as I have said, and in the period of reaction, the demand for inflated paper issues, for the sake of increasing prices and making it easier to pay debts, swept the Mississippi Valley with irresistible strength, and it was reflected in the measure of 1874, vetoed by the President. When Greenbackism, after that, attempted to carry its views as a separate party organization, it was weaker than when it had pervaded both institutional parties as a social and economic doctrine. It is highly creditable to the country that in the face of such a sentiment, under the pall of deep business depression, the Resumption Act of 1875 was carried through Congress.

This act made very slight contraction of the currency, fixing the volume of greenbacks at $346,000,000; but it provided that they should be kept at par with gold by being made redeemable, — although they were not to be canceled when redeemed, but paid out again by the government as a part of the country's volume of currency.

The redemption feature was not, however, to go into effect until 1879. Meanwhile, the silver movement had its origin chiefly at the instance of the Western mine owners. In 1876 the price of silver had so declined that the bullion value of the silver dollar of 412.8 grains was about 89½ cents in terms of gold. The discount on greenbacks at that time had made them worth about 87½ cents. Notes were growing better because of the improving credit of the

government; but silver was growing worse because of certain world-wide conditions affecting its production and use.

In 1876 the House Committee on Mines and Mining attempted to secure the passage of a bill which would have opened the mints to the coinage of silver dollars for the full benefit of any one depositing the bullion, such dollars to be full legal tender for all public and private purposes. The bill was not passed, but a great debate was entered upon. It resulted in the compromise known as the Bland-Allison Act of 1878. This is to be remembered as one of the landmarks in our economic history. The silver dollar, let it be borne in mind, had wholly disappeared ten years before the war; so that when men spoke of hard money and payment in coin, they meant gold. Legally, however, the silver dollar had existed until it had been dropped from the list of American coins by the Act of 1873. If we had merely repealed the Act of 1873, having resumed specie payment in 1875, we should have found ourselves in effect, like Mexico, upon a silver basis.

In other words, at the weight ratio of 16 to 1, the silver dollar in the later seventies was ten cents cheaper than the gold dollar, and would have been used for the payment of debts, so that gold would have disappeared from circulation. It was the belief of the silver mining men and of the theoretical bimetallists that the free opening of the mints to silver would so affect the market price for both precious metals as to restore approximately the bullion ratio of 16 to 1. France and her fellow-members of the so-called Latin Monetary Union had, meanwhile, suspended the coinage of silver. Our country, for years, was engaged in negotiations with European governments on the basis of the

theory that silver and gold could be kept at a parity by an international agreement, fixing the ratio and providing for the opening of mints and the giving of full validity to both metals for monetary purposes.

But, meanwhile, our compromise measure of 1878 made the government a purchaser of not less than $2,000,000 worth of silver every month, to be coined into dollars and put into circulation. This was really token money, because the government coined on its own account, issued the silver dollars — or notes representing them — at par with gold, and maintained free interchange on the gold basis of all parts of our monetary system. But government purchase did not restore old-time ratios. The price of silver kept a downward course; Europe would not join in a bimetallic movement; the market ratio between gold and silver fell to 25 to 1, and later, for a time, to about 32 to 1. In other words, the actual amount of silver in a standard dollar came to be worth for a time only fifty cents.

After a period of years, the government's monthly purchases of silver increased under modifications of the law to 4,500,000 ounces per month, the government issuing silver certificates and depositing the bullion without attempting to coin it. The psychological effect upon the people in the West and South where silver dollars circulated freely was one that, under the given conditions, could hardly have been different. They became accustomed to actual contact with the silver dollar, and it seemed to them a sufficient monetary standard. They had crops to sell and interest to pay on mortgages. Cheap money and high prices seemed to them eminently desirable. They familiarized themselves with the idea that the Act of 1873 was a crime, and that the gold standard was a device of the Eastern and European

capitalists and money-lenders for the oppression of the producing and debtor classes.

Meanwhile, the volume of outstanding silver dollars and silver notes based upon bullion purchases became enormous. And the Treasury was finding a growing difficulty in holding enough gold reserve to preserve the faith of the country in its ability to keep the different parts of our money system interchangeable on the basis of the intrinsic value of the gold dollar. The laws were in such condition that the silver notes could be pushed into circulation by bankers and others, who hoarded greenbacks, and could use them (the volume of greenbacks being kept at $346,000,000) by a so-called "endless chain" plan to draw the government's gold reserve out of the Treasury. There seemed to be actual danger lest, in spite of ourselves, we should be thrown upon the silver basis.

Mr. Cleveland, in his second term, found himself confronted with this imminent danger. Every possible Treasury device was resorted to by the administration to keep a reserve stock of gold and maintain full monetary credit. Government bonds were issued not so much to meet exigencies due to public expenditure as to obtain fresh stocks of gold. At length, a special session of Congress was impelled in 1893 to suspend the monthly purchases of silver bullion.

This purchase device had been unsatisfactory to both sides in the great contention. It afforded a large market to silver miners; but what they wanted was the full restoration of silver as standard money, and the farmers of the South and West, from 1893 to 1896, were stirred up by an organized propaganda which was carried into every school district. Public men of both great parties were divided. The issue culminated in the election of 1896.

The silver men carried the Democratic national convention and made Mr. Bryan their standard-bearer. The Republicans were forced by the logic of the situation to what, for practical purposes, was a support of the gold standard, although they still held out some hope of a possible international arrangement. Mr. McKinley, the Republican nominee, had been friendly to the use of silver money and had hoped for the ultimate success of the bimetallic system.

From having been a less emotional and popular controversy in the earlier period, the silver question had, after 1890, aroused intense feeling and conviction. In states like Colorado it swept the whole community before it, so that in its sectional aspects it was more sharply defined, if possible, than the slavery contest had been in the fifties. In so far as it was due to selfish motives, it was a movement of the silver mining interests that were successful in stirring up the agricultural regions at a time when farms were mortgaged, prices were low, drought had devastated extensive regions, foreclosures and evictions were common, and the gold standard seemed in some subtle, unceasing way to be making it harder and harder for the farmer to obtain dollars with which to meet deferred payments.

After the so-called sound money victory of 1896, it was inevitable that the question should have recurred in 1900. But many things had happened to lessen its intensity. A great wave of prosperity had set in, and the war with Spain had given rise to new questions. With amazing rapidity, the world's production of gold had increased, and even the mining interests of the West showed quick recovery from the shock of defeat. Colorado consoled herself for a declining silver interest by a remarkable revival and expansion of her gold output.

The great money fight, like many another contest among earnest bodies of men, seems not discreditable to either side in the contest if studied fairly, even when, as in this case, the perspectives of history are still very short ones. One must study the statistics of farm values, the facts of railroad building, and all other phases of that unprecedented movement which has built up our Western states before he can pronounce judgment upon the motives and convictions that entered into our monetary contest.

Where contracts for the payment of money at deferred periods are sharply sectionalized, it is extremely difficult to make it appear to the opposing private interests that the money terms written in such contracts have the same intrinsic character at the end of the period that they had at the beginning. We have now been fortunate in having a long series of years of remarkable prosperity, during which the farms of the West have paid off their mortgages, and in which capital has become widely diffused. Conditions now existing make it easy for the government to maintain the parity on a gold basis of all parts of the monetary system. The great leaders of the battle against a gold standard, while professing to retain their theoretical views, admit that the enormous recent production of gold — together with the total change in the sectional relationships of debtor and creditor classes — have removed the money issue from the realm of immediate practical politics.

Yet the monetary system of the country is one that could be improved and strengthened in many respects, and there are questions of currency reform that ought to be dealt with in a scientific spirit at a moment when they are not involved in partisan or popular controversy, and have little if any sectional bearing. It is no part of my purpose

to discuss currency reform in a technical sense. I am merely showing how the money question has entered into political controversy in this country, and how it has inevitably been associated with all the conditions of rapid national expansion. It is the present judgment of the great business forces of the world that gold answers better than anything else for the purposes of a standard upon which to base public and private contracts for the repayment of borrowed capital, and as a commodity in which to redeem all forms of circulating currency. No single commodity, such as gold, could form a theoretically perfect standard.

Thus far, however, the money function of government throughout the civilized world has been confined in the main to a recognition of the determinations of the commercial world, and to the protection of the standard modes by which the business community agrees to carry on its transactions. It is one of the chief functions of modern government to recognize, record, and enforce private contracts. Government aids the business world by legalizing and inspecting weights and measures. Money, as the measure of value, is of such vital importance to the business world, that government from the earliest times has coined it and protected it. It has been our fate more than that of most other countries to have brought the problems of money into sharp, intense political controversy. It is now plainly the duty of government so to adjust the monetary system as to diminish, so far as possible, the range of future political controversy in that particular field.

As I have shown with regard to other questions, the economic world goes very far toward the establishment of its own laws and principles. The function of government is to keep those laws and principles in operation for the

general benefit; to protect sections and individuals against injustice, and to maintain conditions of safety and harmony.

The business of banking, quite apart from the issue of currency, is one that government very properly regulates for the protection of the community at large. For similar reasons the business of insurance is one that requires, in a peculiar sense, the oversight and regulation of government. It is easily conceivable that both banking and insurance are functions that might with comparative ease be transferred to government for direct management. In certain countries, as in Germany, there is a marked tendency toward the assumption by government of various forms of banking and insurance as a means chiefly of promoting the social and economic well-being of the poorer classes. It is not unlikely that government savings banks and forms of working-men's insurance may, in the near future, come to be strongly urged in all civilized countries as enterprises that government ought to undertake.

With us in the United States, the chief thing is to encourage men in the exercise of their own energies through protection of their opportunities. The state will not compel the working-man to save his money, but it can and should encourage him in saving it by so regulating and controlling savings banks, industrial and life insurance, and other financial and business organizations, as to safeguard the working-man's opportunities and to encourage him in thrift. Thus far in our experience of nation-making and government, political controversy over questions of an economic nature has merely brought us to the point of a better regulation of economic methods and conditions for the protection of the ordinary citizen in the exercise of a reasonable freedom of action.

IX

PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN POLICY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIP, AND EXTENSION OF SOVEREIGNTY

However sound may be the theory that a nation should never carry its political differences into questions affecting its outside relations, it is manifestly impossible to give practical effect to any such counsel of prudence. Even those who profess to stand by the old maxim that they are for their own country, right or wrong, usually insist upon their own point of view in a time of emergency. It is a difficult matter for a nation to find a consistent line of policy in its relationships with the rest of the world, and to keep domestic controversies from affecting foreign relations.

We became a nation at a time when international law, in so far as it had been evolved, was merely a body of doctrine and usage that concerned the Christian powers of Europe. Wars were frequent and devastating, alliances were shifting, reigning dynasties were frequently in closer understanding and harmony with one another than with the nations over which they ruled, and portents of great transition seemed everywhere visible.

The English retained the provinces and vast territory to the north of us, the French and Spaniards held the territory to the west and south, including Florida and the mouths of the Mississippi River. France had helped us in our war, but the events of the French Revolution had

aroused much prejudice among sober-minded and conservative Americans, while the philosophical principles of French political reform continued to fascinate the followers of Mr. Jefferson. The French had expected us to adhere to an alliance with them which might be useful in their times of need.

Our foreign relations in that early period played a large part in our internal controversies, and Washington's steady judgment was of incalculable value. His Farewell Address, counseling the nation against foreign alliances, has held its place as an authoritative document. If his views had prevailed in practical application, it is probable that we should have avoided the second war with England, the issues of which might just as well have been settled by a patient and skilful diplomacy. But that war, like the war with Mexico in 1846, and the war between the states in 1861, was largely due to the fact that we had failed as yet to secure a sufficient harmony in our domestic politics, so that the pendulum of controversy swung too far and too violently.

If our experience has taught us anything, it is that one of the best safeguards against foreign war is domestic peace; while, on the contrary, the harsh and unregulated play of political contention within a nation, due to fundamental discords, is a great hindrance to the diplomatist who would like to find peaceful solutions for differences between nations.

After the statesmanship and doctrine of the Washington period, and the mishap of our second war with England, the next great experience in our development of foreign policy and doctrine came with the announcement in 1823 of what is called the Monroe Doctrine. Our example had

been followed by the Spanish territories of Mexico, Central America, and South America, and a series of Spanish-American republics had been established with constitutions modeled upon ours. A reaction had set in among the ruling coteries of Europe, and the Holy Alliance had been formed to stop the disintegrating trend of liberalism and, incidentally, to aid Spain in the reconquest of America.

The aims of the Holy Alliance were contrary to English policy, and our government was encouraged by England in its outspoken position. John Quincy Adams was Secretary of State, while Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison were, though in retirement, still available for consultation about great policies. The Monroe Doctrine belonged to no individual, but expressed the views of all our foremost statesmen. It held that America was no longer to be regarded as a field for European colonial adventure. It was, in effect, a declaration that we would defend the independence of the new Latin-American republics, that we were opposed to the transfer of remaining American colonies from one European sovereign to another, and that we regarded the Western Hemisphere as in process of evolving a series of self-governing states, which should adopt our ideals of peace and democratic equality, and should be free from the militarism of Europe and its surviving feudal institutions.

The second war with England had settled no specific questions in controversy, but it had done a great deal to nationalize the spirit of the country. It had given us freedom and prestige on the high seas; it had taught Europe to respect us and believe in our permanence; it had ended those colonial traditions and prejudices which had given us French parties and English parties in our domestic

politics; it had destroyed the first secessionist movement, namely, that of New England as centered in the Hartford convention; it had advertised and popularized our recent purchase of the Louisiana country through our military victory at New Orleans and our assertion of exclusive control over Mississippi navigation; and it had brought forward a new set of statesmen, — notable among them being Jackson, the military hero of New Orleans; Clay and Calhoun; with men like Crawford, Webster, and Benton soon to appear as national leaders.

We had finally purchased Florida from the Spaniards, and were engaged in a triangular diplomatic dispute with Russia and England over the Oregon country. While we were completing the diplomacy for the extension of our domain, with an instinct for scientific frontiers and continental integrity, these questions were always mixed up in their motives with the divisive and sectional character of our domestic politics. The Northeast was naturally concerned about Maine, the St. Lawrence River, and our fishing rights in Canadian waters and off the coasts of Newfoundland. To our people pressing westward, the Oregon question seemed important. To our new Southwest, relations with Mexico and Spain bulked large in political significance. To the Carolinas and Florida the future of Cuba and all the developments in the West Indies and to the southward were matters of concern and anxiety.

Nationalism and sectionalism were growing side by side, with strange admixtures of motive and curious results upon public policy. Compromise statesmanship sought to mitigate sectional feeling, in the hope that time might lessen the tendency to division, while increasing national power and influence. I have shown in previous pages how the

acquisition of Texas for slave territory led to the purchase of California for freedom. The long contest over the Oregon country was settled by a diplomatic compromise which was infinitely better than war, however disappointing to those Americans who claimed a much larger strip of country west of Lake Superior.

This settlement came at a time when the South was friendly to England through reason of its expanding cotton trade; and our own sectional animosities stood in the way of our securing in the far Northwest a boundary line which could have been asserted with success, in all probability, if we had been harmonious among ourselves. As one studies the rather inglorious chapters of our political and diplomatic history in the period from 1825 to 1860, it seems a matter of good fortune and of adventitious circumstance, rather than of consistent statesmanship, that — excepting for the Mexican episode in the forties — we were not drawn into foreign war.

But all our crucial questions, domestic and foreign alike, were accumulating and were gradually shaping themselves along the line of our internal sectional cleavage. There was no way to settle these things by a foreign war, and so we fought them out among ourselves. At the end of the Civil War period we were in position to command the respect of Europe, and to make our views felt in all matters that concerned our outside relationships.

In the first year of our war, England, France, and Spain had jointly agreed to intervene in Mexico and change the government of that republic on slight pretexts of debts neglected and grievances of private citizens unredressed. Mr. Seward, as Secretary of State, could protest in a dignified way in diplomatic correspondence, but we were

powerless to do anything else. Meanwhile, England and Spain disagreed with France, and Napoleon III pursued the adventure alone, making a successful invasion and placing Maximilian of Austria in power as dynastic head of a new Mexican empire.

At the close of the war, General Grant sent an army to the Rio Grande to support the Mexican patriots, the French troops were withdrawn from the country, Maximilian's imperialist movement came to a fatal end, and the Mexican republic was reëstablished under our auspices and protection. We were forgiven at last for having taken Texas and California, and Europe discovered more about the Monroe Doctrine through a concrete lesson than could possibly have been learned through volumes of dissertation or diplomatic correspondence.

England, through our war period, had been in a state of divided sentiment. Obviously, our blockade of Southern ports and our creation of England's cotton famine had brought immense loss and distress upon that country. Our commerce, in turn, had suffered from Confederate cruisers and privateers in the equipment of which the South had made use of private British aid, and we claimed that this might have been prevented by greater vigilance on the part of the British government. Canada, meanwhile, throughout the war, had been sympathetic toward the cause of the North. The Southern statesmen felt that England had given them encouragement and made them promises which were wholly unfulfilled. Thus, at the end of the contest in 1865, the North had its deep grievances against England, while the South was almost equally bitter.

That was the moment when statesmanship failed us, with the assassination of Mr. Lincoln — the greatest single

disaster that ever befell our country. Mr. Lincoln would have enlisted the coöperation of General Lee and the best minds of the South; would have restored the Southern states in a spirit of brotherhood; would have avoided the mistake of immediate negro suffrage and its attendant Reconstruction horrors; would have used Southern rather than Northern troops to cause the expulsion of the French from Mexico. He would have been prepared to meet the questions at issue with England with a united country behind him greatly superior at that moment in its military and naval strength to any other power in the world. But after the death of Lincoln, our statesmanship dragged itself through a morass of sectional bitterness and fallacy and purely futile coercion, and could not find those moments of calm vision necessary to a just forecast of the future.

The British government was sufficiently apologetic and regretful. At that time the Dominion of Canada had not been formed. The British provinces in North America were separate from each other. All the country west of the province of Ontario was merely a hunting and trapping wilderness in which the Hudson Bay Company bought furs, trafficked with the Indians, and exercised government. Mr. Seward had, indeed, a capacity for large views, and at a fortunate moment he improved the opportunity to buy Alaska from the Russians. The British government, in token of good-will and to repair all errors of the past, offered to give us its great territories of the Northwest, which would have added almost as much to our domain as the entire extent of the United States.

In our blindness and fatuity, we preferred a lawsuit to collect damages for Confederate inroads upon our commerce, — due, as we claimed, indirectly to British negli-

gence in preventing the Confederates from fitting out a few commerce-destroyers in British ports. At that time the Canadian colonies exercised no jurisdiction over the British Northwestern country, and made no pretense of even a moral claim to it. As I have said, with intentional repetition, one of the greatest objects of a far-seeing national statesmanship, is the acquisition of contiguous, unoccupied territory, for purposes of national expansion. Jefferson had strained the Constitution to make the Louisiana Purchase, and had sent the Lewis and Clark Expedition to the Columbia River and the Oregon country at a period when our movement of settlement had scarcely crossed the Alleghanies and the Blue Ridge. But sixty years later, after we had acquired California, chartered the transcontinental railroads, developed Oregon, and were purchasing Alaska, our public men declined to accept as a free gift those vast and noble regions which now comprise Manitoba, British Columbia, the intervening province of Alberta, the great wheat-growing country called Saskatchewan, and the mineral wealth of the Yukon.

Further than that, the British government was prepared to settle, in a generous spirit, all the long-standing questions about fishing rights and many other matters of detail that had survived in the Northeast from the Revolutionary period. But not to stop there, Great Britain was quite willing to go the final length, and give its consent to our annexation of the Maritime Provinces, Upper and Lower Canada, and Newfoundland. It was a period of such friendly sentiments toward us on the part of the Canadian colonies, and of such need on their part of close trade relations with us, that annexation would have been welcome to them.

War, whatever the excuses for it, is attended by many penalties. One of the greatest penalties we have had to pay has been in the obscuring of our perceptions as to wise and far-reaching policies. In the bitterness of sectionalism and in the stress of a vicious political life tainted by the venality and corruption of the speculative period following the Civil War, wisdom was dismissed, and the spirit of foresight was wholly lost. A constructive statesmanship would have helped to put the South on its feet and would have acquired the whole of British North America in an atmosphere of universal good-will. But nations, as individuals, have to learn wisdom through discipline of hard experience; and, where a better destiny fails them through their inability to rise to their supreme opportunities, they must do the best they can with the narrower chances that will come to them when, at later periods, they have recovered somewhat the ability to see clearly and act sensibly.

We made the treaty of Washington with England and set up the Geneva arbitration under which we recovered a few millions of dollars. We had established arbitration as a method of settling differences with England, in consequence of which we lost and paid an absurd price in a later arbitration to settle the claims of Canadian fishermen against us, while, years afterward, we lost again in a contention regarding the Alaska fur-bearing seals. At a far later date we settled the dispute about the Alaska boundary by means of a tribunal which we knew in advance would ratify our claim to a continuous Alaska coast-line, which we should not in any case have surrendered.

All these contentions which have entered more or less into our political life, which have affected our tariff contro-

versies, and which have endangered our foreign relations on several occasions, would have been settled in a final and comprehensive way if we had accepted the whole of British North America at the end of our Civil War and had devoted ourselves to the harmonious up-building of the North American continent.

There would never have arisen any further question as to the extension of our domains. Our ideals of a homogeneous people, using the same language and governing themselves in communities based upon British institutions with the customs and principles of the common law, would have been promoted in the largest possible way. Our friendliness with Great Britain would have been assured, because no questions of dispute would have remained.

But our politicians rejected this large opportunity to settle all foreign questions and to fix forever our destinies as the foremost power of the world. Instead of this, they nagged England on all occasions, encouraged Irish Fenianism, and alienated the Canadians, our natural friends, by a harsh commercial policy. Our treaty of reciprocity with Canada expired in 1866, and we failed to renew it. Whatever had been its merits or its faults from the standpoint of commercial details, there were large social and political advantages arising from close relations with Canada. And it had been the general opinion that at some moment when the British government found sufficient reason for willingness to withdraw from North America, the Canadian provinces would gladly enter our Union as states through natural affinity, and through gravitation of a sort even stronger than that which had brought Texas and California into the American fold.

But the dominant politics at Washington, after Lincoln's death, occupied itself with the attempt to impeach President Johnson, to reconstruct the South on a false basis, to develop and exploit the West in a spirit subsequently revealed by the Credit Mobilier investigations, and to encourage the new protectionist movement at the very point where it was most to be deprecated. Much, indeed, might be said for the broad tariff theories of those who desired to stimulate our major lines of manufacture — iron and steel products, textiles, pottery, glass, and the like. But to turn all the permanent forces of Canada's economic development away from normal lines for the sake of excluding a few fishermen and farmers from our markets, was to travesty the principles of protectionism.

Our one great opportunity for expansion lay to the northward, where, until a few years ago, there was no settlement or development of any consequence except within a narrow zone along our own frontier. One fatuous policy after another, upon our part, has now indefinitely postponed the possibility of our Northern and Northwestern growth. The sons of our Western farmers are flocking by the scores of thousands into the Canadian Northwest; and they will help to build up Canadian provinces rather than American states. It would have been better for everybody concerned to have had one great nation occupying our continent north of the Mexican line. Until recently it was an ideal of easy realization. Each year, as it passes, makes that solution more difficult and less probable. The resources of Canada will be developed chiefly by the capital and energy of the citizens of the United States, and we shall lose to another power — just as Europe has lost to us — in the transfer of money, men, and productive energy.

Under the circumstances, there remains for the time being only one thing to do; namely, to settle detailed questions of difference with Canada, to promote the best possible relations, and to encourage rather than discourage mutual trade and intercourse of all kinds, on the sound principle that one's nearest neighbors should be one's best and most useful friends. But an artificial frontier two or three thousand miles long — stretching across a wilderness which we ourselves had the energy and means to develop with a rapidity unprecedented in the history of the world — should never have been allowed to become hardened and established as a permanent dividing line between nations whose trade policies would thereby have to abandon their natural courses.

The Monroe Doctrine, meanwhile, has had its further development until it is no longer to be explained by mere reference to the language of 1823 or to the situations that then existed. As it has grown, it may be termed an expression of the feeling of the people of the United States about the conditions and destinies of the Western Hemisphere as a whole, made influential by concrete tests. It does not pledge us to any line of action in a given case, and it is not inconsistent with any line of policy we may choose to adopt in our relations with other parts of the world.

We have always recognized the fact that Europe would trade extensively with all American countries, would have some difficulties with them, and some complex relationships. We have always been tolerant of the fact that European colonies had survived in America from an earlier period. But our general attitude has been opposed to reconquests or further extensions of European sovereignty, and we have

been openly favorable to the establishment of independent governments of a republican form throughout the Western world. We have endeavored at different times and in a variety of ways to promote the settlement of disputes between Central and South American powers and European governments on such a basis as to avoid European naval expeditions and the seizure and occupancy of American seaports. South American governments have been so turbulent and unstable that it has required great tact and effort on our part, at the expense of many misunderstandings, to help them keep their independence through the period necessary for their firm establishment.

When the rest of Latinic America was breaking away from Europe, the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico were held by Spain. One revolution had succeeded another in Cuba, with much aid and encouragement privately rendered from this country. And on several occasions we had come near the point of official intervention. For seventy-five years Americans had regarded the Spanish yoke as temporary, and had expected that Cuba would either become an independent republic or be absorbed by this country. Our attitude toward Cuba had been affected not only by the geographical nearness of the island, but also by our large interest in the sugar and tobacco which were the chief export crops of the island.

The Cuban revolt of 1895 had followed, after a lapse of only a few years, a ten-years' struggle for independence. It soon reached a form peculiarly disastrous to all interests. The revolutionists had no access to the sea, but were safe and strong in the highlands and forests of the interior. The Spaniards accumulated on the island a force of approximately two hundred thousand men. The Spaniards could

not prevail against the tactics of an enemy that retreated and fought no battles, and the revolutionists could neither drive the Spaniards from the fortified places on the seaboard, nor prevent the bringing of recruits and supplies by water. It was a deadlocked situation which resulted in a maximum of suffering and gave no prospect of early solution. Spain was exhausting her resources with no honorable way of withdrawal, and Cuba was the victim of a warfare which was destroying women and children.

The people of the United States could see no solution short of the complete withdrawal of Spain from the Western Hemisphere. Spain, on the other hand, could promise reforms of administration, but could not give up technical sovereignty in the West Indies, because any cabinet or dynasty at Madrid consenting to such surrender would have been overthrown before the process was complete. Whatever, from the standpoint of international law or political doctrine, might have been said by way of excuse for American intervention, there arose a tide of public opinion which swept all things before it. The intention of the American people was not to enter upon a quarrel, but to end one; not to make war, but to do a piece of police work and establish conditions of stable peace where war had been more or less chronic for three quarters of a century. In several weeks the task was accomplished. Cuba had become a burden to Spain, and compulsory withdrawal was a merciful relief to the people of the Iberian Peninsula who were paying not only the heavy pecuniary tax of the war, but also the heavier tax that made sacrifice of their sons in the hopeless attempt to hold East Indian and West Indian possessions by military force.

Many things have resulted from our adventure in 1898

for the liberation of Cuba. We were compelled to reorganize our army and to develop our navy. We were drawn into various currents of international relationship from which we had expected to keep ourselves relatively free. An attempt to emancipate Cuba had forced us to offensive-defensive action in the Pacific to protect our coasts against the Philippine fleet of the Spaniards. We had destroyed that fleet at Manila, had come into temporary occupation of the Philippine archipelago, and in the final settlement with Spain had kept the Philippine Islands, largely through England's influence, in order to prevent their falling into the hands of some other power.

We could easily have annexed Cuba, and with some show of reason. But, at the outbreak of the war, in order to exhibit to the world our disinterestedness, we had denied any purpose of conquest. We had not even dreamed of such a thing as acquiring the Philippines, and our desire for colonial empire was even less than our fitness for it. But, in the end, we kept the Philippines through the logical process of excluding all other solutions one by one. We precipitated thereby a great domestic political controversy over an issue which called itself "imperialism."

It was a wholesome contest, because it forced us to a searching of hearts and a clarifying of motives. It drove us to the clear perception that the acquisition and government of outlying possessions was for us an exceptional and an abnormal matter, rather than an orderly and desirable development of our political life and system. In the great debate of the year 1900, the country specifically accepted and justified our Philippine policy in view of the circumstances that surrounded it. But the country held the party in power to ordinances of self-denial and altruism, in respect

of the Philippines, that were even more exacting than those accepted in the case of Cuba. We were not to exploit the Philippines for our own political or commercial benefit, were not to subject them to the carpet-bag rule of adventurous or discredited Americans, were not to use them as a key to future domination in the Pacific.

Our principles of action in the Philippines were defined in the system for governing them established by Mr. Root as Secretary of War and put into operation by Mr. Taft as Governor-General. It was a policy for the immediate creation of municipal and local self-governing units; for the opening of all positions in the civil service by preference to native Filipinos; for the military policing of the islands by natives; for the universal establishment of schools; for an improved administration of justice under appropriate civil and penal codes, with native judges in so far as possible; for the election of a Philippine legislature at the earliest possible date; for tariff and tax systems favorable to Philippine revenue and trade, and for the postponement of the question of ultimate sovereignty until the Philippines should actually have come into existence as a political entity.

This Philippine undertaking has already proved a costly and difficult one, but its lessons have been so salutary as to have justified it. It has placed upon our government delicate responsibilities, which have changed our whole attitude toward the world at large. It has sobered and dignified our diplomacy, and has reacted very favorably upon our political conditions at home. It has led us to a deeper study of all the problems of politics and administration, and has strengthened, rather than weakened, our belief in the old American ideal of a homogeneous republic. Porto

Rico is comparatively small, and we can doubtless afford to give the Porto Rican people as individuals the status of American citizens, — while developing in their island, as in the Hawaiian group, a form of republican self-government suited to their conditions, and giving it a political membership in our sisterhood of states analogous to that of a territory. But the Philippines are more distant, and presumably have in store a different destiny.

At some future time, opposing views about that destiny may take the form of a live political problem in this country. But, for the present, the Philippine question in its larger bearing has been met, and the result has been accepted by both parties. There will be difference of opinion about the extent of the concessions we should grant to Philippine products in our markets, and many other questions of detail will obtrude themselves, and will help to round out the programs of self-praise and of accusation, as parties wage their periodical campaigns.

The fact that we were present in the Philippines with a considerable military force, enabled us to take an important part in the joint expedition of the Powers which followed the Boxer uprising against foreigners in China. It enabled us also to exert more influence than we should otherwise have had on behalf of what was called the "open door" in China at a time when Russia seemed on the point of annexing Manchuria and Korea, with a view to monopolizing their trade. It gave us added weight in the making of international opinion against the dismemberment of the Chinese Empire.

Not least important of the events and policies that followed our undertaking on behalf of Cuba, was the determination that an isthmian canal must be built, and that it

must be under the political guarantee and control of the United States. In a period before the Civil War, when a canal project seemed likely to be realized, England and the United States signed the so-called "Bulwer-Clayton Treaty," which was meant to secure political neutrality for the canal, the other great powers of Europe being expected to add their signatures to the treaty. The agreement covered various matters, the terms of which were at once disregarded by both powers. The document was never urged upon the continental countries for their signature. The immediate project of canal digging to which it referred was abandoned. The treaty existed merely as a paper instrument which, according to official declarations of many American Presidents and Secretaries of State, had never gone into effect, and was not to be regarded as of any validity.

In the seventies and eighties, American capitalists undertook to secure construction of the canal by the Nicaragua route, while M. de Lesseps, the builder of the Suez Canal, under a concession from Colombia, was entering with great enthusiasm upon the project of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. Both of these projects proved too large for private capitalists. The French Company had spent fabulous sums, and failed under scandalous circumstances. Such was the situation when an American battleship on our Pacific coast made its memorable voyage around the continent of South America in order to join our fleet in Cuban waters. The same sort of irresistible public opinion which had driven us to liberate Cuba forced the government to adopt the policy of building an isthmian canal as a part of our shore line for purposes of defense.

I am speaking of political policy, and not of matters less

essentially related thereto. And so I shall not dwell upon those chapters of recent history which led to our abandonment of the Nicaragua route after we had chosen it, and to our purchase from the French Company of its assets and rights at Panama. Nor shall I discuss the mistake of the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty, which, in abrogating — for purposes of good form — the discredited Bulwer-Clayton convention, went much farther and provided that a canal to be constructed at the cost of the United States Treasury should be neutralized under the political guarantee of all the maritime powers of Europe. The treaty was revised, and we retained the right, which in any case we should have exercised, to control our own canal; although we solemnly pledged ourselves to do what no one had asked of us, namely, to give all powers, for their ships of war as well as of commerce, exactly the same use of the canal as we retained for ourselves.

We had failed after the war between the states to avail ourselves of our easy opportunity to fix forever the form of our development by acquiring British North America. We were now, after our war with Spain, in a mood of domestic harmony. Sectionalism no longer disturbed our grasp upon larger policies. The determination to build an isthmian canal of some sort, like the first vote of money for the Cuban expedition, was with almost absolute unanimity in Congress. We had acquired Porto Rico, had secured coaling and naval stations from Cuba, and had provided for a Cuban republic under the terms of what was virtually an American protectorate. We had acquired the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, and the Philippines. The completion of our larger policy required an isthmian canal under our own control, as a virtual extension of our coast-line.

To construct such a canal did not mean that we should annex the republics north of it nor unduly dominate those south of it. But it meant, of necessity, an important development of our policy toward those republics, and toward the future of the West Indies and the Caribbean Sea. It was, in every sense, to the interest of the South American Republic of Colombia to have our government purchase the assets of the failed French Company and build the Panama Canal. But the government of Colombia at that moment was neither responsible nor representative, and it adopted a mercenary policy which defeated its own objects. The Isthmus of Panama declared its independence from Colombia, our government promptly recognized and protected its withdrawal, the canal zone was purchased from the new government at Panama rather than from the authorities at Bogota, the Republic of Panama was established under our auspices and virtual guarantee, and the President proceeded to carry on the work of construction where the French Company had left it off.

The completion of the canal must have a profound effect upon our future development as well as upon that of other countries. It will have a tendency to bring the turbulent Central-American republics into a state of order necessary to their economic development. It would seem not improbable that they might be led to a permanent confederation in union with the Republic of Panama, under the same sort of guarantee for internal order and sound finance as now protects both Panama and Cuba. It is to be assumed, further, that our close relations with Mexico will develop of themselves without need of written guarantees. As respects San Domingo and Haiti, our natural policy will be one of endeavor to save them from too

frequent revolutions at home, and financial misadventures abroad. The ratification of the San Domingo treaty early in 1907 was more significant than was commonly understood. That treaty will enable us to protect financial interests and to aid in the orderly progress of a rich but turbulent island republic.

As for Venezuela and Colombia, our desire will be to help keep them afloat as republics until able and wise men safely control their destinies. It is to be expected that the growth of their economic interests may give them, for a time, a stability like that of Mexico, after which they may develop a citizenship much more capable than at present of keeping domestic peace and carrying on the institutions of government. As Brazil and the Argentine Republic and Chili go forward in their present development of wealth and political stability, the Monroe Doctrine, so far as they are concerned, will mean only a friendly recognition of the earlier good intentions of the United States. As the ideals of peace and justice advance in the world, republics situated like these three have less and ever less to fear from external foes.

It was a serious moment when President Cleveland and Mr. Olney took steps which made it necessary for England and Venezuela to accept arbitration in order to fix a permanent and final boundary line between the helpless republic and the ever encroaching colony of British Guiana. But it was an instance in the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine that was salutary in the end. It has led to a successive rectification of frontiers in South America and North America by diplomatic negotiation, and in several cases by arbitration, with the result of doing away with differences which might have led to war. It was a step,

furthermore, which made it easier for a later administration to end a European raid upon Venezuela — with a blockade and a prospective seizure of territory — on the pretext of collecting various private debts. The authority of our government caused the withdrawal of the expedition, the submission of pecuniary claims to proper tribunals, and the payment of the awards by an orderly process.

Such steps on the part of our government will help to bring about permanent conditions of peace and order in the world through the establishment of right doctrines respecting governmental intervention in matters of private business. Our South American neighbors have developed principles and ideals of law, government, and international relationship that are far in advance of the average conditions of their citizenship. But the ideals of leadership may greatly affect in the end the training of a body of citizens capable of social self-control and of the working of political institutions. It is no time to lose faith in democratic government, whether for ourselves or for other nations. On the contrary, we have arrived at a period in our national progress when it would seem possible for us to advance along the lines of those principles with better assurance and less agitation than at any previous moment.

We were able to carry out our Cuban policy with good effect, because it had the overwhelming approval of our own public opinion regardless of party. Our latest intervention in the affairs of Cuba has been effective through its reasonableness, its practical usefulness, and the unbroken support it has received from every right-minded organ of American opinion. If the Democrats should succeed the Republicans in power, they could do nothing else for Porto Rico, Hawaii,

or the Philippines than to emulate the present administration in its sincere effort to promote human well-being in those island dependencies.

The completion of the Panama Canal will benefit all nations, and it will come in the fullness of time for our own developments of trade. It will give us convenient access to the South American and Oriental seaports at a time when the further development of our manufactures will make it necessary for us to apply ourselves in earnest to the cultivation of our foreign commerce. It will strengthen us in the strategic sense, because it will enable our ships of war to pass quickly from our Atlantic to our Pacific coast. It will bring us into closer relations with South America in ways that will strengthen our influence and aid in the stable progress of Brazil and the Spanish-speaking republics.

Our recent experiences have been useful in that they have sufficed to show us that we do not wish to extend our governmental authority any further if we can avoid it, with the one great exception of our growing willingness to join fortunes with Canada, if, at some future time, the Dominion should so desire. At present, the Dominion is in a position at once very favorable and very uncertain. Belonging nominally to the British Empire, it is under the protection of England's great fleet. But its chief protection lies in the policy and the good-will of the United States. So long as Canada avoids participation in Old World broils and disputes, this country can permit no foreign power to interfere with the Dominion's peace and self-directed activities.

England has vast interests in all parts of the world. Canada has had no part in the creation of those interests, and none whatever in their management or control, nor

have they ministered in any way to her profit or security. With England's adventure against Dutch republics in South Africa, Canada had no proper relationship of any sort. It was a fundamental error of the most dangerous kind for Canada to send troops to South Africa, and thus take a voluntary part in the war of a great empire against two minute republics. For it is obvious, on a moment's reflection, that Germany or some other European power might have become involved in the contest against England, and Canada's meddling in the strife would have justified a transfer of the scene of hostilities to North America. But nothing could be more fundamentally contrary to the policy under which we tolerate the political separateness of the country north of us, than the habit of participation in European, Asiatic, and African wars.

If Canada may join England in foreign wars over questions that do not concern Canada, the result, under the established rules of international law, might be the conquest of a part or the whole of the Dominion by a European power or coalition. But this, in turn, would disturb the reasonable conditions of tranquillity which we have prescribed for the proper development of North America. So long as England is at peace, Canada is in a favorable position, because her security is jointly guaranteed by England and the United States. But if Canada should regard herself as a militant vassal of the chief naval power of Europe, her position might, at some future time, cause us very serious disturbance.

From her own standpoint, Canada has four possible futures. From our standpoint, she has only two. As it appears at Ottawa, she may, first, continue in the present anomalous and ill-defined relationship to the British

Empire; second, she may take a representative and responsible part in helping to govern the British Empire, along the line of Mr. Chamberlain's imperial federation projects; third, she may become an independent member of the family of nations, having close relations with England and the United States, but exercising full sovereignty on her own behalf; or, fourth, she may return to the views of thirty years ago and accept annexation.

From the standpoint of the development of our policy, on the other hand, Canada, must cut loose from European political ties and accept full responsibility as a member of the family of nations, or else merge her political destinies with ours. As I have said, we missed the opportunity for an ideal solution forty years ago, and all parties at interest must now await — in patience and with friendliness and self-control, though some dread may attend the waiting — the arrival of that inevitable crisis which will compel Canada to make a decision.

We have come to a period when the complexity of human interests makes strife of all kinds too costly and undesirable to be entertained in a spirit of recklessness. As I have tried to show in all these discussions, our citizenship is specializing and perfecting its instruments of government, while the government is ever trying to build up an effective citizenship. We seek in the field of domestic politics to reduce by all reasonable means the areas of controversy. The supreme effort of our administration at the present moment, is so to mediate between the conflicting forces of our industrial and economic life as to prevent the hardening of antagonisms and the development of another political contest as extreme and as intense as the money fight, and others through which we have already passed.

With these efforts to keep our internal political life sane, moderate, reasonable, and progressive, a like tendency is observable in our relationships toward other countries. The ideals of nationalism still hold men firmly, and we shall not make progress toward world harmony in our age from any other standpoint. Russia will insist upon development as a Russian nationality, irrespective of those political convulsions which attend her efforts to modernize her institutions. United Italy, united Germany, triumphant Japan, and France despite all drawbacks, choose to face the future in their distinct and separate rôles as nations, impelled by their own aims and held together by their own bonds of association, making up what, in our first chapter, we discussed as constituting the modern state.

We in the United States must accept the responsibility of a great place among the nations. We must be strong for the sake of our destiny, our dignity, our influence, and our usefulness. The fact that we have a beneficial theory of progress for the Western Hemisphere republics, which we sometimes exemplify in practical emergencies, and which we call the Monroe Doctrine, cannot divest us of one single shred of the responsibility that may fall to us in helping to work out in an orderly and peaceful way the problems of the Pacific Ocean and the Farther East. It was our mission to introduce Japan to the nations of the Western world, and our relations with Korea and China have been exceptional in their friendliness and in their power to bear fruit in future offices of usefulness and good-will.

Our experience has sufficed to convince us that we wish to govern ourselves with a common language and under familiar laws and customs, upon the continent of North America. The responsibilities of greatness and power will

be costly, for we shall have to maintain a powerful navy, and be prepared at all moments to do our share toward keeping the world's peace and order. But it will be the business of our statesmanship to remove causes of disagreement in every direction, and to seek the establishment at home and abroad of high standards of justice.

There has never been so wide-spread harmony in matters political throughout the United States as in these years of the first decade of the twentieth century. There are many questions of disagreement, but the margins of difference are narrow, the demand for honesty and public spirit in political life is clear and strong, and one party might succeed the other in control of administration without shock or strain, certainly without violent reversals of accustomed policy. And as there has been unusual agreement in the field of domestic political life, so also there has been unprecedented harmony in our relationships with other countries.

We have never been on terms of cordiality more sincere and unfeigned with England, France, and Germany, than at the present time. Spain begins to perceive that we rendered her an inestimable service at the end of the nineteenth century, and that we did it without ill-will, though in a rude and humiliating manner. The ill-will of Colombia, on account of our virtual seizure of Panama, will disappear with the realization of the vast benefits that Colombia, beyond any other South American country, is to receive from a canal that connects her frontages on two oceans. Japanese statesmanship is too intelligent to misunderstand a policy that deliberately proposes to build up the American states, from Maine to California, upon the basis of a citizenship of unmixed white population, with economic and political standards unmodified by Asiatic immigration.

The time is evidently one favorable for progress not merely in friendly sentiment among nations, but also for substantial gains in methods by which to prevent war and to diminish the chances of serious dispute. It is a time for progress in the rules and agreements which make up the so-called law of nations, and for the further development of influence and authority in world conferences and tribunals like the limited one held in 1906 for our hemisphere at Rio, and the general ones that assemble from time to time at The Hague. If not just now, then in the comparatively near future there should appear such political progress in the domestic life of nations and in their relations with one another, as to make it easily possible to reduce the burden of armaments, to get rid of the manifold evils of militarism, and to distribute equitably the duties of international police work.

But it must be a good while yet before any scheme of international organization can subordinate to itself the aims and ambitions of developing peoples whose patriotism centers in their allegiance to their own country. And as their patriotism grows in a diffused intelligence, it would seem inevitable that their political life should take on our own democratic spirit, if not our precise democratic forms. Our political growth and experience in America has demonstrated the wisdom of those who founded our institutions; and with an amazing transformation of facilities and social conditions, we seem not to have changed the essential aims of our political structure, which are those of orderly freedom, of equal opportunity, and of democratic brotherhood upon a high level of intelligence and social well-being.

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